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S A l l y  C h i v E r S  A n d  n i C o l E  M A r k o T i C‘
l
In this compilation we have gathered a set of essays that explore rep-
resentations of disability on film. One of the quickest paths to critical 
acclaim for an able-bodied actor is to play a physically disabled char-
acter in a manner that a largely uninformed audience finds convincing. 
Filmic narrative fictions rarely ignore disability. Examples of lauded per-
formances include those by Daniel Day Lewis (my Left Foot), Tom Hanks 
(Philadelphia), Sean Penn (I Am Sam), and Hilary Swank (million Dollar 
Baby).1 As David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder point out in Narrative Pros-
thesis, disability in narrative is both excessively visible and conversely 
invisible (15). Rather than absent, as other stigmatized social identities 
can be (for example, films can entirely avoid lead female or racialized 
roles), disability is highly and continuously present on-screen. However, 
it is not always agential. Often, disabled bodies appear in order to shore 
up a sense of normalcy and strength in a presumed-to-be able-bodied 
audience. In this book we follow this argument into narrative film, noting 
the contradiction between how many characters in films display disabil-
ities and how seldom reviewers and audiences “notice” disability as a 
feature within the film. This characteristic disability haunting of contem-
porary film merits critical scrutiny and warrants a set of critical terms 
that separate disability studies from past film criticism. In what follows, 
we focus on critical notions of “projection” and filmic constructions of 
“problem bodies” to contribute such scrutiny and such terms.
 Filmic narrative often aligns the bodies it represents with an elusive 
and ideal norm of the human body that William Blake designated “the 
 1. All films cited and discussed in the essays are listed in the Filmography at the end of the book.
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human abstract.”2 Most bodies are presented as normative by default, 
implicitly—self-evidently, or so it might appear to a viewer—achieving 
the norm, while other bodies are designated “abnormal,” failing to 
achieve, or even to aspire to, that norm. As Robert Bogdan, quoting his 
young son in his pivotal publication Freak Show, points out, typically, in 
mainstream films, when characters “look bad” they “are bad” (6). Fre-
quently, a disabled body is represented as a metaphor for emotional or 
spiritual deficiency. Unlike normative filmic bodies that literally advance 
the plot, the disabled body often exists primarily as a metaphor for a body 
that is unable to do so.3 Rarely do films come along like Crispin Hellion 
Glover’s, David Brothers’ and Steven C. Stewart’s It is fine! EVERYTHING 
IS FINE! a film written by and starring a disabled actor, which presents a 
disabled character as exactly that—disabled, yet still a fully participating 
character in the film.4  So what happens when a disabled body metaphori-
cally becomes a site of projected identity? The essays collected in this 
anthology take on the poetics and politics of that question.
 Projecting disability
In this book we analyze the “projection” of disability. We include in 
our analysis the act of the film projector displaying disability as well 
as what film viewers project—in the sense of prediction—disability to 
be. According to Sigmund and Anna Freud, projection is an emotional 
defense mechanism, whereby one attributes one’s own negative or unac-
ceptable thoughts and emotions to others.5 Rey Chow, in her book on 
cultural otherness, Ethics after Idealism, discusses the notion of fascism 
as “projection, surface phenomena, everyday practice, which does 
away with the distinction between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’” (19). 
In writing about fascism through the lens of Freudian projection, Chow 
 2. Blake speaks, for the most part, about the human soul. But his notion that “we” need to make 
others poor or unhappy in order to recognize our own satisfaction speaks to the us-them relationship 
that normalizes the body as well as the spirit (Plate 47).
 3. So, for example, in the film Shallow Hal, the Jack Black character “evolves” emotionally into the 
kind of man who could love a “fat chick,” while Gwyneth Paltrow’s character remains a physically 
repellent figure, but one who audiences must learn to see as “beautiful on the inside.”
 4. Although none of the films in this collection address It is fine! EVERYTHING IS FINE! much 
could be said about the representations of heterosexual masculinity in the film, as well as the ways in 
which the film disjunctively approaches the too-often-taboo subject of sex and disability.
 5. Citing her father’s book Some Neurotic mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality, Anna 
Freud labels projection as a “defensive method” (43) that immature egos (she speaks predominantly 
of children) employ “as a means of repudiating their own activities and wishes when these become 
dangerous and of laying the responsibility for them at the door of some external agent” (123).
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insists that the more obvious meaning of projection, that is, “as an act 
of thrusting or throwing forward, an act that causes an image to appear 
on a surface” (21), shifts the discussion of a subject’s anxiety mediated 
via expulsion (from the inside to the outside) to one where the subject’s 
apparent lack collides with and thus forms a surface. Film, says Chow, is 
the external image that represents both the act of expulsion and projected 
otherness.
 Chow’s discussion offers an analysis of the ways in which film cre-
ates a literal surface upon which narrative projects identity. Spectator-
ship (both public cinema viewings and private DVD rentals) allows audi-
ence members to take on the unique and contradictory position of what 
we call the “panopticon voyeur.” Film critics since Laura Mulvey6 have 
outlined and analyzed the myriad ways that film audiences embody the 
hidden nature of the voyeur. But as the panopticon’s power relies on its 
dwellers’ awareness of being observed, few critics speak to the normal-
izing power of projected viewing audiences. Unlike the literary notion 
of the “ideal reader,” the panopticon voyeurs of film shape and establish 
subject matter, cultural representations, and even changed endings (in the 
case of audience test screenings). For an example of how projected audi-
ences determine race representations, one has only to look at the contrast 
between Disney’s Pocahontas and mulan films, both of which focus on 
“real” historical figures. The former, for the most part, was directed at 
non-indigenous audiences, and subsequent criticisms of its racism and 
historical inaccuracies did not affect its box-office success. For the latter, 
however, Disney, keen to promote films in China, strove to ensure geo-
graphical and historical accuracy. The film was, for the most part, praised 
for its cultural sensitivity and artistic renditions of local landmarks and a 
brave heroine. Although at the time of its filming, Disney did not know 
whether or not the Chinese government would permit wide distribution 
of mulan, the studio treated future Chinese audiences as both subject 
and object, as spectators who would have a vested (and thus a control-
ling) interest in the bodies projected on-screen. Chow would say of these 
binary positions that, as subjects, spectators react to the filmic narrative 
also as studio projections, as viewers assumed by the industry to have a 
participating and controlling interest in the storyline and its unfolding. 
These projected viewers also act as objects: they accept the film as spec-
tacle and their own physical selves as Disney fodder; they accept the 
graphic images on-screen as representative of their bodies as national 
story. The panopticon voyeur, then, straddles a position between passive 
 6. For explication of film and voyeurism, see critics Mary Ann Doane, bell hooks, Christian Metz, 
and Linda Williams.
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observer and normalizing surveyor, playing a role both in the film’s ulti-
mate screening and in how a film projects its characters.
 Disability activists frequently point out that those who live long 
enough eventually become disabled; the statistical probability that a por-
tion of life will be lived with a disability increases with age. This dis-
ability axiom strategically implicates a wide public under the disability 
rubric with the political goal of broadening an activist base.7 In keeping 
with this axiom, we argue in this book that there are many ways of living 
with disability. Narrative film presents some of those ways. How expe-
rience is represented textually and how that representation is projected 
onto and via audiences are both central aspects of the experience itself. 
That is, the representation of disability does not exist separate from dis-
ability itself. Accordingly, we propose that—disabled or not—when “we” 
all watch a film, we all participate in disability discourse.8
 Film theory requires disability analysis and critique, particularly 
because of its longstanding attention to spectatorship and to the gaze. 
While the gaze is a form of physicality that disability studies seeks to 
redirect, the mis-assumed relationship between looking and knowing is 
particularly salient to film reception. In front of a screen—in an audience-
directed cinema or individually at home—lies a space for a normative 
and deviant public not just to look but to stare at disabled figures without 
censure.9 Before the screen lies a place where many people can take an 
extended look at the disabled body and live comfortably or even uncom-
fortably with their reactions, be they to shudder, to desire, to identify, to 
pity, to turn away. While we intervene in scholarly debates about projec-
tion and the gaze by refusing to accept the filmic frame as seamless rep-
resentation, we recognize the value of film analysis and movie watching. 
While we challenge basic tenets of film theory, presuming to redirect 
them, we also recognize that a collection of essays such as this one con-
tributes to film theory’s continued but expanded relevance to contempo-
rary social issues, notably those involving disability.
 7. As James I. Charlton points out, disability is “a significant part of the human condition”; knowl-
edge about disability, he argues, is therefore knowledge about “the human condition itself” (4).
 8. The very category of ubiquitous “we” becomes suspect when discussing bodies that do or do 
not fit a normative ideal of health and well-being. It is therefore incumbent on each viewer to under-
stand the consequences of such visual participation. For the duration of this essay, “we” indicates “we 
two book editors.”
 9. The parental admonishment toward children, “Don’t stare!,” insistently commands both a 
looking at and a looking away. For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between disability and 
staring, see Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s “The Politics of Staring” and her Staring: How We Look.
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“We Are All handicapable”
In the 1990s, the weekly Canadian television skit show Kids in the Hall 
confronted socially problematic comedy. Unlike other male-dominated 
comedy troupes (such as Monty Python), dressing up as women (or other 
characters physically different from their own bodies) for the actors in 
Kids in the Hall is not the punch line. Indeed, representing bodies not 
their own (the troupe comprises five male actors) is rarely the source 
of amusement so much as are the social situations that represent such 
bodies within contemporary mass culture. Although Kids in the Hall 
does not deal extensively with issues of disability, the comedy troupe 
often focuses its humor on the representations of bodies that do not “fit” 
implicit normative standards, thus presenting to the viewer a full range 
of what we call problem bodies—awkward, medicalized, edgy bodies.10 
Their comedy helpfully prevents the viewer from falling passively into 
the long-available role of gawker at nature exhibited as freakish. We 
include an analysis of their work here not as an example of television 
representation but as an example of cultural criticism of the reception of 
cinematic portrayals of disability.
 We focus here on one notable Kids in the Hall skit that highlights and 
parodies film studio and audience responses to disability-focused movies. 
The skit, “The Academy Awards,” plays off a social situation that fre-
quently accompanies celebratory ceremonies for and about mainstream 
film, a social situation whose allegorical proportions motivate this collec-
tion of essays. This skit makes fun of the “issue film” and its supporters 
while at the same time exposing the limits of the metaphorical language 
available for disabling declarations. “The Academy Awards” features 
four actors receiving nominations for Best Actor category at the Oscars.11 
The skit does more than offer merely another parody of the Oscars, for 
it also returns the viewers’ attention back onto the language that des-
 10. The term “problem body” is explicated in the next section of our introduction.
 11. In the skit, Kids in the Hall pokes fun at the viewers who participate in what Tobin Siebers calls 
“disability drag”:
The modern cinema often puts the stigma of disability on display, except that films exhibit the 
stigma not to insiders by insiders, as is the usual case with drag, but to a general public that 
does not realize it is attending a drag performance. In short, when we view an able-bodied actor 
playing disabled, we have the same experience of exaggeration and performance as when we 
view a man playing a woman. (115) 
The Kids in the Hall skit anticipates Siebers’s nuanced critique of actors who “play” disabled and are 
then rewarded for their (overly sentimentalized, yet assumed-to-be verisimilitude) role with a shared 
Oscar win. In the drag films Siebers points to, audiences expect the depiction to be unmistakably 
exaggerated, whereas these Academy Award winners—though obviously overacting, even within the 
melodramatic milieu of an “issue”-focused film—are received (and hailed) as representing “true” dis-
ability experience.
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ignates one kind of body as having a say over another kind. In the skit 
one actor is nominated for his role as Hamlet, a role that is dramatically 
and expertly depicted in an exceedingly short “Oscar clip.” The remaining 
three have all played characters with disabilities. Predictably, rather than 
a single Oscar winner, there is a three-way tie among the able-bodied 
actors playing disabled characters. As one of the award presenters calls 
it, “Everybody but the Hamlet guy!”
 Charles Riley drolly points out in his book on disability and/in 
media, “The safest nomination bets for Oscar gold, year after year, are 
disability flicks” (70). Playing on this pattern of recognition, of the three 
Kids in the Hall “victors,” the first actor is nominated for his role as a Deaf 
activist.12 In the clip, from a film named Hear the Light, he speaks to a 
group of anti-Deaf protestors, declaring: “I can’t believe what I am lip-
reading here today. Now I may not be able to hear with these [points to 
his ear], but you people, you can’t hear with THIS! [makes a fist over his 
heart].” The second actor is nominated for his portrayal of a wheelchair 
activist, righteously struggling against the big-business company deter-
mined to install “bumps” in every road and sidewalk. The clip from his 
film, named Rolling Tall, also includes a speech: “Large bumps?! . . . Well 
if that’s your idea of AMERICA then count me out. [points to himself] 
I’m not the one that’s handicapped. [points to the crowd] YOU’RE the 
ones that are handicapped . . . IN HERE! [points to his heart].”
 Breaking the mold, the third actor depicts a character with a traumatic 
head injury. The first two “clips” in this skit set up and remind viewers of 
the sentimental genre that a third such “clip” would then demolish: how 
will a character convincingly (even tongue-in-cheek convincingly) accuse 
anti-head-injury crowds that they are the ones with a head injury, “IN 
HERE! [pointing at heart]” As avid Kids in the Hall fans, and nascent dis-
ability scholars at the time the skit began circulating, when we two view 
a film or performance particularly guilty of depicting the usual suspects 
of disability clichés,13 one of us invariably remarks to the other: “I’m not 
the one with a spike in my head, you’re the one with a spike in your head, 
in your heart!” in effect parodying the parody. Needless to say, the Kids in 
the Hall skit does not present this exclamation as a well-set-up punch line: 
They do not project the humorous logic of their skit to its ultimate con-
clusion. Rather, the clip for the third actor playing a disabled character 
 12. In the various clips from the nominated films, “protestors” carry signs reading “SCREW THE 
DEAF” and “I LOVE BUMPS.” Meanwhile, the obviously hearing actor, during his nomination clip, is 
shown signing (in popular idiom rather than in ASL) a single word: “Ok.” 
 13. For an extensive list of such filmic clichés, see Martin Norden’s significant publication Cinema of 
Isolation, where he expands upon various disabled “types” (such as “Tragic Victim,” “Noble Warrior,” 
etc.).
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opens at his birthday party. After being given a hat for his birthday, he 
says to his mother:
you know I can’t wear this. I’ve got a spike [points to spike] through my 
head. . . . I’ve accepted it. Why can’t you? I’ve got a spike through my 
head, a spike through my head, spike through my head, a spike through 
my head, a spike through my head!”
The Oscar audience reacts as appreciatively to this film “clip” as to the 
other issue-focused clips. The cliché invoked and “driven” home here 
is the attempt by well-meaning family and friends to ignore a disabling 
injury and pretend the injured character is “the same” as before, or “the 
same” as “us,” or, in the cynical reading of the initial plural evocation in 
our introduction, “we are all” handicapable (as one character in the Kids 
in the Hall skit sarcastically names it). The Kids in the Hall’s ending to 
their “Academy Awards” skit invokes issues films about disability and 
parodies the predictable moment in these films when a disabled char-
acter “overcomes” disability to end up “just like” everyone else.14 The 
character needs to convince his mother that he will never be “the same,” 
will never fit, will always have a spike in his head. This is a funny and 
useful parody; still, we prefer to think of our own ending to the skit as 
leading us to that narrative projection, eminently theorizable, where dis-
ability clashes uncomfortably with disability metaphors, where “having a 
spike in your head, in your heart” is not only an “issue” of disability but 
also a problem of spectatorship, meaning, and the normative gaze. That 
is, we’re not the ones with spikes in our heads, in our hearts—you are. In 
this book we collect a set of critical essays about disability in cinema that 
collectively identify and reimagine the spectatorship, meaning, and nor-
mative gaze that settle upon what we call “the problem body” on film, 
transforming the spike from our joke into what Canadians would recog-
nize as “the last spike.”15
 Through their characters’ continuing refrain that “I’m not the one 
who’s disabled [blind, Deaf, injured, etc.], society is,” we read this Kids 
in the Hall sketch allegorically as a challenge to rethink every social situ-
 14. One Hollywood example of this plot structure is the character of Sam (Oscar-nominated Sean 
Penn) in I Am Sam who proves that he can draw on aspects of his cognitive disability to parent “just 
like” other parents.
 15. “The last spike” is a titular element of both popular Canadian historical accounts and popular 
narratives about the completion of a transcontinental railroad, constructed in the name of nation 
building with underpaid immigrant labor across unceded indigenous lands. Just as The Kids in the 
Hall’s spike illustrates the twisted logic required to maintain patterns of disability representation, the 
railway’s “last spike” illuminates the violent logic of nationalism.
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ation that entails a response to disability that follows such sentimental 
logic. These comedians reveal underlying social expectations for and 
about the disabled body not only to successfully and invisibly function 
within an ableist society, but also to represent, for the general public, 
a moralizing symbol. This moralizing symbol acts as a commodity for 
viewers not only to reject particular bodies, but also to expect accumu-
lated metaphorical weight (morally and symbolically) from those othered 
bodies.
 For the most part, in independent cinema, representations of illness 
and disability can interrogate the various binary constructions of “healthy” 
versus “ill” that mainstream films have traditionally constructed around 
“our” bodies and the bodies of others. In most mainstream films, not only 
are disabled individuals relegated to marginally participating identities, 
but so too are groups who prefer to identify themselves as socially and 
politically determined, rather than as medically defined. The irony of the 
Kids in the Hall skit is that, as the “disabled” character points an accusing 
finger at others, the metaphor perpetuates itself as a literal and self-
reflecting mirror for audience members. Ultimately, the “I’m not but you 
are” binary of the skit reconfigures the notion of a disabled body, judged 
by an ableist projection of a “healthy” attitude onto the “ailing” attitude.16
The Problem Body
We propose and examine the term the “problem” body which Nicole 
Markotić first used for critical analysis in an essay on the “coincidence” 
of body and texts in the Canadian feminist journal Tessera. We propose 
this term in alliance with—and juxtaposed to—other terms upon which 
theorists have drawn to investigate the role of the disabled body con-
structed within the framework of the normative body. Some examples 
include Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s the “extraordinary” body, G. 
Thomas Couser’s the “recovering” body, Susan Wendell’s the “rejected” 
body, and Michael Davidson’s “defamiliar” body.17 In our usage, the term 
 16. Disability as social metaphor has been discussed greatly by such critics as Lennard Davis, David 
Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, Martin Norden, and others. An obvious example of such a conflation 
comes in the movie At First Sight where Val kilmer’s character, newly sighted after growing up blind, 
reacts badly to his girlfriend urging him to walk quickly past a homeless man. In the subsequent scene 
he rants against sighted people who “don’t want to see” unpleasant truths.
 17. See Garland-Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies, Couser’s The Recovering Body, Wendell’s The 
Rejected Body, and Davidson’s Concerto for the Left Hand: Disability and the Defamiliar Body for further 
elaboration.
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the “problem” body18 refers to various manifestations and representa-
tions of the Deaf body, the disabled body, the aged body, the ill body, 
the obese body.19 In presenting this term, we do not intend an emphasis 
on physical disability per se but an emphasis on the transformation of 
physical difference into cultural patterns of spectacle, patterns that repli-
cate a range of pathologizing practices that oppress people.20 We trace the 
history of the phrase to Louis Althusser’s term “problematic,” which he 
uses to indicate how a word or concept cannot be considered in isolation. 
Indeed, the problematic points to the fundamental contradiction within 
the capitalist apparatus. Althusser’s term invokes a Marxian history of 
production relationships, in order to “define the nature of a concept by 
its function in the problematic” (39), but it allows us here to analyze the 
problematic construction of bodies as essentialized, rather than merely 
contextualized, contradictions within an ideological framework. Thus we 
evoke a status that is both discursive and material.
 Michel Foucault invokes the problematic in madness and Civilization 
less to designate cause and effect and more to scrutinize the idea of sub-
jectivity within scientific power structures. Such science-based power 
structures construct the subject based on classification rather than subjec-
tivity. Psychiatry, for example, divides the “sane” from the “mad”; simi-
larly, medical practice has routinely divided the normal body from the 
disabled body, rendering the latter a “problem” within normative hierar-
chies and creating both the category of “normal” and of “disability.” For 
our purposes, the “problem” body stands for those bodily realities that—
within shifting ideologies—represent the anomalies that contradict a nor-
mative understanding of physical being. In the context of this collection 
we examine the problems and possibilities of filmic representation that 
classifies and thereby problematizes bodies. The essays collected herein 
each take on a cinematic process of division in order to transform dis-
ability into a representative signal for a set of social problems that extend 
beyond the interpretive bounds of medical practice. As Susan Crutchfield 
 18. We thank many writers and critics (especially Julia Gaunce) who helped us develop this term as 
a useful marker of physical and mental difference.
 19. This list expands with each revision of our essay, and with other essays we research in this field, 
an expansion that we find to be reflective of the ongoing work by disability scholars in the humanities 
who seek to define disability without confining it and who aim for inclusion but not dilution. We hope 
that adjectives left off this list intrude conceptually through our term “problem” body, and we hope the 
ever-expanding list speaks to such “problems.”
 20. The physicality of this process hides but does not obliterate the relevance of mental disability 
to filmic representation and the pathologizing practices which oppress people. We do not separate 
physical from mental disability in our work, believing the binary set up between them to be false. As 
Eunjung kim’s included essay makes clear, disability in the film Oasis is not clearly physical or mental. 
With that noted, we and our contributors are careful throughout to heed ways in which film projects 
physical disability as though absolutely distinct from projections of mental disability.
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and Marcy Epstein argue in the introduction to their collection, Points of 
Contact, “disability, like art, has no particular physical geography, though 
history has treated the category as something manifest, palpable, bound-
aried” (3), thus aligning the “category” of disability with the cultural 
landscape of “art” and representation. They are, they say, interested in 
“disability as a farrago of contradictory effects, a sideshow in which there 
is no outside” (9). In this collection we not only challenge looks from the 
outside but also invite critical responses to how that outside gaze refig-
ures the body as a problem, as a sideshow in which, for many film spec-
tators, there exists no perceptible inside.
 The word “problem” shows up throughout disability studies to sig-
nify how lived bodies participate in a web of social relations and espe-
cially how certain lived bodies strain the threads of that ideologically deli-
cate web. Simi Linton provides a perfect example of the role the adjective 
“problem” plays in disability studies: “the fact that impairment has almost 
always been studied from a deficit model means that we are deficient in 
language to describe it any other way than as a ‘problem’” (140). To date, 
disability theorists have avoided the conceptual lens of the “problem” 
because it is situated outside disability studies actions and inside oppres-
sive social structures. For example, in Disability, Self, and Society, Tanya 
Titchkosky sketches out her section, “The Problem of Disability”:
“Problem” is the definition of the situation of disability. . . . Such an under-
standing does not arise simply because our bodies, minds, or senses give 
us problems; the problem is brought to people through interaction, the 
environment, and through the production of knowledge. (131)
In Reading and Writing Disability Differently, Titchkosky hyphenates 
Markotić’s term, “problem-body,” and draws on it to evoke this sense of 
how disability connotes problem in a broader social sphere.
 In returning to the articulations of Althusser and Foucault, our goal 
is to take on and expand the concept of the “problem” body to include 
multilayered corporeal realities and the intersections to which such reali-
ties lead. In particular, our objective is to define and reveal the “problem” 
body as a multiplication of lived circumstances constructed both physi-
cally and socially, in order to call into question the ways that certain 
bodies more frequently invite the label “problem” than do others. This 
critical strategy is in keeping with recent theoretical work in disability 
studies, and especially Snyder and Mitchell’s concept of the cultural 
model of disability that imbricates the physicality of disability with the 
social and imagines the two always working in concert.
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Cultural locations
Through our collection we hope to shift the “either/or” structure of dis-
ability studies to a “both/and” model so that disability can be under-
stood as both physical and social. In narrative filmic representation dis-
ability is both given and taken away, both opportunistic metaphor and 
phenomenological experience. In order to encourage and account for 
multiple readings of the disabled body on-screen, we shall also examine 
the “problem” body as it is projected along with gendered, homosexual, 
racialized, classed, and abused bodies. As Carol A. Breckenridge and 
Candace Vogler point out, “disability studies reminds us that feminism, 
sexuality, gender studies, and critical race theory meet at a point of 
incomprehension when faced with the corporeality of the disabled body” 
(350–51). We hope to shift that sectioned meeting from incomprehension 
to renewed interest in the multiple deviations and differences that bodies 
share. The Problem Body: Projecting Disability on Film will bolster readers’ 
and critics’ conceptualization of problematized bodies in Althusser’s 
sense of the term “problematic.” Our projection of Althusser’s term into 
film and disability studies directs our argument that it is not that dis-
abled bodies pose social “problems” so much as that disabled bodies both 
materialize and symbolize moments of interaction between the social and 
the physical, and among many other so-called identity categories.
 Our project, then, is to examine projection (in both Freud’s and 
Chow’s sense of this notion) through the ways in which disability, 
gender, race, cultural otherness, and sexuality intersect. Intersection-
ality has become a pivotal critical term to call attention to the need to 
think of difference in context. kimberlé Crenshaw solidified the term in 
order to “[highlight] the need to account for multiple grounds of iden-
tity when considering how the social world is constructed” (1245). Her 
work on race and gender reveals the need to think through structural 
intersectionality about how black women’s experience of violence differs 
from white women’s experience of violence, through political intersec-
tionality about how identity-based politic movements have “marginal-
ized” violence against women of color as a political issue, and through 
representational intersectionality about how women of color are cultur-
ally constructed, specifically in popular culture (1245). We consider how 
projected images of disabled characters require analysis that attends to 
the experience of disability. Vivian M. May and Beth A. Ferris, in their 
analysis of Atom Egoyan’s film The Sweet Hereafter, draw on what they 
call the “productive methodological practice” of intersectionality in 
order to adequately account for agency on the part of a young, female, 
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newly disabled character (132). Disability theorists engage with literary 
and cultural theories in order to argue the necessity to account for race 
in critical analysis and to ground scholarly work in geographical, polit-
ical, and gendered landscapes.
 We wish to distinguish disability as a category of identity as well as 
investigate the usefulness of expanding disability’s definition and chal-
lenging identity as a critical paradigm and a political strategy. Most 
importantly, we hope to demonstrate the importance of disability as a 
category of analysis even in those blurred instances where disability 
may not overtly preside.21 We recognize that adding yet another adjec-
tive in front of the noun “body” (in identity discourse, critics speak of 
the “female” body, the “queer” body, the “racialized” body, etc.) cannot 
replace the critical work of designating and examining the role of bodies 
in scholarly criticism through simple nomenclature. Rather, we hope to 
open up the discussion for readers to further examine the discourse that 
perpetuates and challenges ongoing projections of “problem” bodies. We 
seek what Alexa Schriempf calls an “interactionist model” for the analysis 
of “problem” bodies, rather than an additive model that risks ignoring 
the fusion of identity categories (65). Othered bodies often reveal a self/
other edge that not only marks gendered borders but also limits configu-
rations of the physically ideal such that physicality both is and is not 
a problem. As Jim Overboe argues, the disabled/non-disabled binary 
model elevates the able-bodied argument to tout it as superior because 
“normalized embodiment and sensibility sets not only the parameters of 
‘what the problem is,’ but also the limits of the discussion and the type 
of communication required to take part in the dialogue” (25). The body’s 
literal edges and social roles—our focus here—discount the economy of 
normalized embodiment and instead demand cinematic challenges to 
visual conventions, to able-bodied actors, and to narrative genres.
 The social contexts surrounding the physical other invite further 
discussion about a spectrum of physically diverse bodies. At times that 
spectrum threatens to become so diffuse as to render disability irrelevant 
or merely a subcategory competing for status, albeit marginal. Our col-
lection draws on disability theory to provide a viable framework for 
examining the complicated and socially enriched process that determines 
the boundaries between the “normal” body and the “problem” body. We 
shall concentrate on bodies repeatedly left out of—or exploited by—tra-
 21. Our argument is not simply a reframing of the claim that all bodies are ultimately, or will ulti-
mately become, disabled. Rather, we find disability theory an effective starting place for the scrutiny of 
physicality, and, as such, it promises a mode of analysis that refuses the normativity of the white, male, 
heterosexual, fit, young, tall, athletic body.
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ditional cultural and especially film criticism, and on the social problems 
that so-called deviant bodies confront because of normative cultural 
expectations. Rather than claiming the disabled body as an object that 
existing theories could simply reconfigure, we wish to reveal—through 
the visual dramatization of disability—the “problem” body as a chal-
lenging multiplication of physical and social problems. The “problem” 
body, then, demands a rich discourse to advance thinking beyond a focus 
that limits itself as either this body or that body.
 Our aim is not, of course, to conflate all othered bodies into one trope 
but rather to suggest and examine the terminology of identity in order to 
better recognize ways in which disability has, historically, been assigned 
to the margins of the margins. By proposing our term, the “problem” 
body, we look critically at filmic bodies termed, rendered as, dismissed 
as, and rejected as “problematic.” We explore the changing rubric of dis-
ability against such traditional rejections, and continued projections, and 
we consider the role of disabled bodies—and of other bodies configured 
as problems—in the emergence of public, and culturally determined, 
identities.
Projecting the Problem Body
“Project,” both verb and noun, slices through the history of film studies 
to ground visual ideals and to highlight the problematic in filmic nar-
rative. Though disability scholars discuss film frequently, especially on 
academic listservs and at scholarly meetings, omnibus publication about 
the relationship between film and disability is scant. In the following 
essays, this book seeks to solidify and clarify that widespread interest 
and dialogue. In addition to the need for more attention to what have 
been variably named mental/cognitive/intellectual disabilities on film, 
there is a continued need for further film scholarship on disability and 
race, sexuality, international cinemas, gender, and documentary. Essays 
in this volume begin the work in these areas, but we do not organize 
them under such headings because the articles, like the disabilities they 
parse, do not lend themselves to easy categorization.
 In the first essay, “‘The Whole Art of a Wooden Leg’: king Vidor’s 
Picturization of Laurence Stallings’s ‘Great Story,’” Timothy Barnard 
points to the interest an early Hollywood film, The Big Parade, takes in 
the portrayal of realism and the “great story” of the amputee war vet-
eran. Thanks to king Vidor’s portrayal of “absence” as high pathos to an 
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audience just beginning to come to terms with postwar masculinity, Jim 
Apperson (John Gilbert) became a “triumph” of early war movies. The 
spectacle of Apperson as simultaneously embodied and disembodied, 
argues Barnard, provided a means to present “real” war and “real” war 
casualties. Post-WWI, then, the war vet reemerges, this time on film, 
as a powerful symbol—as well as a problematic sign—of both “excep-
tional masculinity and exceptional masculine loss.” The hero’s “loss” of 
a leg becomes also his gain of an exceptionally stiff phallus, one that he 
removes to sleep and puts on to run, awkwardly, toward his love and his 
new life.
 Michael Davidson’s essay, “Phantom Limbs: Film Noir and the Dis-
abled Body,” continues this investigation of the relationship between 
masculinity and disability in early U.S. cinema. Davidson looks closely at 
film noir images of gendered, queered, and disabled bodies. Such projec-
tions allow for minor, often cameo, characters to enable a non-normative 
narrative about the protagonist. Namely, Davidson says, “the disabled 
character represents a form of physical deviance necessary for marking 
the body’s unruliness.” But he argues beyond the simple narratives based 
on disabled characters as foil for the non-disabled. In his argument, the 
disabled body is a site for “social panic” about problem bodies, and the 
film’s narrative presents such characters’ stories as “phantom limbs” that 
would—given the time period and the Production Code—be unspeak-
able. Citing numerous gay icons that emerged from the film noir oeuvre, 
Davidson discusses the noir hero’s heteromasculinity as dependent 
on the gay and lesbian counter-figures. He points out that the psycho-
analytic gaze has relied on the act of looking as formulated through a 
trope of castration, thus—in contrast to Barnard’s argument about The 
Big Parade—equating the missing limb with the missing phallus. For 
Davidson, moments of social agency in film noir undermine and relin-
quish the normative narratives the films endeavor to bolster.
 Also focused on the psychoanalytic gaze, Johnson Cheu’s essay, 
“Seeing Blindness On-Screen: The Blind, Female Gaze,” revisits Laura 
Mulvey’s classic argument, but in his argument the gaze is an ableist 
trope, signifying particular ways of seeing for sighted audience mem-
bers. As the male gaze reconfigures all audience members into male voy-
eurs, so too does the normative gaze configure and insist upon audience 
members as not only assuming the identity position of non-blind, but 
problematically infusing audience members with the power-laden act 
of viewing blind (female) characters as particularly needy and disad-
vantaged. Presuming from the start a “disabled gaze,” Cheu goes on to 
discuss the on-screen gaze of blind female protagonists and argues that 
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such characters are “co-opted in order to take away the blind woman’s 
agency.” Rather than repudiating simple stereotypes, film and filmmakers 
co-opt a Blind gaze for the benefit of the (projected) able-bodied audience 
members. Relying on critical race and postcolonial theory, Cheu observes 
the normative gaze as defining racially dominant identity groups and the 
normative gaze as defining bodies as either able or not able.
 Focusing on the interconnectedness of physical, cognitive, and sen-
sory disability, Dawne McCance examines the relationships among 
speech, subjective autonomy, and medicalization in her essay, exploring 
projections of modernity in François Truffaut’s The Wild Child (L’enfant 
sauvage [France, 1970]). This film, McCance argues, offers a speech-and-
hearing model as trope for other (mental and mobility) disabilities. Such 
an approach allows her to investigate, via Jean Marc Gaspard Itard (chief 
physician at the Paris Institute for Deaf Mutes), early-nineteenth-century 
crises of how to define humanity, intersecting with late-twentieth-century 
crises of narrative representation. Positing what she calls the “theatre of 
mimesis,” McCance places the film within the hybrid genres of “memoir, 
confession, family history, and political commentary,” ultimately dem-
onstrating how the director doctor projects the intertwined notions 
of speech and autonomous subjectivity onto the character of Victor. 
Throughout the film, argues McCance, Truffaut “portrays Victor’s inca-
pacity to hear-and-speak as what keeps him from crossing the human/
animal line,” thus revealing the doctor’s and the director’s investment in 
human realization as aligned with hearing and verbal articulation.
 Paul Darke’s essay, “No Life Anyway: Pathologizing Disability on 
Film,” also articulates the challenges of imagining disability as a human 
trait. Darke posits that the projection of an overly medicalized char-
acter and a narrative that advocates de-medicalization in Whose Life Is 
It Anyway? locates itself on the bodies of the disabled. In other words, 
any argument against medical intervention conflates into the argument 
against keeping disabled patients alive. Darke analyzes the implications 
of portraying disability rather than pathologization as burdensome. In 
doing so, he points to the demeaning technology that “unnaturally” 
perpetuates “sub-human” life. Such routine devaluing of the disabled 
body on-screen, argues Darke, becomes increasingly circular: as the film 
insists on the protagonist ken’s dehumanization, it must more and more 
depict ken’s body as inhuman. ken himself rejects the hospital’s medical 
intrusions; the film portrays him as refusing to consider himself as fully 
human. Like a “good cripple,” says Darke, ken “overcomes his abnor-
mality by preferring death to impairment.” Death, then, and a hero’s 
choice for death, project as superior the character “trapped” inside an 
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inferior container. ken’s “body logic,” suggests Darke, best describes the 
default sacrifice for disabled characters that pervades the cinematic rep-
resentation and construction of normalcy.
 Projecting notions of illness and treatment, of terminal disease and its 
exacerbating “cures,” Heath Diehl’s essay, “‘And Death—capital D—shall 
be no more—semicolon!’: Explicating the Terminally Ill Body in Margaret 
Edson’s W;t,” circles around the protagonist’s terminal illness and her 
own problematic articulation of that illness as a grammatically definable 
experience. The patient is in constant pain, not so much because of her 
illness, but because of the treatment. Vivian Bearing, projected as pure 
intellectual, becomes invested in her own ongoing analysis of the pro-
cess, particularly its semantics. By examining this film through the trope 
of literary criticism, Diehl connects the meaning (or lack of meaning) of 
the body dying in pain to the representational strategy of analogy. Diehl 
argues that the film “voices a meta-filmic commentary on how instances 
of pain and suffering complicate the process of cinematic creation.” Diehl 
argues that the role of the protagonist, Vivian Bearing, is not so much 
“true” confessor as “first-person narrating I.” Bearing, a New Critic, 
attempts to render her physical experiences as readable and as “research” 
for other scholars, based on her training as a scholar who relies on anal-
ysis and poetics. But Diehl argues that the film’s conflation of the body as 
a screen of pain and scrutiny relies on Bearing’s textual embodiment as 
sentient experiment: her words, in other words, fail her.
 In “‘A Man, with the Same Feelings’: Disability, Humanity, and Het-
erosexual Apparatus in Breaking the Waves, Born on the Fourth of July, 
Breathing Lessons, and Oasis,” Eunjung kim argues that many cinematic 
representations of disabled men attempt to sexualize them, usually by 
means of non-disabled, usually non-white, female prostitutes. The prosti-
tute characters pity, fall for, service, or swindle the male characters, these 
“once men” who must now pay to participate in their own sexuality and 
thereby “rehabilitate” their masculinity. She concludes her argument 
with a contrast to the South korean film Oasis. Whereas the disabled 
characters in the preceding films are each presented as “a man, with the 
same feelings they have” (i.e., they are each offered as sexually desiring 
and deserving intimate attentions from non-disabled women), Oasis pres-
ents disabled female sexuality as a “deviant” means to a normative end. 
As kim puts it, “The film plays on the belief that sexual abuse is a part 
of the experience of heterosexuality, yet problematically disallowed to 
disabled women because violent sexual attacks are regarded as “saving” 
them from asexual genderlessness.” She argues that cinematic portrayals 
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of disabled sexuality rely on heteronormative apparatuses that empha-
size the ways in which presumed desexual beings are resexualized into a 
humanized presence.
 Looking closely at the representations of gender and sexuality in 
million Dollar Baby and murderball, Robert McRuer’s essay, “Neoliberal 
Risks: million Dollar Baby, murderball, and Anti-National Sexual Posi-
tions,” argues that these films are “haunted” by a “proper sexuality” 
that supposedly provides stability within a politically and economically 
unstable world. Beginning with Fredric Jameson’s notion of the com-
fort of nostalgia in film, McRuer examines how million Dollar Baby posi-
tions itself as a “comfort” to millions of viewers, while at the same time 
offering death as the radical solution to its recently disabled protago-
nist. The “currency” for such a disability story, says McRuer, circulates 
throughout the film, indicating a homogenized subtext about the “con-
fluence of market and state.” Watching Hilary Swank’s character, Maggie 
Fitzgerald, audiences are schooled, argues McRuer, on “what it means to 
be an American.” McRuer furthers his argument to look at the ways that 
murderball may—and may not—function as an antithesis to million Dollar 
Baby. The nationalism in murderball is more overt and thus also becomes 
easier for audiences to challenge in the moment of the viewing. Patrio-
tism as depicted through the disabled individual turns on the responsi-
bility characters express toward the “common good,” by remaining per-
sonally responsible for their own bodies.
 Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell, in their essay, “Body Genres: An 
Anatomy of Disability in Film,” proceed from their notion of the “cul-
tural location of disability” to discuss viewer identification or, as they 
call it, “dis-identification” with visual disability performances. Viewer-
ship itself, Snyder and Mitchell argue, provides an opportunity for audi-
ences to play both witness and gazing subject upon marginalized and 
exoticized object. They discuss normative views and viewing practices, 
critically addressing the “dynamic relationship between viewers and dis-
abled characters.” Taking up Linda Williams’s argument about excessive 
(female) bodies on film, they argue that disabled bodies, within the rubric 
of “excess,” form a critical nexus in film viewing practices. Simply put, 
they point out that disabled bodies in film function as “delivery vehicles” 
in order to transfer extreme sensations to audiences, positioning disabled 
characters as a physical and emotional “threat” to the supposed “integ-
rity” of the able body. The out-of-control, excessive, disabled body both 
slips easily within and challenges the “shared cultural scripts” that audi-
ences recognize as they view disabled characters on-screen. Audiences 
| Introduction18
approach these cinematic bodies with a social investment that displays 
disabled bodies as anomalous and incorporates all other bodies within a 
“masquerade of normalcy.”
 As a coda to the book, Anne Finger’s short story, “‘Blinded by the 
Light’ OR: Where’s the Rest of Me?” fictionally reassesses the value of 
disabled bodies as depicted on-screen and as viewers. In her narrative 
Finger begins with a “fictional character” who is “limping towards a 
movie theatre.” The fictional character gains a name, a social context, and 
a relationship with the narrator herself. Indeed, Finger presents her char-
acter and her narrator engaged in a metafictional relationship that com-
ments on the film viewing experience as much as on film’s representa-
tions of disabled (female) characters. The narrative layers unfold through 
the film: the viewing of the film and the telling of that viewing come to 
readers through Irma’s limping body. Refusing to settle on the “cause” of 
Irma’s limp, the narrator manages to convey the importance that ques-
tion has for readers (and viewers). The story asks, How does cause signify 
identity? Disability, Finger concedes, “requires a narrative.” And as she 
gives one, that narrative grows into a commentary about going to see 
mata Hari, about “fire-engine red” crutches, and waiting for a friend as 
endless well-wishers attempt to hold open doors. “Imperfectly blind,” 
Irma’s friend, Linda, needs to sit close to the front of the theatre; Irma 
needs to sit on the left aisle. As Finger’s story winds through character 
development and plot development and narrative development, the plot 
in the story—so to speak—thickens. Mata Hari falls for a good man, the 
good man becomes a disabled good man, Mata Hari goes on trial for 
treason, and her blind lover sees nothing of her impending doom. And 
Irma and Linda? They fall into the film entranced, but as “THE END” 
appears on-screen, Linda snaps open her cane and Irma picks up her 
crutches: The End.
Conclusion
Many scholars who focus on representations of the body come to rely on 
terminology that refers to physicality as existing within a “sliding” or 
“floating” scale of subjectivity. The problem in relying on such gradation 
lies in definitions of disability that include, ultimately, virtually every 
physical signifier indicating any deviation for the “ideal” body. As illus-
trated in the preceding essay descriptions, the focus in The Problem Body: 
Projecting Disability on Film is rather an appraisal of certain focal points 
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on that sliding scale between the normal body and the problem body that 
scholars here address and that we deem valuable: junctures illuminated 
by filmic projections that deserve critical consideration.
 Does the significance of ever-expanding bodily realities on film per-
meate the social/political construction of marginal bodies? By analyzing 
bodies that cultural labels render into “problems,” we have turned to 
disability theory’s ongoing attempts to revamp the social model and re-
incorporate the body into a cultural model. We look to disability studies 
to provide a rich methodology for critics to re-enter and re-evaluate com-
plicated filmic narratives that do not simply exploit or resist repeated ste-
reotypes of disability. We argue that such use of disability theory prom-
ises to strengthen film analyses, which need to take into account narrative 
arguments currently at risk of over-dilution and reckon with the role of 
the panopticon voyeur. The unpredictability of disability—its refusal to 
be confined within current paradigms of study—leads to a reading of the 
body as a projection of constantly in-process theoretical shots. In turn, 
readings of such films through disability theory offer a means by which 
to grapple anew with the role of the body in film and disability studies.
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James Apperson (John Gilbert), amputee veteran. The Big Parade. Directed by King 
Vidor.  MGM, 1925.
So in discussing the whole art of a wooden leg, let it be understood that this 
impedimental aid to locomotion ties one to the wooden things of life.
 —Laurence Stallings, “The Whole Art of a Wooden Leg: An Essay,” 
     March 1923
I pictured Laurence Stallings the author, among the men of that platoon. He 
surely must [have] been there!
 —Robert M. Finch, “An Overseas Veteran’s Impressions of The Big Parade,”  
  November 1925
The picture is nothing less than a triumph for Vidor. His handling of “scenes” 
is great, while the “Inside” stuff that Stallings has slipped him consummates a 
flavoring vein ever present.
 —Review of The Big Parade, Variety, December 2, 1925
The penultimate scene of MGM’s 1925 WWI epic The Big Parade depicts 
protagonist Jim Apperson’s poignant homecoming after the war. In a 
long shot showing Jim (John Gilbert) coming through the entryway on 
crutches, his family and the film audience see for the first time that one 
of his legs has been amputated. After a reaction shot zooms in to a close-
up of his mother’s anguished face, she embraces him and the audience 
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sees (through a double-exposed mini-narrative) her memories of her son 
growing up with two legs. This flashback montage culminates with a 
medium shot of Jim’s lower half showing one intact leg and what appears 
to be the stump of the other. The film, however, does not end on this 
note of high pathos. Jim and his mother withdraw to an interior room 
where he confesses his love for a peasant girl in France. With his mother’s 
blessing, and fitted with a prosthetic leg, Jim returns to France where, in 
the film’s final scene, he and the young woman, Melisande, run across 
fields to one another. The film ends with their climactic embrace and the 
closing credit. This ending would conform to melodramatic formula but 
for Gilbert’s distinctive limp-running gait.
 During the filming of The Big Parade, MGM head Louis B. Mayer 
was shocked when he heard that the studio’s romantic star, John Gilbert, 
would be depicted as an amputee with his lower leg bound up in a har-
ness. He insisted that the scene be reshot to depict instead a wounded 
but intact leg (Vidor, King Vidor 74). Mayer, worried about the studio’s 
fortunes, and Gilbert, worried about his own career aspirations, both 
thought that images of a veteran’s dismembered body might prove too 
disturbing for American postwar film audiences. king Vidor, the film’s 
director, insisted on including the image of an amputated leg, and after 
test audiences received it enthusiastically, MGM released the film using 
the original homecoming sequence. The Big Parade went on to an unprec-
edented ninety-six-week run at New york’s Astor Theatre and a highly 
lucrative road show. It grossed the highest box-office receipts of the silent 
era and boosted the careers of Mayer, Irving Thalberg, Vidor, and Gilbert. 
Mayer’s MGM grossed over $19 million with the film and became a major 
studio, Thalberg prospered as Hollywood’s production boy wonder, and 
Vidor became a sought-after directorial auteur gaining creative autonomy 
and bigger film budgets. The film also established Gilbert as a top male 
star of silent cinema and marked what he later called “the high point of 
my career” (Brownlow 187–93).
 With Gilbert’s performance as Jim Apperson culminating in a pre-
sentation of his body as physically less than it once was, the film cre-
ates a new kind of problematic yet appealing male star portrayed as both 
romantically desirable and physically disabled. Both more and less of a 
man, Gilbert’s Apperson serves as a simultaneously realized and dimin-
ished masculine icon, as the film transforms postwar manhood into a 
cinematic spectacle simultaneously embodied and disembodied, both 
dismembered and redeemed. Audiences of the1920s received the film as 
unprecedentedly “real” despite the tricked representation of an ablated 
body serving as a key source of its claim to realism.
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 In The Big Parade the absent, as a referent to what was once present, 
serves as a means of representing something more convincingly “real” 
than the physically material. This absent presence operates on two con-
vergent levels in the film: both in its textual properties as an immaterial 
shadow image of a previously present material world and in its narrative 
construction of a male body first presented as physically whole, -abled, 
and normative and then amputated, disabled, and physically diminished. 
As such, the film draws upon what David T. Mitchell has identified as a 
strategy of “narrative prosthesis” that renders disability as a means of 
lending “a distinctive idiosyncrasy to any characters that differentiate 
themselves from the anonymous background of the norm” (17). And yet 
while Mitchell argues that all literary narratives, in their dependency 
on disability, “operate out of a desire to compensate for a limitation or 
to reign in an excessiveness,” The Big Parade’s film narrative appears to 
turn such desire on its head. “Disability inaugurates narrative,” Mitchell 
asserts, “but narrative inevitably punishes its own prurient interests by 
overseeing the extermination of the object of its fascination” (20). In The 
Big Parade, however, the presentation of Jim Apperson’s newly disabled 
body culminates rather than inaugurates the film’s narrative and, as such, 
serves as a sign of contradictory masculine realization and a fetishized 
object of melodramatic fascination. Ultimately, the film’s power as a 
cultural text resides in its projection and symbolic resolution of a con-
vergence of perceived modern crises—of postwar manhood, of soldiers’ 
physical mutilation and disability, and of what is “real” and right in a 
world shaped by both destructive and creative technological forces. The 
film offers a cultural response to the technological destruction of WWI by 
replacing it with a cinematic construction narrating change as both loss 
and regeneration and portraying a (dis)embodied problem body made 
both more and less than whole and exemplary.
 Besides being a boon for MGM and its team of filmmakers, the suc-
cess of The Big Parade also validated and valorized Laurence Stallings, 
the veteran amputee whose military service and wounding in the war 
inspired the film’s narrative. As its promotional posters announce, The 
Big Parade was “king Vidor’s Picturization of Laurence Stallings’[s] Great 
Story.” In the 1920s, Stallings established himself as a prominent intellec-
tual American veteran of WWI with powerful credentials of both cultural 
and masculine authenticity. As a Marine officer wounded in action, an 
author, a playwright, and, ultimately, a Hollywood screenwriter, Stall-
ings achieved period fame as a producer, a reviewer, and an embodi-
ment—both literally and figuratively—of “the real thing.” Stallings’s war-
inflicted disability provided him with problematic cultural capital that 
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placed him in a unique position to tell, judge, and contribute to a “great 
story” of the Great War deemed distinctively “real.”
 Stallings’s contribution to the The Big Parade’s contradictory claims to 
postwar realism reflect early-twentieth-century dilemmas centering on 
the knotted relationship among manhood, modernity, technology, visual 
culture, and questions of absent presence and “the real.” As Scott McQuire 
has observed in Visions of modernity, cinema contributed to the modern 
dilemma of the “real” because “cinematic images not only depicted motion 
in new ways[;] . . . they combined ‘realism’ with a unique immateriality 
and mutability. The shift from a regime of stable, fixed or monumental 
images to images which are transitory, immaterial and incessantly labile, 
marks the fundamental threshold of modern experience” (66). Thus the 
power and appeal of Stallings’s disabled subjectivity—capable of repre-
senting the body’s status as labile and mutable—provided him with a 
powerful cultural agency as it intersected with the medium of Hollywood 
film. “Far from shoring up the real,” McQuire argues, “cinema accentu-
ates its ambiguity. Opting for neither one nor the other, cinema finally 
cannot choose between faking reality and the reality of its own fakes” 
(72).
 Such problematic yet dynamically promising negotiations among the 
body, modernity, realism, and absent presence saturate cultural preoccu-
pations of the post-WWI period. As Jani Scandura and Michael Thurston 
argue in modernism, Inc., the tomb of the unknown soldier (the dedica-
tion of which Stallings dramatizes in the conclusion of his novel Plumes) 
represents “not so much anonymous corpses as named absences—[but 
instead] the emptiness of the corpse as a sign and the hollowness of the 
image that we have buried and refuse to bury with the corpse” (3). In the 
case of Stallings’s body, as a living but disabled body rather than a corpse, 
it manages to serve as an absent (yet, as the above-quoted reviewer of The 
Big Parade put it, seemingly “ever present”) inspiration for a performance 
of these same traumas, yet one that also allows for a tacked-on fantasy of 
cinematic-cum-prosthetic resolution through regeneration.
 In his authorship and criticism, and in his contribution to The Big 
Parade, Stallings’s status as a uniquely “real” individual relied inextri-
cably on his amputated leg—the irrefutable proof that he had served in 
the war and made a profound physical sacrifice for his country. Prior to 
his contribution to The Big Parade, Stallings had rendered his experience 
of war and wounding through literary and critical prose and through co-
authorship of a Broadway play. In these earlier endeavors, his war wound 
proved a simultaneously powerful and problematic sign of both excep-
tional masculinity and exceptional masculine loss. With his contribution 
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to The Big Parade, Stallings’s ablated leg and prosthesis became the sources 
of and inspiration for a powerful new cinematic realism. In an ironic 
essay written for The Smart Set in 1923, Stallings describes his prosthesis 
as an “impedimental aid” and characterizes his postwar creative efforts 
as those of an artist in search of “The Whole Art of A Wooden Leg.” This 
search coincides with what Scandura and Thurston call “the High Mod-
ernist aesthetic dream of wholeness in fragmentation” (3). And yet Stall-
ings came closest to achieving such an art through the “low” modernist 
mass medium of Hollywood film. Just as a wooden prosthesis makes one 
ostensibly whole, Stallings found in Hollywood a creative medium that 
could magically represent him as newly whole—both physically and as 
a more wholly realized creative voice of postwar modernism. With this 
filmic agency, however, came sacrifices, compromises, and a process of 
absenting certain aspects of his perspective as a disabled veteran.1
From the Page, to the Stage, 
to the Silent Screen 
The Problems and Promise of (Re)presenting a War Wound
In the transition from novelist and essayist to playwright and screen-
writer, Stallings shifted his focus away from the details of his physical 
disability and toward the experiences of trench warfare in Europe. Both 
were unfamiliar to most Americans, yet the latter held greater appeal as 
an intriguingly exotic yet comfortably distant “reality.” With the failure 
of his first and only novel, Plumes, based on his experiences as a disabled 
veteran back in the United States, Stallings discovered that the details of 
postwar disability could prove to be too “real” and too close to home.
 With a far more damning antiwar message than The Big Parade’s, 
Plumes depicts a soldier’s bitter re-entry into American civilian life and 
his frustrated efforts to fight against the social phenomenon of war. Unlike 
The Big Parade, where Jim Apperson returns home at the end of the film 
with his leg amputated, Stallings’s novel opens back in the United States 
after the war and with the autobiographical protagonist Richard Plume’s 
leg badly damaged yet still intact. The novel centers on an omnipresent 
wound as it haunts and tortures the protagonist from the outset. In pos-
session of its own agency, Plume’s “raging knee” (147) tortures him and 
 1. For a historical analysis of post-WWI disability that focuses on British veterans—and that has 
informed this essay’s consideration of cultural actors and texts—see Joanna Bourke’s Dismembering 
the male. 
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the novel’s narrative in general. Throughout the novel, Stallings portrays 
the wounded leg as an autonomous character that literally speaks to his 
protagonist and taunts him with its ability to inflict pain: “‘A thousand 
miles walking,’ it flamed up to his brain, ‘couldn’t make any one as tired 
as I can make you, old boy.’ It flickered maliciously as he rolled to the 
floor and projected himself across the carpet with long, lunging swoops” 
(147). Doctors amputate the wounded leg only toward the novel’s end so 
that its unrelenting presence—as opposed to a traumatizing absence—
dominates Plume’s consciousness and constitutes the novel’s central nar-
rative tension.
 With his novel Plumes, Stallings chose not to write about life in the 
trenches but to focus instead on the experience of returning to the home 
front as a wounded veteran whom people saw as a freakish spectacle and 
an object of pity. Subjected to stares of horror and guilt, Plume confronts 
postwar America’s paradoxical indifference to and awkward fascina-
tion with the situation of its disabled veterans. Critics, however, panned 
Plumes and characterized it as an artless book marred by the author’s pre-
occupation with his disability.2 The novel went immediately out of print, 
and Stallings responded to the damning critical reactions by later trying 
to have his own novel suppressed shortly after the publication of its first 
and only edition.
 For his next project, Stallings co-authored the play What Price Glory?, 
a war-front drama based on his combat experiences in France that became 
a Broadway sensation. Like Plumes, What Price sought to intervene in 
romanticized portrayals of war by offering a more realistic alternative. 
Unlike Plumes, however, the play—with its depiction of the chaos and 
violence of the trenches together with its frank use of profanities in the 
soldier’s dialogue—received critical acclaim as an exceptionally “real-
istic” portrayal of modern warfare. Whereas Stallings’s novel centers on 
the omnipresence of a problematic war wound after the fact and does not 
include any depiction of the war itself, What Price depicts, exclusively, 
life in and near the trenches where the specter of getting wounded simul-
 2. Most reviews of Plumes, like Robert Littell’s in The New Republic, acknowledge a certain power 
in the novel while dismissing it as flawed in more general literary terms and in relation to Stallings’s 
treatment of his disability. “If Plumes,” Littell writes, “by reason of its narrowness, its singleness of 
suffering is not an interesting book, nor its characters very real, except in that core of themselves 
which feels and suffers really deeply, it is far harder to forget than many a more interesting book.” In 
a note to his editor, F. Scott Fitzgerald is far less equivocal in his assessment of the novel. He condemns 
it as “disappointingly rotten” and describes Stallings as lacking the “genius to whine appealingly” 
(82). Hard-boiled novelist and critic Jim Tully dismisses Stallings as someone whose amputated leg 
impairs his creative abilities. “The war seems to have robbed Stallings of two things,” Tully declares, 
“a leg and a sense of humour. His attitude toward it is still sophomoric. One would think that he and 
Pershing were the only men who went over the top and suffered in their country’s cause” (46). 
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taneously haunts and tempts the play’s protagonists as both a threat-
ening and a potentially liberating possibility. Unlike Plumes, the war play 
allowed American audiences to focus on experiences clearly separated 
from their day-to-day lives, including the presence of disabled veterans 
such as Richard Plume and Stallings. The play could give its audiences 
a safe, imaginary entry into a distant, and thus more comfortably “real,” 
albeit violent and nightmarish, setting. Everything about the play (its 
subject, setting, and presentation) remained safely apart from the lived 
experience of Americans on the home front. As audiences bought tickets 
and filled theatres to see this theatrical reenactment of distant trench 
warfare, What Price proved far more palatable than Stallings’s earlier 
prose rendering of a disabled veteran’s ongoing struggles back home.
 After its release in 1925, the unprecedented success of The Big Parade 
would overshadow both Stallings’s novel and his Broadway play as the 
most lasting and widely received representation of his war experience 
and postwar problem body. In attendance at the film’s opening night at 
the Astor Theatre, the New York Times reviewer, Mordaunt Hall, describes 
its power as “an eloquent pictorial epic of the World War” that had stirred 
its audience to both “laughter and tears”:
This powerful photodrama . . . [has] been converted to the screen from a 
story by Laurence Stallings, co-author of “What Price Glory,” and directed 
by king Vidor. It is a subject so compelling and realistic that one feels 
impelled to approach a review of it with all the respect it deserves, for as a 
motion picture it is something beyond the fondest dreams of most people.
As Hall’s review illustrates: “Laurence Stallings, [as] co-author of ‘What 
Price Glory’” proved central to the film’s reception as “compelling and 
realistic.” Thus through the medium of the silent cinema photodrama, 
Stallings—with the help of Vidor, Thalberg, and MGM Studios—success-
fully translated his wartime experience of physical mutilation into some-
thing that appealed to American audiences as it carried them “beyond 
[their] fondest dreams.”
kicked in the head by disembodied Manhood
King Vidor’s Epiphany of Cinematic Realism
In an interview with kenneth Brownlow, king Vidor describes the cre-
ative inspiration at the root of The Big Parade:
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Stallings had been a Marine, and had been at Belleau Wood, and had lost 
a leg. That’s why I had Gilbert lose a leg in the picture; he copied Stall-
ings’s leg movement for the last scene. Stallings was the biggest source of 
inspiration about the war. (Brownlow 188)
Thalberg saw What Price in New york, sought out Stallings, and brought 
him to Hollywood to work on the film. Having offered a short summary 
treatment for the film, Stallings returned to New york by train accom-
panied Vidor. The young filmmaker later recalled a career-changing 
epiphany he had during that train voyage—one brought on by the vio-
lently inspirational and undeniable “realness” of Stallings’s physical loss 
and compensating prosthesis:
Late into the night the war reminiscing would go on. Towards morning, 
when I’d hear Stallings snoring above, I’d tell myself that it was time to 
relax and get to sleep. But the horrors and details of Chateau-Thierry and 
Metz had me too excited for sleep. I kept saying to myself, “This is all 
too fantastic and unreal. It never happened.” One night, as I sat in my 
lower berth with eyes closed, the train started a violent swaying action. 
Stallings’s wooden leg, hanging on a wall hook, swung in a wide arc with 
the motion of the train and the heavy brogue on the wooden foot kicked 
me hard in the chin. When I recovered from the blow, the evidence of the 
swaying leg with the sock and shoe still on it was all too real. I could never 
again say to myself that the horrors of war didn’t happen; I accepted the 
facts. I have often wondered if this timely blow on the chin didn’t contrib-
ute much to the reality and later success of the film. (Vidor, A Tree 74–75)
This remarkable moment suggested to Vidor the potential of a supple-
ment or proxy to communicate truth and assert itself as an undeniably 
real thing. Swaying with the train’s machine-generated rhythm, Stall-
ings’s disembodied prosthesis—as Vidor characterizes it—comes to life 
as a seemingly vengeful spirit of the technologically driven violence of 
the Great War. The leg (with the assistance of the train) does not allow 
Vidor to dismiss the destructive power that technology could wield. For 
him, it was not just Stallings’s prosthetic leg that had kicked him in the 
face; it was also the hard truth about the war and all that Stallings and 
men like him had experienced. Vidor’s epiphany—how to make a pow-
erful narrative film—proves to be one best characterized as both literally 
and figuratively inspired by the phenomenon of “narrative prosthesis” 
in line with Mitchell’s explanation of his “coinage of the phrase ‘narra-
tive prosthesis’” as a means of arguing that “disability has been used 
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throughout history as a crutch on which literary narratives lean for their 
representational power, disruptive potentiality, and social critique” (17). 
Vidor, however, would use the inspiration of “narrative prosthesis” for 
a film rather than literary narrative and thus would wind up including 
powerful—though equivocal—visual narrative commentary on the prob-
lematic “social construction of disability itself” (17).
 This “prosthetic” moment on the train with Stallings inspired Vidor 
as a filmmaker by providing him with the means for achieving a similar 
in-your-face shock using the film medium in a way that could counteract 
audience’s efforts to dismiss it as fiction, just as he had tried to dismiss 
Stallings’s war stories as “too fantastic and unreal.” Getting kicked by 
Stallings’s prosthetic leg made Vidor realize that (to draw upon Mitchell’s 
characterization of disability’s role in narrative constructions), “disability 
[could] serve as the ‘hard kernel’ or recalcitrant corporeal matter that 
cannot be deconstructed away” (17). As Vidor tells his story, the proxy 
for Stallings’s missing leg struck him with the realization of how to create 
a cinematic realism that could also be a powerful proxy for the real. Stall-
ings’s wooden leg simultaneously communicated masculine loss and a 
regenerative new potency as a kind of ideal phallus that remains eternally 
rigid, even while Stallings sleeps.
 Having had the inspiration for how to make The Big Parade a power-
fully real war epic kicked into his head by Stallings’s disembodied pros-
thesis, Vidor went on to construct recurring images of the protagonist’s 
legs performing as if they had an agency of their own. Through close-ups, 
framing, and clever manipulation of the mise-en-scène, Jim Apperson’s 
legs practically become autonomous characters in the film. The focus on 
Jim’s two legs in scene after scene sets the stage for the film’s melodra-
matic climax which depicts only one leg and the other’s disturbing partial 
absence. At the film’s outset, Jim’s two feet (and the goading of “the girl 
next door”) get him into the war. When the “Big Parade” of recruitment 
passes through his hometown, the marching band’s marshal beat appeals 
to Jim’s feet. In close-ups crosscut with medium shots of his torso, we see 
his feet tapping in rhythm with the drumming, seemingly of their own 
volition. These same feet carry Jim into the parade to join his friends on 
their way to enlist.
 Jim’s legs really come into their own once he arrives in France and ini-
tiates his courtship of Melisande. In a patently Chaplinesque instance of 
slapstick, for example, Jim first meets Melisande as he stumbles through 
the streets of her village with a barrel over his head. Harking back to 
silent cinema’s roots, such physical humor punctuates The Big Parade’s 
first half. In the second half, a physical gravitas of wounding and mutila-
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tion replaces this physical humor. The barrel-over-the-head gag also con-
tributes to the film’s disembodied leg motif, for, with the barrel coming 
down to his waist, Melisande first meets Jim’s legs on their own. At their 
second meeting, she identifies him from the unraveling leg puttee he 
unwittingly drags through the mud. In a flirtatious exchange, Melisande 
volunteers to rewrap the puttee, and this leads to a charged intimate con-
tact with her fondling his muddied leg. In both this scene and the film’s 
promotional poster, Jim’s leg serves as a suggestively phallic allusion to 
the sexual tension between the French peasant woman and the American 
doughboy.
 As the lovers’ courtship develops, the film draws attention to Jim’s legs 
so frequently that Melisande seems to have a relationship with them on 
their own. Close-ups feature Jim’s legs and feet again and again. One scene 
includes close-ups of him polishing his boots before a date; in another 
sequence his legs hang from a hay wagon as Melisande talks to them and 
then shakes them to attention while the rest of Jim’s body remains off-
screen. The lovers’ poignant farewell amid the evacuation of Jim’s battalion 
to the front culminates with Melisande clinging to Jim’s leg. Once again, 
the framing cuts off the rest of his body as he climbs up into a truck. As the 
truck pulls away, Jim throws one of his boots to Melisande as a last sou-
venir. She holds it up triumphantly and then falls to the ground clutching 
it to her breast. The film’s first half ends with a long shot of Melisande 
alone on an empty road as she holds Jim’s boot. With this shot, Vidor ends 
the film’s first half with a desolate image serving as a counterpoint to the 
frenzy of the evacuation sequence. As he later described it, “Where minutes 
before had been frantic confusion, there was now lonely solitude. In the 
roadway crouched the girl alone with the boot. Nothing marred the still-
ness as the scene slowly faded out” (A Tree 78). This visual transition from 
a frenetic and cluttered mise-en-scène to one of “lonely solitude” and still 
desolation prefigures the climax of the film’s second half that also moves 
from fullness to absence with the tense stillness of Jim’s homecoming fol-
lowing a visual crescendo of chaotic battle sequences. For the film’s final 
scene, however, Vidor added a redemptive coda—a cinematic prosthesis 
coinciding with Jim’s prosthetic leg—that depicts a romantic union and a 
happy return to seeming wholeness.
Jim Apperson’s Jazzy new Gait
The Contrapuntal Rhythm of Disability
The film’s famous evacuation sequence exemplifies what Vidor describes 
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as his experimentation with creating cinematic “silent music.” Attuned to 
how movement before the camera and the later act of editing could create 
“distinctive rhythms . . . blended into a total symphonic effect,” Vidor 
sought to exploit such rhythms and effects as a means of contributing to 
the dramatic power of his film narratives. In the case of The Big Parade’s 
evacuation sequence, he uses this silent music “to achieve a powerful 
surge of emotion just before the theatre lights went up for intermission.” 
He describes another example of this technique in a battle scene with men 
slowly marching through a grove of pine trees meant to replicate the U.S. 
Marine’s offensive at Belleau Wood. In preparing for this sequence, Vidor 
studied “almost [one] hundred reels of documentary film made during 
World War I” by the U.S. Army’s Signal Corps (some of which were later 
integrated into The Big Parade’s battle sequences). Viewing this footage pro-
vided him with a promising inspiration for creating his visual silent music:
One day . . . I was struck by the fact that a company of men were pass-
ing the camera at a cadence decidedly different from the usual ones. It 
was a rhythm of suspended animation and their movement suggested an 
ominous event. There was no sound track, but the whole pattern spelled 
death. Then a flag-draped coffin came into view on top of a horse drawn 
caisson. The men were in a funeral cortege. The thought struck me that 
if I could duplicate this slow, measured cadence as my American troops 
approached the front line, I could illustrate the proximity of death with a 
telling and powerful effect. I was in the realm of my favourite obsession, 
experimenting with the possibilities of “silent music.” (A Tree 76)
Using “a metronome and a drummer with a bass drum [who] amplified 
the metronomic ticks,” Vidor instructed all actors and extras “that each 
step must be taken on a drum beat, each turn of the head, lift of a rifle, 
pull of a trigger, in short, every physical move must occur on the beat of 
a drum.” Later reflecting on one British extra’s complaint that he felt he 
was performing “some bloody ballet,” Vidor explains, “I did not say so 
at the time, but that is exactly what it was—a bloody ballet, a ballet of 
death” (76–78). In orchestrating his “bloody ballet of death,” Vidor adds a 
visually rhythmic component to his film’s antiwar message: Soldiers who 
march in metronomic time march to a militaristic and mechanical rhythm 
linked to the unprecedented death and technological destruction of WWI. 
Thus the film implicitly critiques the standardized physical movements 
of a military march that require men to move their bodies in a uniform 
cadence and, as such, contribute to a militaristic display of a normative 
masculine body. Having carefully orchestrated images of controlled and 
standardized body movement, Vidor then replaces it with images of an 
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individually distinctive physical movement inspired by Stallings’s dis-
abled body and its gait. In short, Stallings’s body provides the film with 
a rhythmic counterpoint for its conclusion.
 As Vidor explains, Stallings’s distinctive gait inspired the culminating 
instance of the film’s visual “silent music”: “That’s why I had Gilbert 
lose a leg in the picture; he copied Stallings’s leg movement for the last 
scene” (King Vidor 58). This movement results in a closing counterpoint 
to the earlier rhythm of the death march. Where the metronomic march 
through the woods had been Vidor’s “bloody . . . ballet of death,” the 
film’s final sequence—with Jim hobbling to Melisande in “a cadence 
decidedly different from the usual”—represents a visual equivalent of a 
modern, syncopated jazz solo—music of a U.S. postwar era characterized 
by improvisation and the irregular accenting of downbeats. The ending 
of the film represents a visual American musical counterpoint to the 
earlier visual symphony of death in a European theatre of war. Having 
depicted images of the war’s death and carnage using carefully syn-
chronized visual rhythms that Vidor associates with European musical 
forms such as the symphony and the ballet, he then ends the film using 
a jazz-like syncopated gait of disability that aligns the film’s redemptive 
conclusion with the national optimism of the U.S. postwar Jazz Age. Jim 
Apperson, a wounded survivor of the war’s European death marches, 
leaves the drumbeat of The Big Parade behind and, as a new man fitted 
with a wooden leg, jerks his new body to an independent new rhythm 
of international love and healing. Just as Vidor’s bloody ballet of death 
prefigures the counterpoint of Jim’s jazzy postwar gait of disability, so too 
does Vidor’s visual motif of Jim’s disembodied legs precondition the final 
revelation of his missing leg and its ultimate replacement with a pros-
thesis. The normative soldier’s body linked to the death and destruction 
of the war enables the counterpoint for a veteran’s disabled body tied to 
new postwar hopes represented as individualistic, transcendentally dif-
ferent, and ultimately redeemed.
The Big Parade’s new leading Man
Crossing the Romantic Heartthrob with the Tortured Freak
Using MGM’s romantic star property John Gilbert and Laurence Stallings’s 
body as an inspiration, Vidor made the actor’s body deliver a new kind of 
physical, fallible, and more “realistic” star performance. Vidor describes 
altering Gilbert’s “personal style of make-up and dress” for the film and 
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explains, “I decided that in his new character of down-to-earth doughboy, 
he would use no make-up, and wear an ill-fitting uniform. Dirty finger-
nails and a sweaty, begrimed face were to take the place of perfectly made-
up skin texture” (A Tree 75). In addition to changes in make-up, hygiene, 
and skin texture, Vidor also manipulated Gilbert’s body by using a har-
ness to conceal the lower half of one of his legs. With amputation repre-
senting one of the most irrefutable signs of service and sacrifice in the 
war, Vidor concealed part of Gilbert’s leg as a means of linking physical 
absence with “realism” in his construction of the “character of down-to-
earth doughboy.” As Stallings’s irreverent self-description put it—making 
an ironic reference to the prosthesis he used—his status as an amputee 
made him someone uniquely “tied to the wooden things of life.”
 In emphasizing (and constructing) Gilbert’s body as fallible, Vidor 
risked de-emphasizing the idealized handsome face that, up to that 
point, had been the key to his star status. In the end, Gilbert’s portrayal 
of the physically disabled Jim Apperson succeeded as a groundbreaking 
performance of postwar manhood. The performance, however, was not 
entirely unprecedented as a cinematic depiction of injured masculinity. It 
was, rather, an innovative crossing of Gilbert’s romantically desirable star 
qualities with those of an alternative, yet highly influential, star persona: 
the silent-film phenomenon Lon Chaney whose portrayals of physically 
tortured characters had established his unique stardom beginning with 
his lead role in the 1920 film The Penalty.
 In playing the romantic, handsome male lead who appealed (and was 
marketed) to female audiences in the 1920s, Gilbert had to compete with 
other, more established matinee idols, including, among others, Douglas 
Fairbanks, John Barrymore, and Rudolph Valentino. Gaylyn Studlar has 
compared these men’s star personae to that of Lon Chaney, whose silent-
era stardom marked a radical departure from their brand of physically 
idealized masculinity. As Studlar points out, Chaney, one of the silent 
era’s biggest box-office draws, played an entirely different kind of male 
lead that “embodied a startling rejection of [their] character-building, 
cult-of-the-body norms” (201). Where stars such as Fairbanks, Barrymore, 
and Valentino (and Gilbert) performed images of virility and physical 
perfection, Chaney portrayed “the grotesque body and the male body in 
pain” (8). In The Big Parade, elements of Chaney’s alternative star persona 
combined with Gilbert’s standing as a romantic male lead and, together, 
resulted in a contradictory new postwar masculine type.
 Chaney achieved his stardom playing mentally and emotionally tor-
tured characters who also had physical disabilities—most famously in The 
Hunchback of Notre Dame (1923) and The Phantom of the Opera (1925). The 
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marketing of Chaney’s pictures, Studlar explains, targeted male audiences, 
and his depiction of tortured and mutable physicality could not have been 
further from the physically idealized and sexually objectified star bodies 
of actors cast as matinee heartthrobs for female moviegoers. Studlar reads 
Chaney’s unique and overlooked significance as an alternative male star 
of the silent era in connection with the cultural legacy of the freak show: 
“Chaney’s variations on the grotesque male body create a radical contrast 
with the beautiful male body foregrounded for the audience’s specular 
consumption of Barrymore, Valentino, and, albeit in less explicitly sexual 
ways, of Fairbanks” (201). In The Big Parade, Gilbert’s role as Jim Apperson 
portrays a male body that manages to be simultaneously grotesque and 
romantically desirable. With his homecoming as a wounded veteran, the 
film portrays Jim as someone who loses a leg but “gets the girl.” The film’s 
remarkable success (which brought unprecedented numbers of men and 
women to the box office) can be attributed in part to Vidor’s decision to 
cast Gilbert, an idealized heartthrob, in a role that borrowed elements from 
Chaney’s physically tortured “freak” persona.3
 Vidor later acknowledges Chaney as the inspiration for creating the 
illusion of physical mutilation in The Big Parade. “I had seen Lon Chaney 
in The Penalty,” he explained, “with both of his legs strapped up and we 
figured that if Chaney could do it, Gilbert could do it. We worked out 
some sort of harness” (King Vidor 58). In an earlier MGM film, He Who Got 
Slapped (1924), Gilbert plays opposite Chaney in a romantic supporting 
role that serves as a counterpoint to Chaney’s lead role as a masochistic 
clown. With The Big Parade, the earlier, contrasting star performances 
melded into one romantically freakish character.4 As a result, much of 
Studlar’s description of Chaney’s alternative male stardom fits The Big 
Parade’s Jim Apperson:
Chaney’s roles offered a revelation . . . of masculinity allowed to be failed 
and freakish. The masculine self exposed in Chaney’s films was in the 
freak show mold of the Other constructed in contradictory terms: stigma-
tized and yet aggrandized, grotesque and yet still romantically capable 
of suffering for love. This male suffering is totally unlike that of the Bar-
rymore hero. (210)
 3. For a discussion of how a similar “enfreaking” of “war-injured bodies” played out contem-
poraneously in propaganda and modernist literature of the 1920s, see Thomas Fahy’s “Enfreaking 
War-Injured Bodies,” 529–63. 
 4. For a detailed theoretical and historical analysis of the social construction of freaks that seeks 
to “develop an understanding of past practices and changing conceptions of human variation,” 
see Robert Bogdan’s article in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (ed.), Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the 
Extraordinary Body (23).
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Gilbert’s role in The Big Parade combines in one character what Studlar 
characterizes as oppositional male types “totally unlike” one another. The 
portrayal of Jim Apperson demonstrates how much more contradictory 
postwar masculine performance becomes when portrayed as a simultane-
ously stigmatized, aggrandized, and romanticized grotesque capable of 
suffering physically and for love and ultimately uniting with his female 
love interest. By drawing upon Laurence Stallings’s actual veteran’s 
body and employing the cinematic tricks of Lon Chaney’s performance 
of freakish masculinity, The Big Parade presented a new kind of male star 
spectacle that was both romantically desirable and physically disabled in 
a way that appealed to audiences of both men and women as an unprec-
edentedly “real” instance of postwar manhood.5
Conclusion
Hollywood Film as Prosthesis—
Stallings’s “WholeArt of a Wooden Leg”
In his 1923 essay, “The Whole Art of a Wooden Leg,” Stallings irreverently 
describes living in New york City facing the frustrations, embarrassments, 
and exhilarating perils he experienced as a amputee veteran—“one of 
those soldiers who shed a leg or two for the cause of liberty bonds” (107). 
 5. Rudolph Valentino’s sadomasochistic performance in The Son of Sheik (1926)—a departure 
from his earlier roles—and Charles Farrell’s role as a wounded veteran in Frank Borzage’s Seventh 
Heaven (1927) both illustrate the groundbreaking influence of Gilbert’s role in The Big Parade. Both 
these highly successful silent film performances followed in the years just after The Big Parade. Fur-
thermore, John Barrymore developed his early cinematic roles of the 1920s—which Studlar char-
acterizes as a “woman-made object” of eroticized desire for a young, perfect, soft-focus male body 
(93–102)—toward more tormented characters, and characters depicting a variety of physical body 
types and movements. Barrymore’s career in fact reveals one harbinger of the kind of marriage of a 
Chaneyesque freak with the dominant idealized matinee idol masculinity achieved by The Big Parade: 
Barrymore’s cinematic breakthrough role in Dr. Jekyll and mr. Hyde (1920). Barrymore’s “younger 
and more attractive” (Studlar 129) variation on Stevenson’s original Dr. Jekyll is accompanied by 
a physically gruesome counterpoint in his performance of Hyde. The latter, however, is ultimately 
eliminated and expunged from that ideal young body as what Studlar characterizes as a “eugeni-
cist’s nightmare of masculinity” (130). While the Jekyll/Hyde narrative reinforces the clear antithesis 
between an ideal masculine body and its excessively freakish counterpoint, Gilbert’s performance 
as a physically disabled matinee idol concludes The Big Parade by leaving the two types as one new 
version of desirable, disabled, postwar masculinity. In the wake of that precedent, Barrymore went 
on to play the hunchback Richard III in a cinematic reprise of his earlier theatrical performance, as 
well as Herman Melville’s peg-legged Ahab twice, in The Sea Beast (1926) and moby Dick (1930). For 
a more detailed discussion of Barrymore’s film career shaped by “Hollywood’s objectification of 
masculinity for female spectators in the 1920s,” see Studlar (95). For another theoretical discussion of 
female spectatorship and Hollywood masculinity during the silent era and, in particular, the sado-
masochistic turn in Valentino’s later films, see Miriam Hansen, Babel and Babylon, 287–94; on Farrell 
and Borzage and a reading of Farrell’s performance of wounded masculinity in Seventh Heaven, see 
Pat kirkham, “Loving Men,” 94–112. 
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Stallings explains frankly to whom his tongue-in-cheek essay is directed: 
“I address myself primarily to my public, that army of men and women 
who eye me suspiciously in the church, the theatre, and the busy marts of 
trade; to those who are highly curious about this unsatisfactory adjunct 
to locomotion.” Aware of the spectacle he and his prosthesis make in the 
streets and public venues of Manhattan, Stallings reacts with the pre-
scribed authorial tone of the day: a modernist’s balance of irony and pity. 
The essay reaches its painfully comic climax at the theatre where Stallings 
finds himself unable to escape into the easy anonymous role of the spec-
tator as his wooden leg, once again, takes on a problematic life of its own:
I became absorbed in a drama unfolding itself upon the stage and paid 
scant heed to the erring foot. The hero of the play was kissing his sweet-
heart in fond farewell, while offstage the drums of his gallant regiment 
were thumping martially. The drum beats evoked memories, and while 
its owner became stirred by them the ubiquitous extremity crept for-
ward and nestled companionably among the feet of the woman ahead. I 
was first made aware of this highly objectionable familiarity, impersonal 
though it certainly was, by the woman’s mother who turned and glared 
for a moment before denouncing me in firm, well heard tones. The expe-
rienced uniped theatre-goer should learn to park his badge of patriotism 
in the aisle.
Upon leaving New york for Hollywood and working with Vidor and 
Thalberg at MGM, Stallings gained access to another place where he could 
safely place “his badge of patriotism” which was so prone to turning into 
an uncontrollable, unwanted sign of potent yet problematic masculinity: 
onto the silent silver screen. Through the regenerative magic of the Hol-
lywood narrative, Stallings contributed to the displacement of (or at least 
an alternative to) the romanticized military pap performed in the the-
atres he attended as a critic. By working with Stallings, Vidor—who could 
draw on the vast resources and filmmaking apparatus of the burgeoning 
Hollywood studio system—took the veteran’s story and disabled body 
and successfully “picturized” them (as the film’s poster proclaims) as a 
means of crafting a new form of cinematic “realism.”
 While making The Big Parade, Vidor saw himself as working in 
conjunction with Stallings on a powerful antiwar statement “from 
the realistic GI viewpoint” and in a way that “cut out all the bunk, all 
the fantasies and insincerities about the war [because it] happened to 
be the way we both wrote” (King Vidor 73). years later Vidor came to 
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view the film more critically and in a 1974 interview declares, “I don’t 
encourage people to see [it]” (Baxter 21). Vidor’s later dismissal of a film 
he had previously characterized as groundbreakingly realistic indicates 
a hindsight acknowledgment of the film’s melodramatic elements and 
“realistic” shortcomings. Indeed, the film’s melodrama, as much as its 
realism, shaped its depiction of war as one designed to help Americans 
make sense of, rationalize, and accept the historical trauma of a deeply 
irrational mass destruction.
 In his novel Plumes, Stallings renders a far more bitter narrative about 
the experience of returning from war as a painfully wounded and physi-
cally disabled veteran. Through an ironic and debunking use of over-
blown diction and euphemistic clichés, Plumes challenges comfortable 
melodramas and romantic depictions of wounded warriors who fling 
“wide their caparisoned banners” and return “to some close chimney side 
to lick their wounds awhile and adjust their bodies to the gentler arts of 
peace.” With his novel Stallings attempted to rewrite the happy story of 
men who lose legs to “the stroke of the merciful knife” and “amputating 
iron” and then “hobble home to [their wives’] arms” (71). Plumes, how-
ever, failed in the cultural marketplace of the 1920s, and Stallings went on 
to contribute both his body and his writing as source texts for a film that 
blended melodramatic narrative formulas with more groundbreaking 
cinematic representations in a contradictory portrayal of masculinity that 
comes to a happy resolution with an amputee limping on a prosthetic leg 
into his lover’s arms.
 Drawing on a combination of melodrama and attempts at cin-
ematic “realism” inspired by physical disability, The Big Parade trans-
lates Laurence Stallings’s postwar problem body into an exemplary and 
powerful portrayal of postwar masculinity. As a veteran, an author, 
and an inspirational body, Stallings served as the realistic key to what 
became a widely appealing and influential cinematic spectacle of war, 
wounding, love, and recovery. With The Big Parade, Stallings engaged 
with a medium commensurate with his contradictory postwar subjec-
tivity and the simultaneously problematic and promising “reality” of 
a veteran’s disabled body.6 Ultimately, Stallings’s leg and its prosthetic 
 6. A comparison of the cinematic portrayals of postwar masculine disability in The Big Parade and 
in the post-WWII film The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) offers an illuminating contrast that I do not 
have the space to fully explore in this essay. In the later post-WWII film the fictional role of a veteran 
who has lost his hands is played by the actor Harold Russell, who actually did lose his hands in the 
war. For an insightful exegesis of this film and the complicated role that Russell’s disability plays 
in its cinematic narrative significations, see kaja Silverman, male Subjectivity, 52–90. While this later 
postwar epic has many compelling parallels to The Big Parade, it also has at least two significant and 
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replacement—one conspicuous in its absence, the other equally conspic-
uous in its hard, wooden presence—together served as two powerfully 
contradictory signs of authentic postwar manhood that helped to create 
a new cinematic “whole art of a wooden leg.”
revealing differences. First, The Best Years of Our Lives focuses on the painful experience of a veteran’s 
adjustment to postwar life on the home front—something Stallings tried to render in his novel Plumes 
that was rejected by critics and readers in the 1920s. Second, The Best Years of Our Lives includes the 
actual body of an amputee veteran within the profilmic text itself. Silverman explains that although 
“Harold Russell’s double amputation does not ‘make the movie spill over into the real world’[,] . . . it 
does situate the image of Homer Parish’s arms on a different level of representation than the rest of 
the film” (73). This results in what Silverman calls “a strong referential pull, seeming to point beyond 
the text and Russell’s acting to his body and the traces left there by the war.” With The Big Parade, 
Stallings’s body remained entirely “beyond the text” as nothing more than an implied absence and 
yet still managed to inspire a fictional depiction of amputation with a uniquely “strong referential 
pull.” 
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Specular distractions
In Jacques Tourneur’s film Out of the Past (1947), a deaf boy (Dickie Moore) 
protects Jeff Bailey (Robert Mitchum) from police and gangsters who, for 
differing reasons, are pursuing him for his role in a murder. Jeff is sub-
sequently killed by the femme fatale, kathy (Greer Garson), when she 
discovers that he is handing her over to the police as the killer. When 
Jeff’s current girlfriend, Ann (Virginia Huston), asks the deaf boy whether 
Bailey had intended to return to kathy, the boy nods affirmatively, telling 
a lie that frees her from her emotional dependence on the hero and per-
mits her to marry a local policeman. In Fallen Sparrow (1943), kit (John 
Garfield), having been tortured in prison during the Spanish Civil War, 
is haunted by one of his tormentors, a “man who limps,” who has fol-
lowed him back to the United States. The sound of the man’s foot being 
dragged reduces the shell-shocked kit to shuddering hysteria until, faced 
with evidence that his pursuer is a Nazi spy, the hero confronts him in 
a final shootout. In The Blue Dahlia (1946) Johnny Morrison (Alan Ladd) 
has returned from WWII to find that his wife has been unfaithful. After 
an argument the wife is killed, and suspicion points to Ladd, but more 
particularly to Ladd’s wartime buddy, Buzz (William Bendix), who has 
been injured in the war and suffers from what we would now call “post-
traumatic stress syndrome.” His mental disability, although not visible all 
the time, causes him to become violent whenever he hears certain kinds 
of loud music.1
 1. The music that sets Buzz off is referred to as “jungle music,” clearly a reference to jazz and black 
music in general. The movie implies that Buzz’s music-induced violence is due not only to his combat 
43
Phantom limbs
Film Noir and the Disabled Body
M i C h A E l  d A v i d S o n
l
| Phantom Limbs44
 These examples could be expanded to include numerous films in 
which a person with a disability plays a supporting role, serving as a 
marker for larger narratives about normalcy and legitimacy.2 The deaf 
boy in Out of the Past mirrors Jeff Bailey’s flawed yet stoical integrity, 
providing a silent riposte to the flashy glamour and tough-guy patter 
between the other males in the film. The limping tormenter in Fallen 
Sparrow is also a Nazi spy, permitting the director, Richard Wallace, to 
use disability to shift kit’s problematic leftist involvement in Republican 
Spain to WWII patriotism. Buzz’s mental disability in Blue Dahlia annexes 
the era’s concern about soldiers psychologically damaged in the war. In 
most cases disabled figures—at least in the noir films that I discuss—play 
cameo roles, much the way that Hollywood uses Black, Latino, or Asian 
figures to provide a racialized counter-narrative to the hero’s existential 
malaise. In Eric Lott’s terms, the proximity of a racially marked character 
assists in “darkening” the white hero, linking him to more subversive 
or morally suspect forces within the society at large (81–83). A similar 
troping of able-bodied disability appears in films based around a male 
who, although internally wounded, must nevertheless be physically able 
to walk down the mean streets of Cold War America.3
experiences but also to his participation in an integrated, mixed-race Army, for which black music 
serves as a troublesome reminder.
 2. In addition to the films that I discuss in this essay, a brief survey of disabled figures in noir 
films would include the following: In Kiss of Death (1947) a deranged Richard Widmark pushes a 
woman in a wheelchair down a flight of stairs. In The Spiral Staircase (1945) Dorothy McGuire plays 
a mute servant in a small town where a number of disabled people are murdered. Somewhere in the 
Night (1946) features an ex-marine (John Hodiak) who suffers from amnesia. In The Big Sleep (1946) 
Humphrey Bogart, as Raymond Chandler’s detective, Marlowe, works for Colonel Sternwood who 
is confined to a wheelchair; Sternwood’s daughter, Carmen, suffers from some undiagnosed mental 
condition and drug addiction. Another Chandler film, The Brasher Doubloon (1947), features Marlowe 
in a blackmail scheme involving a secretary who is mentally disturbed. In Sorry, Wrong Number 
(1948) Barbara Stanwyck plays a bedridden woman who overhears a phone conversation plot to kill 
her. In Thieves Highway (1949) Nick Garcos (Richard Conte) returns from the war to find his father 
crippled due to a truck accident. In Rear Window (1954) Jimmy Stewart, injured by an accident and 
recovering in a wheelchair while wearing a full leg cast, observes what he thinks is a murder plot in 
a neighboring building. In ministry of Fear (1944) the spy who pursues Stephen Neale (Ray Milland) 
is blind. In They Live By Night (1949) Howard Da Silva plays a one-eyed demented robber and sadist. 
In The Big Heat (1953) Glen Ford gets crucial information on a crime from a crippled secretary; in 
the same movie Gloria Graham is scalded with boiling coffee by her boyfriend (Lee Marvin), thus 
“ruining her looks.” In The manchurian Candidate (1962) Laurence Harvey is a brainwashed korean 
War veteran who is programmed to be an assassin. In The Big Combo (1955) Brian Donleavy plays 
a tough crime boss’s enforcer who is deaf and who tortures his victims by forcing them to listen to 
loud music through his hearing aid. In Ride the Pink Horse (1947) a mob figure, Mr. Hugo, is deaf and 
uses a primitive cochlear implant attached to his ear. In every case, disability is a sign of weakness 
or, more often, evil, but the disability often serves as a metonymic reflection on the noir hero’s own 
internal flaws. Although cognitive disorders and mental illness exist in a separate category of dis-
ability, they form the backbone of many noir films, including a number of Alfred Hitchcock’s films 
such as Spellbound (1945), Strangers on a Train (1951), Vertigo (1958), and Psycho (1960).
 3. Although some films of this period—Sorry, Wrong Number; The Spiral Staircase; and Rear 
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 This phenomenon can be partially explained by what David Mitchell 
and Sharon Snyder call “narrative prosthesis,” the use of dis-ability to 
en-able a story. The disabled body serves as a “crutch upon which literary 
narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive potentiality, 
and analytical insight” (49). If narrative closure depends on restoration 
of the able-bodied individual (to health, society, normalcy), the disabled 
character represents a form of physical deviance necessary for marking 
the body’s unruliness. But, as I hope to show, disability may often facili-
tate other narratives not so easily represented. Moreover, it may utilize the 
disabled body as a site for social panics about unruly bodies in general, 
diverting the gaze from one stigmatized identity onto another. Hence the 
title of my essay, “Phantom Limbs,” refers to the residual sensation of 
narratives that the film cannot represent or reconstitute. We might say 
that the phantom limb phenomenon is the affective response to narrative 
prosthesis, the way that trauma is experienced after the limb has been 
surgically removed and therapy undergone.4
 The phantom limb phenomenon is especially prevalent in film noir, 
a genre that emerged during a period of Cold War consensus when the 
maintenance of normalcy and national health coincided with geopolit-
ical imperatives at large. Cultural representations of sexual or personal 
excess, from Elvis’s gyrating hips to Beat bohemians and motorcycle out-
laws, were dismissed by consensus intellectuals, on the one hand, or were 
heavily monitored by congressional investigating committees and the 
Motion Picture Production Code on the other.5 Film noir sometimes sup-
ported those national goals by celebrating returning war heroes or crooks 
who go straight, yet many of them (often made by black- or gray-listed 
directors) achieved their ends by presenting dystopic views of marginal 
social types—the criminal, the disgraced detective, the wrongly accused 
fugitive. The noir hero is a tough loner who is flawed but who has integ-
limp marks the hero’s psychic wounds.
 4. The first description of the “phantom limb” phenomenon was provided by Ambroise Pare 
in the mid-sixteenth century when he wrote of patients who “imagine they have their members yet 
entire, and yet due complaine thereof” (qtd. in Gorman 30). Silas Weir Mitchell provided the fullest 
early discussion of the phenomenon in the late nineteenth-century. He noted that among his patients 
who had lost organs or limbs, almost all experienced the phantom limb phenomenon. Although the 
phrase usually applies to amputated arms or legs, according to Weir Mitchell it was experienced 
with loss of eyes, internal organs, or rectum, and in cases involving hysterectomy. Perhaps most 
interesting, given our topic, is the fact that it was reported in cases of a missing penis. Mitchell was 
the inventor of the famous “rest” cure for women suffering from nervous disorders. On phantom 
limb and body image see Warren Gorman, Body Image, and Elizabeth Grosz’s Volatile Bodies.
 5. The Motion Picture Production Code was begun in 1930 by the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America under the administration of Will Hays. As Vito Russo points out, “the Code 
survived under different names until the late Sixties, often taking the name of its current adminis-
trator. Thus, at various times it was called the Johnston Office, the Hays Office and the Breen Office.” 
Russo, The Celluloid Closet, 31.
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rity in a corrupt world. He fights on his own terms, even though he is 
haunted by a dark past. Although noir films usually present him as prey 
to the femme fatale, his non-domestic status and bachelorhood mark him 
as a sexually indeterminate figure. His phantom relationship to the domi-
nant culture is assisted by a range of cinematic techniques that destabi-
lize the viewing experience. Expressionist camera angles, high-contrast 
lighting, disjunctive scores, and the use of voice-over and flashback sty-
listically reinforce psychological states of anxiety. Lost in an anonymous 
bureaucratic system or suffering from traumatic events incurred during 
the war, the noir hero must discover a code of honor based on contingent 
necessity rather than sanctioned authority.
 One way to historicize the phantom limb phenomenon with regard to 
Cold War culture is to look at the ways that physical disability served as a 
marker of gender trouble. Critics usually describe film noir as a masculine 
genre, marked by its literary origins in the hard-boiled detective novel, 
but it is often characterized by anxiety over the stability and definition of 
gender roles. Although the Production Code severely limited what direc-
tors could show of “deviant” passions, noir films created unforgettable 
gay icons—the butch masseuse in In a Lonely Place (1950); the effeminate 
drama critic, Waldo Lydecker, in Laura (1944); the fussy, effeminate Joe 
Cairo in The maltese Falcon (1941); and the psychopathic Bruno Antony 
in Strangers on a Train (1951)—who have made film noir a highly prized 
genre within queer culture. These thinly veiled figures of gay and lesbian 
identity serve to show that although the noir hero is often conflicted sexu-
ally, his heteromasculinity is never in serious question. In Richard Dyer’s 
terms, such sexually marginal figures “remind us of how far [the noir 
hero is] removed from that sort of thing” (69).
 “That sort of thing” may help shore up a normative sexuality, but it 
also provides a conflicted specular site that complicates the viewing of 
film noir generally. Robert Corber notes that in Otto Preminger’s film 
Laura, Clifton Webb’s portrayal of the homosexual theatre critic, Lydecker, 
is a “transgressive form of visual pleasure film noir offered spectators.” 
According to Corber,
Webb’s willingness to make a spectacle of his homosexuality hindered the 
spectator’s absorption in the diegesis, which was one of the primary goals 
of the classical system. It encouraged a mobile and ambulatory gaze that 
was easily distracted by the surface of the image. (56)
Although Lydecker is not disabled, he occupies a place of specular “dis-
traction” often occupied by such figures. When, for example, he conducts 
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an interview with the detective, Mark McPherson [Dana Andrews] in a 
bathtub, it disrupts the latter’s sexual obsession with Laura and redirects 
it onto the naked male body. The fact that the body is that of an effemi-
ninate drama critic helps to reinforce the theatrical character of such dis-
tractions throughout the film. I am adapting Corber’s terms about homo-
sexuality to speak of the ways that the disabled body in film noir turns 
performance into spectacle, diverting a gaze between viewer and unruly 
body to one between viewer and queer bodies elsewhere in the film.
 In numerous noir films a physical or cognitive disability marks a 
sexual inscrutability, otherwise unspeakable within terms of 1940s and 
1950s Production Code directives. Film theory has focused extensively on 
the mantis-like features of the femme fatale, but less has been said about 
her husband, a man whose physical disability serves as a camera obscura 
upon the noir hero’s existential wounds.6 In Double Indemnity (1944) Mrs. 
Dietrichson’s husband is on crutches; in The Lady from Shanghai (1948) 
Elsa Bannister’s husband wears braces and uses a cane; in Walk on the 
Wild Side (1962) Jo’s husband’s legs have been amputated, and he pulls 
himself around on a dolly. In all three cases the husband’s crippled con-
dition contrasts with the noir hero’s phallic potency, but it also produces 
a visual spectacle around the body in excess of the narrative’s ability to 
contain it. The presence of a disabled figure complicates the triangular 
gaze between viewer, noir hero, and femme fatale and provides a conduit 
for representing perversity that cannot be solved by reference to the film’s 
diegesis.
 The presence of a cinematic “phantom limb” provides a diversion 
for a more subtle subplot about same-sex alliances. Walter Neff’s (Fred 
MacMurray’s) appropriation of Mr. Dieterichson’s crutches diverts 
attention away from the affectionate relationship between Neff and his 
insurance coworker, Barton keyes (Edward G. Robinson). Arthur Ban-
nister’s (Everett Sloane’s) crutches, braces, and exaggerated pelvic thrust 
 6. By speaking of the femme fatale’s husband, I am speaking somewhat metaphorically about 
a figure, male or female, whose disability thwarts the smooth functioning of a heterosexual gaze. 
Because psychoanalytic “gaze” theory has been based largely around a specifically Oedipalized 
dyad, it has not been able to address the ways that other subjectivities are constructed and contested 
through acts of looking. In Robert Aldrich’s 1963 film, Whatever Happened to Baby Jane, for example, 
Bette Davis plays a former child star forgotten by Hollywood while her disabled sister, Blanche (Joan 
Crawford), is still remembered, despite being a paraplegic. In the film’s visual rhetoric, Blanche is 
the stoical, “beautiful” former actress who is now “tragically” crippled, while Jane is the able-bodied 
but mentally deranged, alcoholic shell of her former self. Much of the film’s drama centers on the 
ways that Jane’s heterosexual gaze is mediated by a Hollywood studio system that promotes ideals 
of youthful beauty against aging and physical decay. Jane fantasizes that she is still Baby Jane until 
she looks into the mirror and sees her decrepit, older self. She then looks into the “mirror” of her 
disabled sister and sees the success that she never had. Both gazes intensify her growing dementia. 
The film is thus about the ways that heterosexual desire is constructed through institutional contexts 
that disability makes strange.
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mediate his queer relationship with his law partner, George Thirsby 
(Glenn Anders). Jo’s (Barbara Stanwyck’s) husband’s amputated condi-
tion frames her erotic desire for the female lead (Capucine). Each of these 
examples illustrates the way that the disabled body reinforces a norma-
tive heterosexuality embodied by the noir hero, while at the same time 
it allows another sexuality to “pass” before the eyes of the Breen Office 
censors. Filmic passing is performed by containing homosexual content 
through the period’s “compulsory homosociality” in which male same-
sex alliances and power are reinforced by excluding women, in which the 
threat of genitalized contact is replaced by official forms of male bond-
ing.7 Such formations become important in a society in which certain 
types of homosocial association (Neff’s and keyes’s loyalty to the insur-
ance firm, Bannister’s and Grisby’s participation in the law) are essential 
to the perpetuation of capitalist hegemony. When women get together, as 
in Walk on the Wild Side, such homosocial bonds, instead of providing a 
socially (and economically) redemptive community, are signs of lesbian 
attachments and prostitution.8
 Although it would be reductive to see the disabled figure in film noir 
as a surrogate for queer identities, it is safe to say that these films build on 
a well-established connection between discourses of disability and sexu-
ality that can be found in cultural texts from Richard III (1955) to Fight 
Club (1999). Representations of a king, “rudely stamped,” or a man with 
dissociative identity disorder (DID) manifest themselves through narra-
tives about non-normative sexuality; perceived “weakness” of (in these 
cases) masculine power seems impossible to express outside of sexual 
difference. Robert McRuer defines the phenomenon as follows:
[T]he system of compulsory able-bodiedness that produces disability is 
thoroughly interwoven with the system of compulsory heterosexuality 
 7. I have discussed this phenomenon in relation to Cold War literary communities in “Compul-
sory Homosociality,” 197–216. 
 8. Another example of this double vector of sexualities and disabilities is Andrew Niccol’s 1997 
noirish film Gattaca, in which the genetically “invalid” but physically able-bodied main character, 
Vincent (Ethan Hawke), must appropriate the genetically “pure” DNA of the paraplegic, Jerome 
(Jude Law), in order to participate in a specialized space program. The fact that the relationship 
between the two men is thematized as queer—a condition reinforced by their sharing of bodily 
fluids, spaces, and identities—reinforces the close link between narratives of genetic perfection and 
sexual pollution. Jerome’s self-immolation at the end of the film provides an all-too-typical Hol-
lywood denouement for both queers and disabled figures. Here, Vincent’s crippled condition is the 
prosthesis that supplements the film’s allegory of physical “normalness”: his queerness supplements 
the film’s allegory of heterosexual normalcy, figured in the main character. Although the film was 
made in 1997, its cinematic techniques and themes of alienation and social control refer to many 
aspects of film noir. I am grateful to Liberty Smith for her own (as yet unpublished) work on the 
intersection of queer and disabilities issues in Gattaca. For an excellent disabilities reading of the film, 
see Mark Jeffreys, “Dr. Daedalus and His Minotaur,” 137–52.
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that produces queerness, that—in fact—compulsory heterosexuality is 
contingent on compulsory able-bodiedness and vice versa. (89)
Finding the historical specifics of compulsory able-bodiedness is an 
important task for disabilities and queer studies, but such scholarship 
is often hamstrung by residual medical and psychoanalytic models that 
generalize the connection of bodies and sexualities around narratives of 
loss and lack. What, then, is the body of theory that the phantom limb 
remembers—and makes strange?
disabling Theory
“Midge, do you suppose many men wear corsets?”
 —Jimmy Stewart in Vertigo (1958)
Before looking more closely at my filmic examples, I want to frame my 
readings by considering feminist psychoanalytic film theory for which 
film noir is often a test case for how subjects are enlisted in dominant 
structures of desire. Such theories have been important for understanding 
the ways in which cinema structures acts of looking through gendered 
spectacles. In the process such theory has disabled the disability narra-
tive of many films by treating acts of looking and gazing as defined by 
castration. For Slavoj Žižek the fantasy object creates an “immobilising, 
crippling effect” upon the subject who must transform his “impotence 
into power by means of the gaze” (126). And Claire Johnston, speaking 
of Double Indemnity, notes that the film’s title sequence, showing a man 
on crutches, places the movie “under the sign of castration” (90). By 
equating visibility and acts of looking with castration, by equating femi-
nine “lack” with physical difference, the missing limb always becomes 
a missing phallus. Whether one agrees or argues with this reading of 
visual pleasure, psychoanalytical theory defines this reading by invoking 
an Oedipus whose blindness must always be a fatal loss, whose insight 
must be purchased through self-mutilation. Since much film noir criti-
cism is indebted to this tradition, it serves as a kind of theoretical gaze 
itself, creating the terms by which films suture the “incomplete” body 
onto the “incomplete” woman.
 As we know from Laura Mulvey’s influential 1975 article, “Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” phallocentrism “depends on the image 
of the castrated woman to give order and meaning to its world” (361). 
Classical narrative cinema embodies this Freudian truism where the 
| Phantom Limbs50
camera adopts the position of the male protagonist as active viewer of a 
passive female subject. The male’s “looking” or scopophilia seeks to gain 
erotic control of that which he finds threatening. Fear of castration drives 
the male protagonist, often a detective or police inspector, to establish 
his authority by fixing her actions through voyeurism and fetishization. 
Film noir’s extensive use of flashback/voice-over to interpret the diegetic 
material of the film reinforces such male control by framing threatening 
(libidinal) events from the past in the voice of authority who may provide 
a “rational” and “truthful” narrative.9
 For Mulvey the films of Alfred Hitchcock embody this fetishized gaze 
in extremis since they invariably center on a wounded protagonist’s anx-
iety about the reality of the female object of his desire. In Rear Window 
(1954) Jeff (Jimmy Stewart) has been disabled by an accident and his 
entire left leg is in a cast. While sitting in his wheelchair, he compensates 
for his inactivity by speculating on the lives of his neighbors from the 
vantage of his window. His detection of a crime in an adjacent apartment 
is furthered by his role as a photographer, but it is equally enhanced by 
the participation of his girlfriend, Lisa (Grace kelly), whose erotic interest 
for Jeff increases when she becomes involved in the detection process. 
Once she moves—quite literally—into Jeff’s line of vision by entering 
the apartment of the crime perpetrator, Jeff’s scopophilic desire increases 
and he begins to regard her as a possible companion and sexual partner. 
In terms made familiar by Mulvey, Jeff overcomes his physical limita-
tions—his castrated position in a wheelchair—by being able to orches-
trate his gaze toward solving a crime; his impotence as a disabled male 
is thus transformed by his controlling Lisa’s actions in his line of sight.10 
Although Lisa had presented herself to Jeff’s (and the viewer’s) view in 
a variety of extravagant outfits in her professional role as a high-fashion 
model, it is only when she participates in Jeff’s fantasy of murder and 
marital intrigue across the backyard that her performance of femininity 
achieves the required erotic element.
 In Mulvey’s second example, Vertigo (1958), ex–police detective 
Scottie Ferguson (Jimmy Stewart) is disabled by a paralyzing fear of 
heights. He agrees to help an old friend, Gavin Elster (Tom Helmore), 
 9. A variation on this use of flashback/voice-over occurs in mildred Pierce where the title char-
acter, played by Joan Crawford, narrates “her” story of domestic trials while raising an ungrateful 
daughter and running a restaurant. But since her voice-over narration is told to a police inspector 
who suspects her of killing her husband, it is still contained within the figure of the masculine Law, 
although it offers, as Pam Cook observes, a corrective version of the noir crime frame. On mildred 
Pierce and voice-over see Pam Cook, “Duplicity in mildred Pierce,” 69–80.
 10. The fact that Lisa initiates the decision to assume a more active role in Jeff’s fantasy is irrel-
evant, given the all-consuming nature of the male gaze. “He” structures the terms of agency that 
“she” exerts.
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whose wife, Madeleine (kim Novak), has become obsessed with a long-
dead female relative, Carlotta Valdez. It turns out that Madeleine is not 
Elster’s wife but his mistress whom he has made over to resemble his 
wife as part of a murder plot. Scottie follows Madeleine around the streets 
of San Francisco, becoming gradually obsessed with her—and, more sig-
nificantly, with her obsession with a dead ancestor. She leads him finally 
to a church tower at a mission south of the city from which Madeleine, 
under the pretense of being possessed by Carlotta, leaps to her death. 
The woman whom Scottie sees falling from the tower is not the woman 
pretending to be Madeleine but Elster’s actual wife. Elster had planned 
on Scottie’s being unable to climb the stairs to save her, due to his vertigo, 
and thus can witness what looks like a suicide but is actually a murder. In 
despair over the loss of (and inability to save) his beloved, Scottie meets 
another woman, Judy Barton, who resembles Madeleine whom he, like 
Elster, makes over into his lost Madeleine. It turns out that Judy is the 
actress who played Madeleine, and she seizes the opportunity of Scot-
tie’s reappearance in her life to rekindle their lost romance. But her hopes 
are doomed since Scottie actually loves the dead Madeleine, for whom 
the working-class Judy can only be a simulacrum. In the climactic scene, 
Scottie takes Judy, now dressed as Madeleine, back to the mission bell 
tower for a reenactment of the original deception. There, after Scottie con-
fronts her about her role in deceiving him, Judy falls to her death.
 As Mulvey notes, Scottie’s obsessive pursuit of Madeleine and his 
equally obsessive desire to recreate her in Judy become “our” point of 
view; there is no room for Judy’s perspective. “Apart from one flashback 
from Judy’s point of view, the narrative is woven around what Scottie 
sees or fails to see” (371). Scottie’s fear of heights is transferred onto his 
ability to control the image of Madeleine, and viewers become complicit 
in this act of coercion. In both films Hitchcock represents the attempt of 
a male to overcome a disability, coded as impotence, by recreating the 
woman into his own fantasy. Lisa must move from being object of soci-
ety’s desire as a fashion model into object of his binocular gaze; in Vertigo 
the working-class Judy must be made over into the wealthy, aristocratic 
Madeleine.
 Mulvey’s article launched a significant body of critical response that 
continues to attempt to develop a theory of female spectatorship. The 
work of Tania Modelski, Linda Williams, Teresa de Lauretis, karen Hol-
linger, and others has retrieved a feminine gaze from Mulvey’s scopo-
philia.11 Modelski, for example, notes that Scottie’s former girlfriend, 
 11. See Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t; karen Hollinger, “The Look,” 18–27; Tania Modleski, The 
Women Who Knew Too much; and Linda Williams, “When the Woman Looks,” 561–77.
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Midge, possesses important knowledge that Scottie lacks, her spectacles 
bespeaking clear insight of the constructed nature of gender against Scot-
tie’s mystified vision. Modelski also criticizes Mulvey’s failure to consider 
one crucial scene in Vertigo in which Judy does gaze back at the camera, a 
moment that expresses her recognition of her own complicity in Scottie’s 
fantasy. Here, the female protagonist acknowledges the camera’s pres-
ence, thereby placing viewers in command of knowledge that Scottie is 
unable to see (87).12
 What is disturbing about both Mulvey’s and her critics’ responses 
to Hitchcock and noir films generally is the ease with which castration 
remains unchallenged as a definition of the disabled protagonist’s rela-
tion to women. Rather than call into question Freud’s theory of castra-
tion anxiety—which is a theory of sexual differentiation after all—critics 
redirect their focus from the Lacanian Symbolic, the realm of language 
and law, to the Imaginary, the child’s pre-Oedipal ties to the Mother. The 
heterosexual relationship between protagonist and femme fatale is not 
altered; power dynamics are merely readjusted between genders. And this 
has implications for my reading of the disabled figure in film noir since 
it fails to recognize his links to female characters in the films. Although 
such links are often pathologized (Norman Bates in Psycho [1960] is the 
obvious version), they are nevertheless complicating factors in any treat-
ment of gender. When Scottie asks Midge if many men wear corsets, he is 
also asking about the role he must assume when wearing clothing usually 
identified with women—and by extension when he is placed in a cultur-
ally disabled position vis-à-vis normative bodies. To see Scottie at this 
point as representing his castrated state in relation to a maternal figure 
seems beside the point. To see him recognizing the ways that disability 
in a compulsorily heterosexual (and ableist) world is figured as feminine 
helps explain his obsessiveness over Madeleine. Midge, as a designer of 
women’s underwear, knows something about male fantasies as well as 
about the construction of bodies according to male designs (she claims 
that the brassiere she is drawing in this scene was designed by an aircraft 
engineer). Scottie’s inability to live within his “darned fear of heights” is 
also his inability to live in a world that expects certain actions to comply 
with gender expectations. And vertigo is equally a fear of gender uncer-
tainty when the normative body is no longer “normal.”
 12. On the epistemological implications of feminist film criticism, see Susan White, “Vertigo and 
Problems of knowledge,” 279–98.
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noir Bodies
“you know, a dame with a rod is like a guy with a knitting needle.”
 —Fisher in Out of the Past (1947)
In shifting my focus to film noir, I would like to build on Mulvey’s impor-
tant idea that cinema constructs its viewers through the gaze but add that 
the viewer is neither unitary nor necessarily a heterosexual male. Fur-
thermore, the “gaze” in film noir is not so simply a reincarnation of some 
primal scene—the male child witnessing his parents in flagrante delicto, 
the mother revealed as castrated. The gaze occurs in highly specific his-
torical contexts that frame what the act of seeing means. In the period 
during which noir films were being made, specularity often implied acts 
of surveillance and political scrutiny that had specific geopolitical impli-
cations for national security.13 For Mulvey, the invariable object of the 
protagonist’s gaze is a woman, but what happens when the protagonist 
is himself the object of scrutiny—when his or her crippled body is no 
less a spectacle than that of the femme fatale? Such is the case with Billy 
Wilder’s Double Indemnity.
 Most theorists of film noir regard Double Indemnity, based on James M. 
Cain’s thriller, as the ur-noir film that invented many of the terms for the 
cycle. The opening credits foreground the importance of disability in the 
film by superimposing titles over a man with crutches who moves menac-
ingly toward the audience until his shadowy form covers the entire screen. 
Given the film’s setting within an insurance company, the credits announce 
not only the physical but also the economic impact of that menace.14 The 
film opens with Walter Neff driving erratically through the early morning 
Los Angeles streets, arriving at the Pacific All-Risk Insurance building and 
staggering to the office of his coworker, Barton keyes. There, he starts a 
Dictaphone and confesses his role in an insurance scam. Neff’s confes-
sion—which becomes the voice-over for the entire movie—begins by iden-
tifying himself through the rhetoric of an insurance affidavit: “Walter Neff, 
 13. As Jennifer Nelson, Timothy Melley, Robert Corber, and others have pointed out, acts of 
looking during the Cold War were often underwritten by a surveillance ideology that placed com-
munists and queers as the inevitable objects of a national gaze. See Jennifer Nelson, Pursuing Privacy 
in Cold War America; Timothy Melley, Empire of Conspiracy;  and Robert Corber, Homosexuality in Cold 
War America. 
 14. As Paul Starr notes, the defeat of a national health insurance plan during the 1930s (and opposed 
by the AMA) led to the expansion of private health insurance companies during the postwar years. 
Defined as “socialized medicine,” the idea of a national plan could now be perpetually demonized 
during the anti-communist decades. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American medicine, 
280–89. It is worth pointing out that Wilder returned to the image of the vast, impersonal insurance 
company in his 1960 film, The Apartment, in which Fred MacMurray appears again, this time as the 
head of the office.
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insurance agent, 35 years old, unmarried, no visible scars . . . [he glances 
down at his wounded shoulder] . . . until a little while ago” (Wilder 11). 
The visible scar refers to the bullet wound recently inflicted by Phyllis Diet-
rich-son, but it also refers to the film’s thematics of visibility and invisibility 
in which the couple has had to maintain the appearance of normalcy (“no 
visible scars”) in order to conceal their role in a crime.
 Neff is erotically attracted to Phyllis Dietrichson when he first encoun-
ters her in her Los Feliz home, but his ardor diminishes once he becomes 
inveigled into her plot to kill her husband and collect on an insurance 
policy. The couple becomes edgy and short-tempered, their meetings 
more fugitive. The erotic charge that prompted Walter to collude with 
Phyllis in a murder plot transfers to his associate, keyes, an investigator 
whose relentless pursuit of insurance malfeasance is inspired by what 
he calls a “little man” inside him. His belief in actuarial odds leads him 
to suspect that the insurance claim filed by Mrs. Dietrichson is a fraud 
and that she has colluded with a shadowy lover to murder the husband 
and make it look like an accident. keyes’s accuracy in pinpointing the 
fraud earns Neff’s respect and establishes the terms of male competitive-
ness and camaraderie that drive the movie, a bonding reinforced by witty 
repartee shared by the two men. At one point, after keyes lights Neff’s 
cigarette, Walter says, “I love you, too,” a remark repeated at the end of 
the movie but given emotional force by the fact that Neff is now dying 
of a bullet wound. While keyes comforts him, Neff says, “[you] know 
why you didn’t figure this one, keyes? Let me tell you. The guy you 
were looking for was too close. He was right across the desk from you,” 
to which keyes replies, “[closer] than that, Walter.” “I love you too,” Neff 
says, in his final line before dying (Wilder 119). This final scene of male 
consolation is a good deal more intimate than most of the scenes between 
Neff and Phyllis, leading some critics to suspect that Neff’s voice-over is 
more of a lover’s confession than a report.15
 The film frames homosocial desire between the two men in terms of 
professional respect against the brittle ambition of the female lead. But 
unlike the homosocial triad diagnosed by Eve Sedgwick, in which males 
form alliances through the female, there is a second triad in which Neff 
and keyes’s relationship is bound to the husband (1–5). Mr. Dietrichson, 
who has become disabled in a construction site accident, is scheduled to 
attend his homecoming football game by traveling on a train. On his way 
 15. Claire Johnston reinforces the idea that the relationship between Neff and keyes is to some 
extent determined by the compulsorily homosocial nature of the insurance company for which they 
work, a business in which women are distrusted: “Women represent the possibility of social excess 
which the insurance business seeks to contain” (91).
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to the station, Neff murders him while Phyllis drives the car (in Cain’s 
novel they strangle Dietrichson with his own crutches). Neff impersonates 
the husband by adopting his crutches and catching the train for which 
Dietrichson had bought tickets. The plan is for Neff to fake falling from 
the back of the train, whereupon the previously murdered husband would 
be placed on the tracks, making the murder seem like an accident. Here, 
Neff’s prosthetic legs join him to a male who is both literally and symboli-
cally disabled: literally through an accident and symbolically through his 
relationship to a scheming wife. But such filmic depictions are less about 
persons with disabilities and more about the role such persons play in a 
corporate world dependent on defining and restricting plausible forms 
of injury. When Billy Wilder changed the name of Cain’s insurance com-
pany, from “Fidelity” to “All Risk,” he pointed to the instability of bodies 
that must be “covered” by actuarial odds. But he pointed to other, sexual 
risks that occur when the domestic frame is broken and the wife begins to 
take out her own policies. Wilder makes pointed reference to keyes being 
“married” to his job and to the idea that by being unmarried, he may 
have more time to pursue his passion for work. Neff, too, is unmarried, 
spending his bachelor hours in bars and bowling alleys, and while one 
might see both as examples of the corporate-driven, other-directed indi-
vidual diagnosed by sociologists of the period, they are also figures whose 
indefinite sexuality is covered by (and aligned with) a pair of crutches.
 The film highlights links between wounded husband and lover in the 
opening credits sequence in which a shadowy person on crutches could 
be either man. The links are reinforced by the fact that once they have 
completed the murder, Neff assumes a paternal role in relation to Dietri-
chson’s daughter from a former marriage. This role places him in direct 
conflict with Phyllis and replicates the exact circumstance of the Dietri-
chson family romance. And just as she schemed to get rid of her husband, 
so too does Phyllis intend to kill Neff once he becomes squeamish about 
the insurance fraud aspect of the crime. Finally, Phyllis literally “cripples” 
Neff at the end of the film, and his bullet wound continues to bleed into 
the fabric of his coat as he recites his confession to keyes. Thus the “vis-
ible scars” that mark Neff’s fatal attraction for Mrs. Dietrichson link him 
to her disabled husband in ways that ultimately prove fatal.
 A variation on triangulation between lover, disabled husband, and 
femme fatale occurs in Orson Welles’s The Lady from Shanghai, between 
Elsa Bannister (Rita Hayworth), her husband, Arthur, and a tough Irish 
sailor, Michael O’Hara, played by Welles. Elsa involves Michael in a 
scheme to murder her husband, but the plot goes awry, and Arthur Ban-
nister’s partner, Grisby, is killed, with Michael set up as the fall guy. Much 
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of the movie involves establishing the erotic relationship between Elsa 
and Michael, but there is a second, queer connection between Arthur and 
Grisby that has never been discussed. Although he is Bannister’s law 
partner, Grisby is also inexplicably included in a yacht trip from New 
york to San Francisco, suggesting more than professional connections 
with the family.
 Arthur Bannister walks with crutches and braces, a sign, for any 
viewer of the 1940s, of the virulent poliomyelitis epidemic that affected 
thousands of people in the postwar era and that was ameliorated by 
development of the Salk vaccine in the mid-1950s. Although Bannister 
is not disabled in the novel upon which the movie is based (Sherwood 
king’s If I Die Before I Wake), Welles made him a polio survivor presum-
ably in order to link him with a virus associated in the public mind with 
impotence and physical wastage. Polio was seldom fatal, but it disfigured 
the limbs and limited physical activities severely. Daniel Wilson notes that 
the disease had a profound impact on young men in the highly masculin-
ized postwar period, creating “an infant-like dependency: temporary loss 
of control over bladder and bowel and of sexual function, confinement to 
bed and dependency on others for the most basic necessities” (9).16 The 
disease was initially called “infantile paralysis,” but even when the name 
was changed, polio continued to be associated with childhood diseases 
and childlike conditions.17 Fred Davis’s 1963 sociological study of polio 
victims and their families points out that in the United States, “crippling 
not only signifies a relative loss of physical mobility but also suggests 
social abnormality, isolation, and in the eyes of some, visible manifesta-
tion of inherent malevolence” (qtd. in Gould 219). By displaying Ban-
nister’s crutches and braces, Welles built upon several layers of 1940s 
social stigma: fear of contagion, often identified with immigrants who 
first manifested the disease in the early part of the century; anxiety about 
physical emaciation and wastage in a productivist economy; and pater-
nalist philanthropic responses to the disease, manifested by the March of 
Dimes fund-raising effort. All these associations figure Bannister as an 
“unfit” husband for Elsa, but they also blend into his effeminate manner 
and theatrical courtroom gestures.
 One scene that points up the queer connections among characters 
occurs at a fiesta that Bannister has arranged. While sailing up the coast of 
Mexico, the ship’s passengers and crew go ashore. Bannister and Grisby 
carry on a drunken conversation that mocks Michael’s macho toughness 
 16. On polio in general see Tony Gould, A Summer Plague. 
 17. It is precisely such infantalizing images of polio that drove FDR to hide all signs of his dis-
ability throughout his three terms as president.
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and Elsa’s seductiveness while establishing a personal collusion between 
them. Many of their references to Michael’s heterosexual prowess are 
coded in terms of disability. Bannister says that if Michael wants to compete 
in their verbal sparring, he’ll need a “handicap” (earlier, at the seaman’s 
hiring hall, Bannister asks Michael if he is “able-bodied”). Responding 
to the news that Michael might be quitting the ship, Bannister retorts to 
his wife that “George likes to have [Michael] around, Lover; Michael’s so 
big and strong—makes a good body guard for you . . . a big strong body 
guard with an Irish brogue.” The bitchy repartee between Bannister and 
George Grisby over Michael’s body sets up a speech by the latter about 
sharks that devour each other, a remark that applies to the Bannisters and 
their moneyed idleness but also to the partners’ homoerotic interchange. 
Elsa is the focal point of the interchange—her beauty and youth counter-
poised to Michael’s strength and virility. She is shot in soft lighting and 
gauzy filters, gazing upward at Michael, in sharp contrast to Grisby and 
Bannister who are shot in harsh, low-key light and unflattering close-ups 
showing their sweaty faces and grotesque grimaces.
 Grisby’s presence in this and other scenes is one of generalized sexual 
threat. He leers at Elsa in a bathing suit, attempts to seduce Michael into 
a complicated insurance scam, and whines in a sycophantic way at Ban-
nister. Although his threat is not overtly homosexual, Grisby’s effeminate 
manner and unspecified links to both Bannisters create narrative ambi-
guities that have plagued most readings of the film. While critics have 
attempted to resolve these ambiguities by focusing on the triangle of the 
Bannisters and O’Hara as primary players in a heterosexual drama of 
sexual intrigue, they have ignored Grisby’s odd presence as O’Hara’s 
provocateur and nemesis.18 Furthermore, Grisby’s ambiguous sexuality 
combines with his right-wing political allegiances (he served on a pro-
Franco committee in contrast to O’Hara’s participation in the Lincoln Bri-
gade) and Cold War paranoia. He is obsessed with the threat of nuclear 
annihilation and wants to escape to a desert island where he will be safe. 
In these scenes Welles wears his leftist sympathies broadly on his sleeve 
while demonizing the idle, right-wing rich.
 The telescope that he carries with him to spy (for no apparent reason) 
on various members of the yachting entourage embodies Grisby’s nuclear 
paranoia. He uses the telescope to capture Elsa in a bathing suit, sitting 
on a rock in a perfect imitation of a Photoplay magazine pinup. He later 
trains his optic on Bannister lurching up the beach with his braces while 
 18. On the Oedipal triangle between Michael and the Bannisters, see Ann West, “A Textual Anal-
ysis of Lady from Shanghai.” 
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others carry heavy hampers around him. The first shot reminds us of the 
camera’s specular potential within the Hollywood “star” system—Rita 
Hayworth as well-known “bombshell” and sex goddess, made famous 
from her role in Gilda. Welles critiques this system broadly in this film 
by showing Hayworth in pinup poses and then cutting to a close-up of 
Grisby, sweating and grinning, while holding his telescope. But just as 
Welles participates in the system by fetishizing Hayworth’s pose, so he 
uses her physical perfection in contrast to Bannister’s disability in these 
matching shots. Both “good” and “bad” bodies are viewed through the 
optic of the sexually (and politically) tainted Grisby. The message is about 
contagion, Elsa’s physical perfection tainted by her proximity to a camera 
lens and crippled husband. The fact that Welles and Hayworth were 
themselves going through a difficult divorce at the time of the filming 
adds yet another layer to the film’s thematics of specular control.
 Bannister’s disability performs several functions in the film. As I have 
said, on a historical level, it reminds viewers of the pervasive impact of 
polio during the postwar period. On another level, prosthetic signs of Ban-
nister’s polio metaphorize his sexual inadequacy as a husband in relation to 
the macho Michael O’Hara. He uses his rolling gait and halting movements 
as part of his courtroom manner to gain dramatic effect, alternately gaining 
sympathy from the jury for his disability and creating comic moments as 
a “helpless” lawyer forced to take the stand in his own defense. Welles 
reinforces the importance of his disability in several scenes by focusing 
on Bannister’s crutches first and then panning away to show his entire 
body—as though the crutches are a synecdoche for the entire man. These 
theatrical representations of physical weakness combine with his racialized 
Jewishness (in contrast to O’Hara’s Irishness and Elsa’s Nordic blondness) 
to create a figure of ambiguous racial and physical threat.19 Finally, Bannis-
ter’s prosthetic and theatrical elements reference his unspoken homoerotic 
attachment to Grisby and, ultimately, to O’Hara.
 All these elements come together in the famous shootout in the mirror 
room of the funhouse that concludes the movie. Bannister is first repre-
sented by his crutches as he enters the mirror maze and then by a full 
image of him, cane in one hand, gun in another, his image juxtaposed to 
head shots of Elsa. His ensuing speech to his wife attempts to unravel 
the various plot threads, but Welles’s violent montage and crosscutting 
undermine visually what the speech tries to resolve thematically. Ban-
 19. Bannister is also ethnically typecast as a “clever Jewish lawyer” in distinct contrast to O’Hara’s 
honest Irishness (complete with brogue). Although this fact is never explicitly stated, it can be sup-
ported by the fact that the actor who plays Bannister, Everett Sloane, portrayed Bernstein, the lawyer 
in Citizen Kane (1941), whose Jewishness is central to his characterization.
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nister admits to Elsa that “killing you is killing myself. It’s the same thing, 
but you know I’m pretty tired of both of us.” The shootout that follows is 
verification of these remarks: husband and wife blast away at each other, 
destroying one illusion while creating another. This final scene is a spec-
tacular send-up of the film’s metaphorics of illusion and reality, but it is 
also a destruction of both sexual and medical threats in an act of mutual 
self-immolation, permitting the hero to walk out at the end, wounded but 
wiser. Disability and sexual transgression are eliminated within mirrors 
that, rather than confirm identity, replicate it in an infinite regression of 
partial identities.
 My earlier reference to compulsory homosociality in the first two films 
undergoes a change in the case of Edward Dmytryk’s Walk on the Wild Side, 
a film in which same-sex alliances are among women. In his autobiog-
raphy Dmytryk refers to the film as “a woman’s picture,” made as such by 
transforming the Depression-era hobo camps and slum shacks of Nelson 
Algren’s novel into a Mexican café and a brothel, both presided over by 
women.20 The film was made in 1962, placing it slightly outside the noir 
cycle, but it deploys many noir stylistic stocks-in-trade: a dislocated, lonely 
drifter; a tragic femme fatale; a dark, underworld milieu; and occasionally 
cinematic effects involving odd camera angles, low-key lighting, and a vio-
lent conclusion. Its more overt depiction of (thwarted) lesbian desire shows 
how the authority of Code censorship had diminished. Dmytryk changed 
Nelson Algren’s original novel considerably, adding Jo’s lesbianism and 
transforming one of her customers, Schmidt, into her husband. In the novel 
Schmidt is a former freak-show and carnival giant, whose physical prowess 
is brought to an abrupt end when he loses his legs in a train accident. In the 
film Jo and Schmidt are married in order to link two kinds of freaks, sexual 
and physical, to preside over a dysfunctional family of wayward girls in a 
brothel called “The Doll’s House.”
 The hero is Dove Linkhorn (Laurence Harvey), a Texas drifter 
searching for his lost girlfriend, Hallie (Capucine). He discovers her 
working in a New Orleans brothel, whose madam, Jo, is clearly in love 
with Hallie and who does everything in her power to prevent Dove 
from intervening. Jo’s husband, Schmidt, is an amputee, his lost limbs 
providing a convenient metaphor for male subordination and weakness 
against Dove’s and Jo’s desires for Hallie. The husband moves around 
the brothel on a wheeled dolly, his proximity to the ground enhanced by 
director Edward Dymytryk’s camera which hovers over Jo’s shoulder as 
she looks down upon him.
 20. Edward Dmytryk, It’s a Hell of a Life, 246.
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 In one scene this filmic perspective heightens the links between the 
husband’s disability and Jo’s problematic sexuality. Schmidt has just 
learned that Dove intends to take Hallie away from the brothel, thus 
eliminating the sexual barrier in their marriage that has been created by 
the distracting younger woman. “Will things be different?” he asks Jo. 
“No, things will be the same,” she responds, to which he adds,
[T]hat’s what you said after the accident—the one that took away my 
legs—Are things the same? Am I still your husband? Let her go. I know 
what’s going on inside him. I know what it’s like, loving somebody and 
not being able to do anything about it.
But Jo dashes his hopes and repudiates the husband’s declaration of affec-
tion:
Love! Can any man love a woman for herself without wanting her body 
for his own pleasure? Love is understanding and sharing and enjoying the 
beauty of life without the reek of lust. Don’t talk to me about love. What 
do you know? What does any man know?
As an expression of Jo’s sexuality, this speech is unusually explicit for its 
time, yet it trades in a stereotype that, as Vito Russo observes, “attempts 
to explain—but not excuse—her man-hating lesbianism” (144). Love of 
life “without the reek of lust” may sound odd coming from the propri-
etress of a whorehouse, but it is what she must say to reinforce lesbian 
stereotypes and enlist the viewer’s sympathy in her marital plight with 
a crippled husband. The fact that, as the husband admits, “everything 
changed” between him and his wife as a result of his accident recycles 
a disability stereotype in which the castrated male produces the phallic 
female, a transference of sexuality across phantom limbs.
 To reinforce this transfer, the scene that follows displays the husband 
taking revenge on both wife and heterosexual hero by butting his head 
into Dove’s groin while the latter is held by the brothel’s bouncers. The 
scene between husband and wife heightens the film’s linkage of disability 
and emasculation, but it also stresses Jo’s butch authority over a world of 
women. Capucine’s weary femme posture and Dove’s attitude of resigna-
tion stand in stark contrast to Jo’s drive and determination as well as her 
command of a mock-domestic household. As with The Lady from Shanghai, 
deviant sexuality is punished in a final shootout that leaves Hallie dead 
and Jo criminally indicted for running a whorehouse, while the hetero-
sexual hero remains alive to continue his lonely odyssey.
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volatile Bodies
What can scholars learn from this (admittedly slight) evidence for a 
crossing of medical and sexual closets during the early Cold War? For 
one thing, I observe the close intersection of the two that always attends 
representations of the non-normative body. What is Tod Browning’s 
Freaks if not a film that exploits “extraordinary” bodies by imagining 
them as sexual? In Elizabeth Grosz’s terms, such bodies are “volatile” in 
their challenge to models of physical “wholeness” and heterosexuality. 
But they are volatile because they make visible the field of sexuality 
itself, not as a set of drives toward an object but as a multifaceted field 
of positions, desires, acts, and practices. The disabled figure in film noir 
is a phantom haunting Cold War society, never given star billing, yet 
necessary for assisting the narrative of sexual containment embodied 
in the noir hero.
 Whereas discussions of the phantom limb usually involve nostalgia 
for a prior “whole” body (“a libidinal memorial to the lost limb” as Grosz 
says [41]), based on Freudian lack I would posit a cultural phantom limb 
that imagines bodies still under construction.21 In a society that figured 
the struggle between superpowers as one between “healthy” Protestant 
capitalism and “invalid” or diseased Communism, such bodies played 
a vital role in representing national insecurity. George kennan, in his 
famous “Long Telegram” of 1946, begins a tradition of identifying Soviet 
expansion as a form of disease. Soviet leaders put forth a dogma that 
presents the outside world as “bearing within itself germs of creeping 
disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions 
until it is given a final coup de grace by [the] rising power of socialism that 
yields to [a] new and better world.” And later in the document kennan 
inverts his disease metaphor, stating that future world stability depends 
on the “health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like 
[a] malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.” The fact that 
 21. Lennard Davis speaks about the way that volatile bodies arrest the gaze in an essay that links 
the Venus de Milo, epitome of classical beauty, and the disabled body, site of fragmentation. Davis 
notes that accounts by art historians of the Venus de Milo, such as those of kenneth Clark, attempt to 
replace the missing limbs of the classical sculpture with the ideal “normal” body it displaces, “an act 
of re-formation of the visual field, a sanitizing of the disruption in perception.” Davis concludes that 
the “mutilated Venus and the disabled person in general . . . will become in fantasy a visual echo of the 
primal fragmented body—a signifier of castration and lack of wholeness.” Although I am unsatisfied 
with the castration definition, I recognize that Davis is trying to link the disabled body with a pervasive 
condition of fragmentation that occurs prior to the stage of self-objectification that Lacan figures as the 
mirror stage. For Davis, the disabled body, “far from being the body of some small group of victims, 
is an entity from the earliest of childhood instincts.” In this sense disability is a social and cultural 
construction, the encounter with which provides an uncanny memory of pre-Oedipal condition. See 
Lennard Davis, “Nude Venuses, Medusa’s Body, and Phantom Limbs,” 57, 61. 
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he issued this foundational document of Cold War containment while 
recovering in a sick bed in Vienna is a significant fact in the metaphor of 
contamination that he uses.22
 By studying a cycle of films created in the shadow of such documents, 
where the discourses of national health and economic stability are geopo-
litical imperatives, I see some fraying in the fabric of national consensus. 
The sexual content that was to be kept out of films through Production 
Code censorship could be introduced through other doors. I also see how 
a cycle of films usually described in terms of expressionist mood utilize 
those features to legitimate an ableist gaze. Orson Welles’s spectacular 
mirror-room shootout may dash perspectives on reality, but it permits the 
“real” Welles (actor, director, heterosexual, able-bodied) to walk out into 
the sunlight at the end. Finally, by speaking of the phantom limb of Cold 
War sexuality, I point to how a moment of (albeit repressed) social agency 
for queer men and women, many of whom had formed homosocial com-
munities during the war effort, was being formed through film. Films of 
this era—Johnny Belinda, Gilda, Laura, Rebecca, Johnny Guitar, The maltese 
Falcon, mildred Pierce, The manchurian Candidate, and their retro versions 
in the 1980s and 1990s—show that noir style is more than a set of surface 
features; it is also a venue for representing otherness in a culture of the 
same.
 22. George kennan, “Moscow Embassy Telegram #511,” 54, 63. On kennan’s own health, see 
Anders Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, 44–45.
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Susy (Audrey Hepburn) tries to put out the light. Wait Until Dark. Directed by Ter-
ence Young. Warner Bros., 1967.
Examining 1940s women’s films, Mary Anne Doane in The Desire to Desire 
asserts, “Disease and the woman have something in common—they are 
both socially devalued or undesirable, marginalized elements which con-
stantly threaten to contaminate or infiltrate that which is more central, 
health and masculinity” (38). By making the comparison between disease 
and woman, Doane negates the existence of disabled women. As Rose-
marie Garland-Thomson asserts in Extraordinary Bodies: 
The normative female body, then, occupies a dual and paradoxical cul-
tural role: it is the negative term opposing the male body, but it is also the 
privileged term opposing the abnormalized female body. . . . So the simple 
dichotomy of objectified feminine body and masculine subject is com-
plicated by other oppositions. Indeed, the unfeminine, unbeautiful body 
defines and is defined by the ideal feminine body. This aberrant figure of 
woman has been identified variously in history and discourse as black, fat, 
lesbian, sexually voracious, disabled or ugly. (28)
 While Doane sees both diseased bodies and female bodies posited as 
oppositions to healthy bodies and masculine bodies, she fails to recognize
a third marginalized category: the disabled woman.1 To be disabled or 
 An earlier version of this article appeared in The Journal of Popular Culture 42.3 (2009) under the title 
‘‘Seeing Blindness on Screen: The Cinematic Gaze of Blind Female Protagonists.” 
 1. For my purposes I make the following distinctions between “disability,” “disease,” and 
“health”: Disease is something that a healthy body can get, such as polio or AIDS. Disability, though 
it may be acquired via, for example, medical malfunction or accidents, is not disease. Blindness, for 
example, can have many causes such as diabetes, glaucoma, brain injury, or the loss of an eye. While 
diabetes and glaucoma are diseases, getting one’s eye poked out is not a disease. Blindness is impair-
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diseased as well as female then is to be doubly marginalized.2
 North American films increasingly value strong women and repu-
diate gender stereotypes; however, many filmic stereotypes about dis-
ability—that we are unsightly, ugly, sexually undesirable—remain. In 
the 1930s film Dark Victory (1939), upon learning that her blindness has 
returned and is incurable, Bette Davis’s Judith Traherne bids goodbye 
to her doctor and romantic love interest and sends away both her friend 
Anne and the maid. She then retreats into her bedroom to die alone. 
Judith’s attractiveness, so inextricably tied to her gender, becomes a moot 
point when complicated by disability, her blindness. In keeping with the 
conventions of melodrama, she decides that it is best to die alone rather 
than as a “burden” to others. Her deathbed scene showcases a recogniz-
able stereotype of disability in cinema, in a scene typical of what film 
theorist Martin Norden has termed “the cinema of isolation.”3
 Film studies scholars have long proposed and examined “the gaze” 
as a way of making meaning, particularly the gaze at women in feminist 
film studies and its relevance to gender stereotyping. An examination of 
the gaze at and of the disabled, however, and its role in perpetuating 
disability stereotyping has not yet taken place. What, for instance, is the 
meaning of Judith’s Blind gaze, and what does it say about cultural ste-
reotypes of the blind? While I presume a Disabled gaze, in this essay 
I shall discuss the gaze of blind female protagonists and theorize how 
the gazes of blind female characters are co-opted in order to take away 
the blind woman’s agency. I argue that these films dehumanize Blind 
women4 and perpetuate stereotypes within a broader social context.
 Film studies has been enamored with examining the Male gaze, and 
ment, not a disease, although a disease can cause blindness. “Health” is a generic term; it includes 
everything from a scraped knee, to AIDS, to baby care, to open-heart surgery. In this way a “dis-
eased” and/or “disabled” body can be considered “healthy.” For example, HIV-positive athlete Greg 
Louganis is thought of as healthy. Of importance here, though, is that both the “diseased” body and 
the “disabled” body, however delineated, are constructed as socially devalued and undesirable.
 2. The terms “disabled/able-bodied people” historically allude to the idea of impairment. The 
terms “disabled/non-disabled people” are gaining parlance in disability studies to signify cultural 
identity. By utilizing the term “able-bodied,” I am attempting to serve the dual purpose of refer-
encing the historical use of the “disabled/abled” paradigm—that is, impairment—while simultane-
ously recognizing the reclamation of naming as part of the process of claiming a disability identity. 
I use the term “Able-bodied gaze” as the polar opposite of the “Disabled gaze” (see note 4 for an 
explanation of the capitalized forms) when I intend to reference literally physically embodied dif-
ference. In this way I examine a doubly marginalized, “othered” group, namely, characters who are 
both female and blind. Since both these groups are subject to dominant ways of looking, the term 
“normative” better encompasses the dominant power structure in play.
 3. For further discussions of disability stereotypes see Martin Norden’s The Cinema of Isolation 
and Paul k. Longmore’s “Screening Stereotypes,” 131–46.
 4. My capitalization of “Disabled” and “Blind” invokes the claiming of an identity and commu-
nity. Other times, my non-capitalization refers to the more common usage of these terms as either 
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critics within feminist and queer studies have responded by articulating a 
female gaze and a queer gaze. However, in works such as Judith Mayne’s 
Cinema and Spectatorship, and in edited collections such How Do I Look? 
edited by Bad-Object Choices, these theorists do not articulate a norma-
tive gaze as a means of understanding how a film operates to perpetuate 
stereotypes of gender or sexuality. Laura Mulvey writes of the Male gaze:
The man controls the film phantasy and also emerges as the representa-
tive of power in a further sense: as the bearer of the look of the spectator, 
transferring it behind the screen to neutralise the extra-diegetic tendencies 
represented by woman as spectacle. (20)
 While Mulvey’s first essay on the topic articulates a Male gaze as both 
the dominant and default gaze in cinema, later studies of the gaze further 
her theory. E. Ann kaplan in her essay “Is the Gaze Male?” writes, “To 
begin with, men do not simply look; their gaze carries with it the power 
of action and possession that is lacking in the female gaze. Women receive 
and return a gaze but cannot act upon it” (121). Like Mulvey, kaplan 
draws on psychoanalysis to arrive at the following conclusion: “We have 
arrived at the point where we must question the necessity for the dom-
inance-submission structure. The gaze is not necessarily male (literally), 
but to own and activate the gaze . . . is to be in the masculine position” 
(130). She moves theories of the gaze from Mulvey’s more literal question 
of who is doing the looking to a more thorough questioning of what those 
positions—the bearer and the receiver of the look—signify.
 The concept of an able-bodied position and a disabled position that are 
markedly different—while explored in terms of disability stereotypes by 
theorists Martin Norden, Paul k. Longmore, and others—remains largely 
unexplored in terms of the gaze. My goal, then, is not only to articulate 
the presence of a Disabled gaze or, more specifically, a Blind gaze, but 
also to explore how that gaze interacts with a normative gaze in film and 
how it functions on a dominant-submissive structure of able-bodied and 
disabled characters in film. I am interested not only in how disabled char-
acters are represented in film but also in what such representation means 
and/or what happens when a disabled character does the looking. As I 
will argue, although many theorists and filmmakers often presume that 
the Blind gaze is nonexistent, they also draw on the Blind gaze to remind 
viewers that blind characters are different, “othered” from the “normal” 
able-bodied characters in film.
 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson posits the term “normate” in her book 
Extraordinary Bodies. This term articulates the type of normativity pivotal 
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to my own argument. Thomson writes:
In this economy of visual difference, those bodies deemed inferior become 
spectacles of otherness while the unmarked are sheltered in the neutral 
space of normalcy. Invested with meanings that far outstrip their bio-
logical basis, figures such as the cripple, the quadroon, the queer, the out-
sider, the whore are taxonomical, ideological products marked by socially 
determined stigmata, defined through representation, and excluded from 
social power and status. . . . Normate, then, is the constructed identity of 
those who, by way of the bodily configurations and cultural capital they 
assume, can step into a position of authority and wield the power it grants 
them. (8)
 Thomson’s “normate” is not specific to disability but rather serves as 
the overarching polemical term against which all identities and bodies 
marked “other” may be measured. As I will discuss shortly, the normative 
gaze often co-opts the Blind gaze in film as a means of upholding stereo-
types of dependency, isolation, and infantilization in relation to disability.5
 Co-optation as I use it here has to do with power relations between 
groups.6 I borrow the term “co-optation” from black studies. Scholars fol-
lowing Frantz Fanon have employed the term co-optation to discuss the 
process by which the dominant group must keep the social order and the 
existing power structures stable by imbuing the colonized group with an 
inferiority complex.7 Fanon writes:
Quite simply, there are instances in which the educated Negro suddenly 
discovers that he is rejected by a civilization, which he has nonetheless 
assimilated. So that the conclusion would come to this: To the extent to 
which M. Mannoni’s real typical Malagasy takes on “dependent behav-
ior,” all is for the best; if however he forgets his place, if he takes it into his 
head to be the equal of the European, then the said European is indignant 
and casts out the upstart—who, in such circumstances, in this “excep-
tional case” pays for his own rejection of dependency with an inferiority 
complex. (93)
 5. Though I focus on stereotypes of helplessness and dependency as related to Blind women, dis-
ability studies scholars such as Longmore, Norden, and others have long claimed these stereotypes 
as applicable to the Disability community as a whole. Further, Moshe Barashe’s examination of the 
image of “the blind beggar” in early Western Europe points to how deeply entrenched notions of the 
blind as helpless and dependent are in Western culture (116–20).
 6. Depending on the text, co-optation sometimes appears without the hyphen as cooptation.
 7. Fanon in Black Skin, White masks does not use the term “co-optation” specifically, although he 
does examine the phenomenon.
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 Fanon suggests that as long as a minority group assimilates, yet 
assumes a subservient position relative to the dominant European culture, 
stability is maintained. Co-optation occurs when the minority community 
threatens the dominant power structure. Thus the dominant culture must 
develop ways to make the minority feel inferior. As Diana Fuss suggests 
in Identification Papers, “It therefore becomes necessary for the colonizer 
to subject the colonial other to a double command: be like me, don’t be 
like me; be mimetically identical, be totally other. The colonial other is 
situated somewhere between difference and similitude, at the vanishing 
point of subjectivity” (146).
 In my examination of the Blind gaze, I am interested in how the nor-
mative gaze of able-bodied sighted characters or the gaze of the camera 
itself constructs the gaze of the blind female character so as to convey 
stereotypes of her helplessness and dependency. In other words, this 
essay examines how the Blind gaze is co-opted in order to privilege the 
sighted normative gaze of the able-bodied characters, thereby imbuing 
the Blind with an inferiority complex. In the film Wait Until Dark (1967), 
for instance, I consider how Susy’s (Audrey Hepburn’s) Blind gaze is co-
opted by the dominant normative gaze to keep Susy helpless and depen-
dent. In other words, Susy, as the colonized other, is situated between 
difference and similitude. The co-optation of her gaze is the vanishing 
point of her subjectivity.
 Co-optation is a means to but distinct from appropriation. In other 
words, the process of co-optation of the Blind gaze results in the able-
bodied appropriating it to further their own sense of dominance. I sug-
gest that films about the blind often appropriate the visual experience 
of blindness through absence of vision (complete darkness) or through 
blurred vision. I argue in the section “Directing the Blind Gaze” that 
cinematic techniques such as a darkening of the screen or fuzzy camera 
shots, can in fact be co-optations of the Blind gaze meant to reinforce 
the dominant power that sight embodies. My argument, though, extends 
beyond such cinematic visual appropriations to include an examination 
of the gazes exchanged between sighted and blind characters as a way of 
understanding how the blind are stereotyped as inferior. In these scenes, 
such as Gloria and Susy’s information exchange in Wait Until Dark (1967), 
it is the privileging of the sighted gaze itself over the blind character’s 
gaze, not the filmic simulation of blindness as darkness or blurred vision, 
which is itself the co-optation of the marginalized group by the dominant 
group.
 Many scholars who have discussed the gaze—Mulvey and the Male 
gaze, hooks and the Black Female gaze, queer theorists and the hetero-
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sexual gaze upon gays and lesbians—presume the particular gaze of their 
minority group as the “other” against the dominant group.8 Within this 
structure, for instance, male characters would be the normate and their 
gaze “normative.” All the above-mentioned groups critique a dominant 
spectatorial position (the male, the heterosexual, etc.) and interrogate that 
dominant position by examining other subjectivities. In other words, all 
these identities share a presumption of the dominant gaze as “the norm” 
and the gaze of the marginalized group as the minority gaze. In the term 
“normative gaze,” I assume a white, male, straight, heterosexual, able-
bodied cinematic gaze. I discuss such a gaze in terms of able-bodied char-
acters and the spectacle of bodies co-opted by the able-bodied characters’ 
normative looking.9
 My distinction invokes dominant/minority binary oppositions that 
play into normative assumptions about disabled characters. Teresa de 
Lauretis in Alice Doesn’t writes, “The look of the camera (at the profilmic), 
the look of the spectator (at the film projected on the screen), and the 
intradiegetic look of each character (at other characters, objects, etc.) 
intersect, join, and relay one another in a complex system which struc-
tures vision and meaning and defines what Aberti would call the ‘visible 
things’ of cinema” (138). For this essay my emphasis on the particular film 
gaze of blind characters at other characters—that is, the intradiegetic gaze 
of the disabled character at the able-bodied characters within the film—
reveals how the Blind gaze perpetuates stereotypes of Blind people, such 
as dependency. My examination of the look of the camera in relation to 
the blind characters reveals another ableist assumption about the Blind 
gaze: how and what the Blind see, namely, blurred images or utter dark-
ness. Taken together, these looks highlight the marginalized and depen-
dent status of the blind in cinema, thus reifying ableist assumptions about 
blindness. The normative gaze constructs stereotypes of dependency, 
isolation, and infantilization of blind characters. While the Blind gaze 
should repudiate such simple constructions, instead, filmmakers often 
make present such a gaze for the benefit of the otherwise able-bodied 
characters and presumed able-bodied audience.
 8. See Mulvey; hooks; and Teresa de Lauretis’s “Film and the Visible,” 225–76.
 9. The question of audience spectatorship that includes a distinct viewpoint of Disabled specta-
tors different from the able-bodied is a valid one and should be examined. However, it is not central 
to the argument about the Disabled gaze within film that I am advancing here.
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Seeing Blindness on-Screen
Georgina kleege in her essay “Blind Nightmares” chronicles blindness 
in film. She writes, “The movie blind . . . are timid, morose, cranky, 
resentful, socially awkward, and prone to despair. Actors represent blind-
ness with an unblinking zombie-like stare, directing their gazes upward 
to give the face a supplicating look of helplessness” (45). Film theory has 
not recognized that blind characters have their own distinct gaze, but 
film critics do mention blindness, as in Linda Williams’s essay, “When 
the Woman Looks.” In the essay Williams considers blindness as simply 
a sensory lack, the inability to see. Thus, when she theorizes, “to see is 
to desire” and thus “[b]lindness . . . signifies a perfect absence of desire” 
(561), she assumes that Blind women, because they cannot “see,” cannot 
desire. Within this configuration Judith Traherne assumes in Dark Victory 
that her incurable blindness takes away her ability both to desire and to 
be desired and that, therefore, she’d be better off dead.
 However, Williams and other feminist film critics have recognized 
changes in female representations in film. Molly Haskell, in From Rever-
ence to Rape, suggests that the typical female character of 1960s and 1970s 
films is “a mail-order cover girl: regular featured, [with an] inability to 
convey any emotion beyond shock or embarrassment and an inarticulate-
ness that was meant to prove her ‘sincerity’” (329). Given how 1960s and 
1970s films portray women, the supposedly desireless and dependent 
blind female characters in films such as A Patch of Blue (1965), Ice Castles 
(1978), and Wait Until Dark may not seem that far afield from non-disabled 
female characters in cinema. There was, however, a cultural shift in the 
portrayal of woman in mainstream cinema in the late 1970s to “strong,” 
liberated women such as independent divorcée Meryl Streep in Kramer vs. 
Kramer, union-organizing Sally Field in Norma Rae, and Sigourney Weaver 
in the original Alien standing alone after all the human males and the 
alien have (supposedly) perished. However, Ice Castles, released the same 
year as Kramer vs. Kramer, Norma Rae, and Alien (1979), represents its main 
character, the “tragically blinded” ice-skater, Lexi, as a dependent char-
acter who resembles 1940s and 1950s screen women more than 1970s and 
1980s female protagonists.
 In the final scene Lexi has supposedly adapted to her blindness 
enough to pass as a sighted competitive ice-skater. Although viewers see 
a simulation of her blurred view of the rink before her routine, she com-
pletes the routine flawlessly. At the routine’s end, however, instead of 
skating approximately to the exit, she trips on the roses strewn on the 
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ice. Prior to this scene the film audience may believe that she has learned 
how to successfully pass as sighted, yet she does something completely 
uncharacteristic of someone who knows how to pass—and of most com-
petitive skaters: she attempts to pick up the roses. This scene reveals the 
insufficiency of Lexi’s Blind gaze as she trips on the roses. Rather than 
present her blurred gaze as at the beginning of her routine, the camera 
focuses on the stumble by shooting her from overhead, assuming the 
normative sighted gaze of the rinkside audience, peering down at her, 
shocked. The normative gaze co-opts Lexi’s Blind gaze, constructed as 
sufficient, if not powerful, at the beginning of her routine, rendering her 
helpless and dependent. The film ultimately conveys her blindness as a 
liability. “Don’t leave me,” she pleads to love interest Nick as he helps her 
to her feet at center ice. Of course Nick doesn’t, assuring both Lexi and 
the film audience that he will always be her eyes, that she can depend on 
his gaze to negotiate the world. This stereotypical portrayal of disabled 
characters’ dependency contrasts the depictions of able-bodied female 
characters that challenge filmic stereotypes, and it invites my examina-
tion of the normative gaze as a trajectory of the Male gaze.
 I suggest that cinematic representations of blindness perpetuate 
ableist notions of the primacy of the physical act of seeing. Audiences 
presume that Blind characters are not able to possess the ability to gaze, 
or to gaze well enough, and still remain the object of the dominant gaze. 
Two levels of seeing operate here. Literally, legal definitions of blindness 
encompass both people who see “nothing” and people with low vision.10 
Figuratively, I argue, the film blind do possess their own gaze. Examining 
Descartes’s theory of the mechanism of vision, Alenka Zupancˇicˇ writes 
in his essay “Philosopher, Blind Man’s Bluff,” “For Descartes, the ‘blind 
man’ does not function as the opposite of those who see. As a (blind) 
man he perceives in his own way everything that others do” (32; italics in 
original). Further, “Descartes’s point is not simply that the blind, in some 
way, ‘see’ as we do. . . . It is not the blind who are compared to ‘us’ (who 
see), it is ‘we’ who have to be compared to the blind in order to be able to 
 10. In Ice Castles (1979) and later films such as Blink (1994), blurred camera shots showcase the 
blind character’s presumed gaze. This depiction of the blind character’s gaze departs from that in 
earlier films such as Dark Victory (1939), magnificent Obsession (1954), and A Patch of Blue (1965) 
where no such shots of the blind character’s gaze exists. In a poignant scene, in Blue, in which blind 
Selina D’Arcy ventures out alone and attempts to cross the street herself, the camera shoots skate-
boarders whizzing by as Selina presses herself against a storefront turning her head frantically in 
response to the barrage of noises. As she crosses the street, the camera shoots close-ups of jostled 
body parts and, in an overhead shot, shows Selina being bumped and shoved along in the crowd. 
“you shouldn’t be out alone,” a man claims, assisting her. The film presents this entire sequence in 
clear focus showing viewers what Selina would see if she could see anything at all. Whether the Blind 
gaze is presented as blurred or nonexistent, the stereotype of the blind character as helpless and 
dependent remains intact.
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understand what happens when we see” (33). Descartes, Zupancˇicˇ claims, 
believes that the blind have their own distinct gaze and way of inter-
preting what they see. But like Fanon and Fuss, Descartes and Zupancˇicˇ 
recognize that here, again, the colonizer uses the gaze of the colonized for 
his/her own benefit.
 Similarly, bell hooks claims for black women a distinct minority com-
munity. She asserts that the genre of Black films “came into being in 
part as a response to the failure of white-dominated cinema to represent 
blackness in a manner that did not reinforce white supremacy” (200). Her 
contention of a minority viewpoint distinct from the dominant (white 
male) one in terms of mainstream filmic representation, spectatorship, 
and criticism is important to the argument I am advocating of a distinct 
Disabled gaze that exists in mainstream film representation, a gaze dif-
ferent from the able-bodied gaze. Just as the gaze of the black female 
character in white-dominated cinema is used to reinforce “dominant cin-
ematic practices”—that is, white privilege, as hooks suggests—the Blind 
gaze is often co-opted by the able-bodied characters and their normative 
gaze. Because, as I suggested earlier, the trajectory of cinematic represen-
tations of blindness has remained relatively stable, an examination of an 
older film, Wait Until Dark, remains pertinent to larger questions within 
disability studies and film studies.
Trespassing and Transgressing
Susy’s World in Wait Until Dark
Wait Until Dark, directed by Terance young, stars Audrey Hepburn as Susy 
Hendrix, a woman recently blind who is unwittingly caught up in a drug 
plot because she has a doll someone has filled with heroin. Two major ste-
reotypes dominate: Susy as determined overcomer intent on being “the 
world’s champion blind lady” and Susy as helpless victim who will fail to 
achieve that championship status. Although she outsmarts the henchmen 
and ultimately reunites with her husband, like Lexi’s gaze in Ice Castles, 
Susy’s gaze is, in the end, co-opted by the gaze of the sighted partner on 
whom she will depend. It is the second stereotype, her configuration as 
isolated, powerless victim, that I shall examine.
 Throughout many of the stalking scenes, the film presents Susy as lit-
erally isolated. young uses the visual metaphor of a prison, filming her, for 
instance, behind a banister after she learns her phone line has been sev-
ered. It is precisely her blindness, her perceived inability to “gaze,” which 
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keeps her isolated and helpless, and her helplessness drives the film.
 Susy depends on a seven-year-old girl named Gloria for her connec-
tion to the world while her husband Sam is absent. Gloria, a neighboring 
child who brings Susy groceries, takes on a significant role. Helping Susy 
determine the identity of men who claim to be the police, Gloria peers out 
Susy’s kitchen window and informs Susy that there is no police car outside, 
only a truck. After the henchman, Mike, leaves her apartment, Susy signals 
for Gloria (who has by this time left) to return to the apartment by tapping 
on the water pipes in her kitchen. Gloria arrives and Susy gives her a set 
of instructions about calling the police and meeting Sam, telling Gloria to 
bring him back to the apartment. Often directors depict such a scene with 
the adult instructing the child. Not here, however. In a wide-angle shot, 
viewers see a standing Gloria towering over a seated Susy, holding her 
hands. Although Susy instructs Gloria, the camera zooms in on Gloria’s 
face as she peers down at Susy. Through employing Gloria’s normative 
gaze, transference occurs. In essence, Susy becomes the child and Gloria the 
adult in this reversal of roles and power. The audience knows this because 
Susy’s gaze is directed upward, signifying her helplessness. At the precise 
moment when Susy should be empowered through her Blind gaze, instead 
Gloria’s normative gaze takes over the power of the scene and re-estab-
lishes Susy as a pitiful object who needs help.
 The climactic scene further compounds Susy’s infantile and power-
less status. As she prepares for the confrontation with Roat, the head 
henchman, a series of shots depict Susy unscrewing and breaking light 
bulbs. This preparation scene is her transgression. That is, the only way 
for Susy to win her battle with Roat is to fight it on her terms—to disable 
him by “blinding” him, causing him to enter “her” world. Roat is sup-
posedly the one dis-abled in this scene. Indeed, much of the fight scene 
occurs in the dark with only Susy’s screams as a guide.11
 At the beginning of the confrontation, Roat has the upper hand as 
he pours gasoline around the apartment. This scene is shot entirely from 
Roat’s point of view as Susy implores, “What are you doing?” and then 
sniffs and exclaims, “Gasoline!” As kaplan’s theory suggests, Roat’s Male 
gaze carries with it “the power of action” while Susy remains power-
less. This scene depicts the supposed transfer of power from Roat to Susy 
when she asks, “Mr. Roat, are you looking at me?” He answers, “yes,” 
 11. The DVD version notes that in the original theatrical release, audiences were forewarned that 
during the last eight minutes of the film (the climactic confrontation between Susy and Roat) theatres 
“will be darkened to the legal limit . . . to heighten the suspense.” Although I do not discuss audience 
spectatorship, such a move raises interesting questions about disability simulation and its relation-
ship to audience spectatorship and empathy.
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affirming his gaze and position, and reminding her—and the audience—
of “powers” he has that she no longer does. Then she throws the acid 
she has already put in the table vase on his face, “disabling” him, using 
his “gaze” against him. Power supposedly transfers here, but Susy still 
depends on Roat’s affirmation to act. He is the one who, to use kaplan’s 
phrase, “owns and activates” the gaze. Therefore he remains in the “mas-
culine/dominant” position. Susy’s gaze still largely depends on his affir-
mation for her to act. Instead, her reliance on his verbal cue, coupled with 
her blind stare, ultimately reminds viewers of the power of sight and of 
both her powerlessness and her stigmatized status as other.
 Were this scene shot in wide-angle, framing both their faces in the 
shot, if she appeared to have been maintaining eye contact with him, 
one could read her action of throwing the acid as a typical woman’s self-
defensive gesture, for her blindness would be a non-issue. But Susy is 
not a typical woman; she is a blind woman. As such, her position is con-
tinually disempowered in relation to the sighted. This sequence works to 
reinforce existing power dynamics because it is predicated on her blind-
ness, on her supposed inability to act independently, a fact of which the 
able-bodied viewer is continually reminded.
 Susy’s role as disempowered continues throughout the sequence. 
Susy does not rely only on her own senses to tell her Roat’s position in 
the room—that he is close, where his head is, and so on. Her throwing 
the acid does immobilize him, but acid coming into contact with any part 
of Roat’s body would do so. In fact, seconds after she asks him whether 
he is looking at her, she throws the acid in his general direction doing 
just that. Susy’s insistence on knowing whether he is looking at her is 
neither logical nor necessary for her to act. But the question of whether he 
is “looking at her” is not about her independence, her ability. It is about 
Roat’s power over Susy.
 In the climactic confrontation she physically struggles with Roat. 
Although she is able to gain possession of Roat’s knife and douse him 
with gasoline, she tells him to tap her white cane (he does), so she can 
sense where he is. Instead of relying on her own senses—listening to his 
footsteps, his labored breathing from their struggle—she depends on 
Roat’s actions and his compliance.
 As the confrontation continues, the film depicts her dragging herself 
away from Roat, screaming. Viewers can assume that she stabs and kills 
Roat while the screen is darkened. The privileging of her gaze over Roat’s 
in the fleeing moment of the darkened screen is short-lived. When Sam 
and Gloria come to save her, viewers see a weak and fearful figure, not 
a strong and capable heroine. Her back to the audience, Susy is wedged 
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between the refrigerator door and the wall, fearful and whimpering. As 
Susy flies into Sam’s embrace, viewers are led to believe, just as in the 
ending of Ice Castles, that the normative gaze of the sighted partner will 
protect her.
directing the Blind Gaze
My discussion has so far centered on the co-optation of the Blind gaze by 
other characters in the film: Lexi by Nick, Susy by Gloria, and even Judith 
by her partner. In each of these films there are moments and scenes where 
the Blind gaze is directed not at another character but through the camera 
at the audience. In Susy’s fight scene with Roat, for example, she keeps 
lighting the match as Roat taps toward her. As a blind woman, there is 
no need for her to continue to light the match; it does her no good. She 
lights the match for the benefit of the audience and proceeds to stare out 
at the camera with a “zombie-like stare” denoting her supposed lack of 
gaze. During Lexi’s routine the camera frames her so that she stares not 
at the audience in the rink but at the audience in the theatre. She stares 
straight ahead at the moviegoing audience while her skating audience in 
the film is behind her or at her sides. Lexi’s “zombie-like stare” does little 
more than match an ableist assumption that all blind characters possess 
a “zombie-like stare,” an ableist assumption about what and how blind 
people “see.”
 Ice Castles addresses this ableist assumption about the “zombie-like 
stare” of the blind through schooling blind people about eye contact. As 
Georgina kleege writes about eye contact in her essay “Here’s Looking at 
you”:
I shift my eyes back, centering my eyes on his, or where I know them to 
be. I hit my mark—bull’s eye—but I see and feel nothing. Still, nine out of 
ten people sitting across the table from me would call this eye contact. At 
the precise instant I see them least, they believe me to be involved in the 
most significant visual exchange. (124–25)
In this passage kleege details a way that she is “passing as sighted,” a phe-
nomenon that Tanya Titchkosky, the sighted partner of a Blind person, dis-
cusses in her book Disability, Self, and Society. Titchkosky writes, “Passing 
means knowing how to do things with eyes, and knowing what to do that 
looks sighted when one is unsure what to do because one cannot see” 
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(70). Prior to Lexi’s “zombie-like stare” at film’s end, she is schooled in 
how to pass as sighted and how to make appropriate eye contact. In this 
scene Lexi walks backstage linked arm-in-arm between her coach and 
Nick. As her friend who does not know that Lexi is blind approaches, 
Lexi whispers, “Now?” and they tell her “not yet.” As Lexi and her friend 
are about to pass each other side-by-side, Nick says “Now” and Lexi 
turns her head toward her friend and says, “Hi.” The camera’s pan shot 
encompasses the whole scene. Never does the camera shoot Lexi’s face 
directly in this scene: she does not possess that zombie-like stare here; she 
passes as sighted.
 yet at the end, when the film once again constructs Lexi as helpless 
(when she trips over the roses), Lexi has a brief moment where she once 
again stares out at nothing. Likewise, when Audrey Hepburn’s Susy 
interacts with Gloria, running around the apartment and staring out the 
window, the camera films her from the side while in motion. It is only 
when viewers are supposed to remember that the blind are helpless that 
passing as sighted and lessons in eye contact are forgotten in favor of the 
close-up shot that displays the co-opted Blind gaze as the gaze of unfo-
cused zombie-like eyes staring at nothingness.12
Conclusion
Patterns and Polarities
I began this essay with Mary Anne Doane’s idea that both disease and 
woman form threats to the dominant paradigm of masculinity. I have 
taken the idea of double marginalization, embodied in the filmic figure 
of the blind woman, and have examined how this double threat is man-
ifested via the mechanism of the Blind gaze and its co-optation. In so 
doing, I hope to further discussions of disability representation in cinema 
through an examination of how representations are manifested by the 
gaze and to further discussions of marginalized minority-group gazes 
through herding all such gazes together under the term “normative.” The 
larger issue of power dynamics and binarism that mark the relationship 
of the dominant gaze to the marginalized are common to my argument 
regardless of grouping. Referring to masculine and feminine polarities in 
 12. This is not a question of apparatus theory, that is, how the film camera is supposed to film a 
“Blind” gaze. The camera films no differently from how it films the gaze of the sighted person, unless 
the director wishes to highlight the stereotype that blind people see nothing (which is not true; most 
blind people have some level of residual sight).
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film, kaplan states, “Our culture is deeply committed to clearly demar-
cated sex differences, called masculine and feminine, that revolve on first, 
a complex gaze-apparatus; and second, dominance-submission patterns” 
(129). I take that hypothesis and apply it to disability and then consider 
the presence of a Disabled gaze in film: how it operates, and the domi-
nant-submissive patterns between the able-bodied and the disabled. The 
construction of blind women, indeed of disabled persons generally, as 
both helpless and dependent reveals, I suggest, ableist fears about dis-
ability, about the possibility of becoming disabled, and about the loss of 
power such acquired disability supposedly brings.
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Le Dr Jean Itard (François Truffaut) tests the hearing of wild child Victor (Jean-
Pierre Cargol). L’enfant sauvage (The Wild Child). Directed by François Truffaut. Les 
Films du Carrosse, 1969. United Artists, 1970.
In what follows I approach François Truffaut’s The Wild Child not as a 
“true story” based on scientific case reports, but as a creative undercut-
ting of the claim to referential truth and of the binaries on which the claim 
builds. I argue that, with Truffaut himself in the role of the doctor, Jean 
Marc Gaspard Itard, The Wild Child portrays the physician (mentor-meta-
physician) as caught in the differend between inside and outside: on the 
inside, Enlightenment science (mastery, sobriety, rationality, the economy 
of the hearth); on the outside, the stuff of myth (gesticulating man-animal 
monsters without language or ideas, the savage, the exotic, the deviant). 
Although the film deals with only one of Itard’s case studies, his experi-
ment with a hearing mute child, the so-called “wild child” of Aveyron, at 
the opening of the nineteenth century, I am interested in the fact that, by 
way of another of his celebrated patients, Itard reaches to the end of the cen-
tury as well—and to the Paris Hôpital Salpêtrière of Jean-Martin Charcot 
and his favored student and amanuensis, Georges Albert Édouard Brutus 
Gilles de la Tourette. In making my claim as to Truffaut’s contesting of 
referentiality, I will extend his role-playing to the character of Charcot and 
read his critique of “documentation” as applicable to Salpêtrière freeze-
frame photography, an important forerunner of motion pictures. From 
Truffaut in 1970, then, I will move back to the beginning—and end—of the 
nineteenth century, in search of something that, in Georges Didi-Huber-
man’s terminology, “besmirches” realist accounts, films and photographs 
(66). Walter Benjamin linked this something, this differend, to an “optical 
unconscious.” I think there may be an acoustical counterpart. At the center 
of this story is the hearing mute child, Victor, whose treatment by doctors 
established his role as developmentally disabled.
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Chirurgien Aide-Major
Truffaut’s L’enfant sauvage (France 1970), translated as The Wild Child 
(U.S.) and The Wild Boy (U.k.), provides a motion-picture rendering of 
the case of a so-called feral child who was discovered in the forest of 
southern France near the end of 1799 when he was about twelve years 
of age; after escape and recapture, the child was brought to Paris in Sep-
tember of 1800 for assessment and institutional placement. It was at the 
National Institute for Deaf Mutes that Itard first encountered the child, 
who was mute, and for a time considered also to be deaf. Along with 
Philippe Pinel, Charcot’s predecessor at the Salpêtrière, Itard examined 
the child, discovering some indicators of auditory awareness but a com-
plete indifference to “civilized” sound, including the all-important sound 
of human speech. Mute and impassive, the child was quickly consigned 
to less-than-human status. In Harlan Lane’s account, Pinel “considered 
the wild boy practically incapable of auditory attention, and took this as 
one more symptom of the boy’s hopeless idiocy” (111). Itard alone did 
not concur with this bleak assessment, so much so that he sought permis-
sion to “adopt” the child he christened “Victor” and to experiment on his 
potential for advancement toward the “human” state. Itard’s task, as he 
stated it, was to solve the following problem of metaphysics: “to deter-
mine what would be the degree of intelligence and the nature of the ideas 
of an adolescent, who, deprived from his childhood of all education, had 
lived entirely separated from individuals of his own species” (7).
 Solution of the problem—that is, assessment of the child’s rational 
capacity—would consist in exhibiting the extent to which Victor could 
assume an upright gait, attune his hearing to phonetic language, and 
utter articulate (what Descartes called “real”) speech. If Victor remained 
deaf to civilization, capable of hearing only animal noise, the case would 
be lost—an outcome that seemed unthinkable to Itard, given his confi-
dence in the power of Enlightenment science and given his opinion that 
the boy, likely abandoned by his parents, was not necessarily a member of 
the species Homo ferus, classified by Linnaeus in his 1735 System of Nature, 
but rather a human suffering only from years of isolation and deprivation, 
a child developmentally disabled.
 In some ways Itard is an unlikely linchpin for this story, as he was a 
banker by profession before being called into military service in Revolu-
tionary France. While in the army and without any medical education 
behind him, he received “on the job” training as a surgeon’s assistant—
acquiring his skills by imitation. Only at the conclusion of his military 
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intern, chirurgien aide-major, in 1796 at the Paris Hôpital Val de Grâce, a 
few blocks down the Faubourg Saint-Jacques from the National Institute 
for Deaf Mutes. By 1800, he had moved to the institute as its resident 
physician, just in time for the arrival of the “wild child.” Itard had an 
obvious interest in otology, even before science of the ear had become a 
medical specialization, and he was inclined to think that hearing, as well 
as speech, was something one could be taught. His optimism about the 
potential of pedagogy was clearly at odds with the view of his senior, the 
father-figure Pinel, who judged the child to be “quite inferior to some of 
our domestic animals” and certainly “incurable.”1
 Nor was Itard’s optimism shared by institute officials, particularly 
when, despite gradual improvements in hearing, the boy remained mute 
(Lane 112). Indeed, to read Itard’s descriptions of the “feral” child during 
the period after his capture—and even five years later—is to recognize 
that, by the doctor’s own account, the pedagogical challenge he faced 
was daunting. For example, Itard’s first report recalls, on capture, a “dis-
gustingly dirty child affected with spasmodic movements and often con-
vulsions who swayed back and forth ceaselessly like certain animals in 
the menagerie” (Itard 4). Victor’s locomotion “was extraordinary,” Itard 
writes, even after he was made to wear shoes, “always remarkable because 
of his difficulty in adjusting himself to our sober and measured gait, and 
because of his constant tendency to trot and gallop.” As do animals, the 
child “had an obstinate habit of smelling at everything that was given to 
him.” And “his mastication was equally astonishing, executed as it was 
solely by the sudden action of the incisors, which because of its similarity 
to that of certain rodents was a sufficient indication that our savage, like 
these animals, most commonly lived on vegetable products.”
 On each point Itard’s initial observations suggest that the case might 
represent a breaching of the human/animal divide—a disability stereo-
type that prevailed long into the twentieth century. “A dead canary was 
given to him and in an instant the bird was stripped of its feathers big 
and little, opened with his nail, sniffed at and thrown away” (8). In his 
second report, written five years later (November 1806) for the Minister 
of the Interior, Itard refers to the newly captured boy as a “man-animal” 
whose physical and mental faculties ranked him “not only in the lowest 
grade of his species but even at the lowest stage of the animals” (53–54). 
Invariably, Itard relates the child’s perceived animality to the fact that, 
 1. In his report, government commissioner Constans-Saint-Estève took the child to be close to the 
state of wild animals, and it was with “wild animals” that the child was most often compared, espe-
cially soon after his capture, when he was discovered to be mute. Linnaeus, of course, listed mutus as 
the second attribute of homo ferus (Itard 5).
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especially early out of the forest, “he made no sort of sound” (9). Even 
if Victor’s habit of “running on all fours” could be overcome, and even 
if the feral creature could be taught to eat like a human rather than “like 
a monkey” (Lane 10), to cure his depravity Itard would still have to lead 
Victor to speech by mimesis, that is, “lead him to the use of speech by 
inducing the exercise of imitation through the imperious law of neces-
sity” (Itard 10–11). The first step, however, would be to make him hear, 
“to awaken the ears of our savage from their long torpor” (55).
 Itard recorded such observations as these in two detailed case reports, 
Rapports et mémoires sur le sauvage de l’Aveyron. The title gives away another 
crossing that, for posterity, distinguishes this case and that, along with 
human/animal breaching, is in my view the subject of Truffaut’s film: 
Itard’s recorded observations of Victor are at once paradigms of detailed 
scientific documentation and poetico-autobiographical memoirs. Truffaut 
bases his film on these clinical case histories—the would-be scientific tab-
leau that not only acknowledges its reliance on mimesis, and thus drama-
turgy, as a pedagogical and diagnostic tool, but also indulges in a hybrid 
genre of autobiography, one that includes, among other things, memoir, 
confession, family history, and political commentary. In short, diagnostic 
“science” is here based on anything but “pure fact.” Of particular interest 
to Truffaut is the folding that these case histories enact of logos into mythos, 
such that Itard’s clinical-pedagogical case studies (exercises in “meta-
physics”), as these become voice-over for the film, have more to do with 
myth (and its imagined “monsters”) than with referential medicine; more 
to do with destabilizing than with sustaining the core myth of rationality 
(the curative power of Enlightenment science, the human/animal hier-
archy).
Theatre of Mimesis
More often than not, Truffaut’s L’enfant sauvage is promoted as belonging 
to a realist genre, based as it is on the “true life” account of Victor taken 
from Itard’s clinical tracts. Truffaut shot the film in “documentary” black 
and white, and, as if to accent its adherence to clinical details of the actual 
case, he used Itard’s case reports to script the film’s voice-over narra-
tive. “Truffaut decided to make a ‘barely fictionalized’ historical film,” 
Roger Shattuck writes. “By choosing to shoot in black and white instead 
of in color and to use little-known actors rather than stars, he kept the 
action soberly focused on the events as Itard told them” (209). Julie Codell 
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makes a similar point, suggesting that “Truffaut’s cool voice-over offers 
a conventional view of the Enlightenment itself as scientific, objective, 
and detached” (104). In support of the film’s realism, critics cite Truffaut 
himself, who claimed that L’enfant sauvage “has a quite strong savor of 
authenticity, because it is a true story scarcely at all fictionalized [ . . . ] 
From the day I decided to play Itard the film took on for me a truly com-
plete and definitive raison d’être. From this experience I don’t retain the 
impression of having played a role, but simply of having directed the film 
‘in front of’ the camera and not ‘behind’ as usual” (qtd. in Codell 103). 
Seemingly, the fact that Truffaut plays Itard encourages critics to define 
the film as realist representation: “His documentary style is enhanced by 
his impersonation of the rationalist Itard” (104).
 Granted, Codell puts the film’s realism into question, acknowledging 
the entanglement of autobiography in Truffaut’s quasiscientific docu-
mentary. With Truffaut in the role of Itard, the film becomes as much an 
account of the director’s personal life and his New Wave philosophy and 
filmography as a realist rendering of Itard and the Aveyron feral child case. 
Codell suggests that Truffaut as Itard (as Truffaut) may also be playing 
André Bazin, Truffaut’s mentor: “Truffaut as Itard plays Bazin and him-
self as a mentoring adult” (103). As well as mentoring adult, critics have 
noted, Truffaut may also be acting out, through Victor, his own troubled 
childhood and his adolescent experience as outsider to the same system 
that could not assimilate the “wild boy.” The mimetic possibilities are 
endless, with stories and selves folding into the film’s so-called documen-
tary realism: Truffaut as Itard as Truffaut as Bazin as Truffaut—and, why 
not add: as Charcot, the doctor-as-performer, lover of theatre and of play, 
positioning himself onstage with his patient in front of the camera as well 
as behind it?
 I am drawn to this connection: Truffaut as Itard as Charcot and all 
the realists’ promise the latter brought to late-nineteenth-century medical 
science. For one thing, Itard does provide, through one of his patients, a 
direct link to Charcot’s “theatre of hysteria” at the Salpêtrière. The patient 
in question was the Marquise de Dampierre, whose history Itard docu-
mented in his 1801 report: a member of the Parisian aristocracy, Madame 
de D. was given to unseemly shouting, cursing, uttering of obscenities, 
and sexually explicit display. While this patient, with her speech-and-gait 
disorder, marked yet another failed cure for Itard, the Marquise nonethe-
less provided, some sixty years later, a case from which Georges Gilles de 
la Tourette, working at the time under Charcot at the Salpêtrière, defined 
the syndrome that bears his name. In his 1885 “Study of a Neurologic Con-
dition” Gilles de la Tourette outlined Madame de D.’s abnormal move-
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ments, which “spread” to involve her voice and speech, such that the 
more uncontrolled her gestures became, the more inarticulate were her 
uttered sounds. Not even marriage and maternity could bring stability 
to the Marquise, Gilles de la Tourette reported (basing his information 
entirely on Itard’s documentation of the case): “Professor Charcot saw this 
patient on several occasions and personally witnessed her movements 
and vocalizations.” Gilles de la Tourette went on to note that “in 1884, 
the newspapers published her obituary and some of them included for 
their readers a list of the obscene words that she had sadly pronounced, 
in particular, ‘merde’ and ‘foutu cochon’ (‘shit’ and ‘dirty pig’)” (Gilles de la 
Tourette 3).
 Gilles de la Tourette never met or examined the Madame de D., and he 
relied on Itard’s 1825 report in defining a before-the-fact case of Tourette 
syndrome (for a time considered to be a form of hysteria, which in turn, 
with its “wandering womb,” conjured up a number of “animal” asso-
ciations2). These details add to the “besmirching” that interests me here. 
All the more provocative, then, is the link from Itard, through Gilles de 
la Tourette, to Charcot who, following Pinel, took up his place at center 
stage of the great anatomy theatre, indeed amphitheatre, of the Salpêtrière, 
aspiring there to a full and exact science of the speech-and-gait disorder 
called “hysteria.” Didi-Huberman notes that when Charcot entered this 
citta dolorosa in 1863, hysteria had not yet been “invented,” or at least, as 
Freud put it in his 1893 Charcot obituary, it had not yet been “rediscov-
ered” (18–19). Charcot set out to give hysteria scientific-medical legiti-
macy, to achieve absolute knowledge, and so absolute mastery, of it by 
using the camera to organize its myriad and fleeting symptoms into a 
comprehensive and coherent nosological grid. Charcot wanted to provide 
for movement-disorder medicine what Linnaeus had for natural science; 
he wanted to configure hysteria into a purely referential classificatory tab-
leau:
For a long time, medicine was circling around a fantasy of a language-
tableau—its own language: integrating the successive nature, and, in par-
ticular, the temporal dissemination of the “case” into a two-dimensional 
space of simultaneity and tabulation, into an outline against a ground of 
 2. These associations go back a long way, Didi-Huberman notes. Hysteria, he writes, “was the 
symptom, to put it crudely, of being a woman. And everyone still knows it. Ustéra: that which is all the 
way back, at the limit: the womb. The word ‘hysteria’ appears for the first time in Hippocrates’ thirty-
fifth aphorism, where it is said: ‘When a woman suffers from hysteria or difficult labor an attack of 
sneezing is beneficial.’ This means that sneezing puts the uterus in place, in its true place. This means 
that the uterus is endowed with the capacity of movement. This means that the woman’s sort of 
‘member’ is an animal” (68)—that is, “something that moves on its own” (71).
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Cartesian coordinates. This tabulation would then be an exact “portrait” 
of “the” illness, to the extent that it could lay out, in a very visible way, just 
what the history of an illness (with its concurrent or percurrrent causes) 
tended to conceal. (24–25)
 At the same time, however, this lover of power and truth, this “Sun 
king and Caesar” of the Paris medical profession who first “elevated the 
figure of the doctor into the Chief” (15, 17), drew on a “dramaturgical pas-
sion” that was equal to his “passion for measurement” (227, 179). Char-
cot’s Tuesday lessons were thus memorable theatrical scenes—better the-
atre than Freud could find anywhere else in Paris. Indeed, as Ulrich Baer 
suggests, where hysterical symptoms were concerned, Charcot, lover of 
the circus, often succeeded in outperforming his patients, who were in 
turn regularly suspected of feigning symptoms the physician wanted 
them to betray (43). “Did they really suffer, or were they putting him on? 
Indeed, is it not the doctor who suffers the hysterics’ charades—suffers 
them as a threat to his authority, his mastery, his grasp of truth?” (31). In 
the circularity of this Salpêtrière theatre of mimesis, where the doctor imi-
tates the patient imitating the doctor simulating symptoms, Baer locates 
the referential crisis that plagues psychoanalysis from the start and that 
thwarts the anatomist-clinician’s claim to conscious mastery—even as it 
brings to light what Benjamin called an “optical unconscious” (51).3 I am 
suggesting that the same crisis plagues the diagnosis and labeling of the 
hearing mute Victor.
 With Charcot the slippage of reference found its way into what was to 
have been hysteria’s most advanced tableau, the Nouvelle iconographie de 
la Salpêtrière, the first volume of which appeared in 1888. The journal was 
supposed to be a study in exactitude, a representation, an iconography, 
of hysteria through pages and pages of photographic notation, many of 
the images “freeze-frame” portraits of female inmates of the Salpêtrière. 
Through the facies of his patients, with the sixteen-year-old Augustine 
as his much-preferred subject (photographed object), Charcot, the “clin-
ical director (metteur en scène),” aimed to find his own version of Carte-
sian certitude; it seems that the director, “a bit of a performer or even an 
imposter” (Goetz et al. 53) did not expect to be outdone by Augustine’s 
theatricality. While the camera may have arrested Augustine’s incoherent 
babble, it did not so much freeze the hysteric’s histrionics as make visible 
her mimicry, including her miming of the photographic apparatus itself 
(Baer 56).
 3. Baer’s reference here is to Benjamin’s “A Small History of Photography.”
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 In many ways Charcot’s photographic studies of female faces are akin 
to the gait and locomotion photo-grids that Muybridge was developing 
at the same time in Pennsylvania. In the Salpêtrière footprint laboratory, 
Gilles de la Tourette was doing much the same thing, using white paper 
rather than photographic film, to record the footprint pattern of patients 
whose feet had been coated in red powder. Publishing the results of this 
study in 1886 as Études cliniques et physiologiques sur la marche, dedicated to 
“mon très Honoré Maitre: M. J.-M. Charcot,” Gilles de la Tourette specu-
lated that deviations from a normal gait could be used to diagnose neu-
rological disease. No doubt, Gilles de la Tourette himself practiced these 
deviant gaits, for he was an adept mimic who even betrayed symptoms of 
the syndrome he named,4 yet he may not have been a match for Charcot, 
who “was known to imitate various gaits with uncanny accuracy by 
expertly breaking down complex movements into their components and 
sequentially coalescing them again into the final behavior” (Goetz et 
al.143–44). Here is the paradox: the analytical method—breaking a foot-
print down into angle of inclination, length of step, lateral swerve, and so 
on—is both a dramaturgical method and the key to Cartesian certitude. 
The analytical method represents both the “loss of gesture” (Agamben 
48) to positivist science and the gesture’s proliferation among physicians-
metaphysicians such as Charcot, for whom imitation becomes crucial to 
diagnostic truth.
does the Savage Speak?
Trufffaut’s The Wild Child is all about this theatricality of “science,” where 
Truffaut as Itard plays (like Charcot) before and behind the camera and 
where Itard’s would-be education of Victor—his experiment in meta-
physics—depends entirely on mimicry. The pedagogical props that Itard 
mentions in his casebooks thus become crucial to the film and to its fore-
grounding of the reliance of science on game. One example is the shell 
game that the film returns to a number of times, a game in which Itard 
(Truffaut) turns silver cups upside down on a table, placing a chestnut 
under one of them. As outlined in Itard’s journal and as shown in the 
 4. Historians and biographers (see, for example, H. Lees krämer and C. Daniels, “Pioneers of 
Movement Disorders,” 691–701) never fail to point out that Gilles de la Tourette was subject to vocal 
aberrations: a voice unusually rough and hoarse, increasingly worn-out yet disarmingly loud, partic-
ularly when he would suddenly explode into passion and shout, and as if in imitation of his patients’ 
maladie des tics; he was also known for his “strange ataxic gait” and his inclination to “abrupt ges-
tures.” A. J. Lees, “Georges Gilles de la Tourette,” 811, 816.
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film, Victor quickly masters the game, winning the chestnut as his 
reward. Itard then introduces more complications—changing the order 
of the cups, placing nuts under two or three cups at once, replacing the 
chestnut with an object that cannot be eaten—but in each instance the boy 
performs equally well. Itard concludes in his report that what attracted 
Victor to the game in the first place was only his appetite for food, so that 
success in the shell game provides but a measure of the child’s “animal 
attention” (21). Significantly, the film picks up on this observation and on 
the transition Itard then makes to games more appropriate for measure-
ment of human discernment—such as drawing objects (e.g., scissors, key, 
hammer) on the chalkboard and having Victor hang each object on a nail 
beneath its corresponding image. The film is careful to depict Victor’s 
success in such shape-recognition games, portraying the child as, if any-
thing, bored by the repeated routines the games entail, but anxious to win 
his master’s approval. It is where the games move into speech (progres-
sion from the game of colors and shapes to the game of alphabet letters 
to that of spelling the word lait) that Victor begins to falter. Though able 
to recognize (memorize) shapes and letters, Victor proves to be incapable 
of speech. In the end, having acquired but four words, he remains all but 
mute—for the reason that, Itard concedes, his hearing cannot be “awak-
ened.”
 Since for Itard “of all the senses hearing is the one which contributes 
most particularly to the development of our intellectual faculties”—since, 
in other words, the mind/body, civilized/savage binary rests on this 
sense more than on any other—his reports stress the importance of put-
ting “all imaginable resources into play in order to awaken the ears of our 
savage” (55). To “awaken” means “to lead to speech.” In order to bring 
this phonocentrism to the fore, and to reveal it to be a sustaining myth 
for Enlightenment science, Truffaut introduces some changes to Itard’s 
account of the Aveyron case. One of these changes is evident from the 
very opening of the film, where Victor is shown prior to his capture, run-
ning through the woods on all fours, foraging in the forest floor, drinking 
in animal fashion from a stream, and swiftly climbing to the top of a tall 
tree. In the iris shot that closes this scene, and that opens the film, we see 
Victor rocking back and forth in the high reaches of the tree, an unmistak-
able framing of his animality, as if to announce that the civilization/wil-
derness binary will be the subject of this film. To foreground the binary 
from the outset, Truffaut changed Victor’s fear of heights, reported by 
Itard, to a fear of confinement. When “Truffaut decided to change acro-
phobia to claustrophobia in the later shock-therapy scene, he sacrificed 
authenticity at the wrong point,” Shattuck contends (212). Perhaps not: 
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for the alteration introduced by the first iris shot critically focuses the 
impassible human/animal boundary that Itard’s science puts into place.
 Based on the Itard reports, when the “man-animal” was dragged out 
of the forest, “It was found that the sound of a cracking walnut or other 
favorite eatable never failed to make him turn round” (Itard 15). Early in 
the film Truffaut changes this clinical detail into village gossip. The boy 
has been brought to the Institute for Deaf Mutes at this point and is being 
examined by Itard and Pinel, while the old peasant Rémy sits to one side 
of the room. When Victor appears not to hear a door that is slammed 
behind him by Pinel, the physicians venture that “he might be deaf and 
dumb.” Rémy then interjects with the walnut story, which he offers as 
hearsay that is circulating in the village, where some people in the crowd 
that had gathered around the feral creature claimed to have seen him 
wheel round at the crack of a nut. In case we might consider the village to 
be an appropriate site for such audio testing, Truffaut shows us the melee, 
with the crowd wildly taunting the captured child. What Itard records in 
his reports as scientific evidence of the difference between a civilized and 
a savage ear Truffaut thus transforms into unreliable prejudice—that is 
yet seized upon by institute doctors as providing the binary they need.
 Although Itard’s mentoring of Victor took place at the Paris Institute 
for Deaf Mutes, Truffaut recasts the setting altogether, having the doctor 
remove the child to his own country home, where, “free from the restraints 
and cruelties of an urban institution” (Codell 104) he might enjoy the nur-
turing affection of Madame Guérin. This makes for a major change to the 
clinical account, especially with the introduction of a family scene, what 
Shattuck nostalgically refers to as “the remarkable family unit of Victor, 
Itard, and Madame Guérin” (210). Portrayal of this idealized family, a 
“family” free of eros (there is no sexual relation shown between Itard and 
Guérin, and Itard’s account of Victor’s sexual awakening is left out of 
the film), accentuates the disparity (Itard’s boundary) between civilized 
domesticity and the wilderness out of which Victor comes.
 Truffaut often uses a window to frame this boundary, the separa-
tion of home-hearth from the forest beyond it; or, conversely, he uses a 
window to mediate between inside and outside. When they visit Itard’s 
friends, Victor peers through the window at the domestic scene inside. 
When Victor returns from an attempted escape, he appears at Itard’s 
window, again looking from the outside in. To an extent, the window is 
a detail Truffaut takes from Itard, who remarks that “the window was 
Victor’s favorite place.” But it is Truffaut who uses the window to call 
up the civilization/savage hierarchy. Codell describes one scene where 
“Itard is at a blackboard at the far left, with Victor as far away as possible, 
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in front of the window on the far right of the scene, an expression of the 
now-hostile dichotomy between civilization (the impervious blackboard) 
and nature (through the window). While Itard writes on the board, Victor 
sneaks away, making a temporary escape that foreshadows his longer one 
at the end of the film” (115–16). In another scene, shot at night under a full 
moon, Itard stands inside the house at a window, gazing down at Victor, 
who has escaped from his bedroom and is rollicking on all fours in the 
yard. Here, again, the window frames the binary constructed by the Itard 
reports, the boundary between educated gentility and an animality that 
the doctor cannot tame.
 Throughout The Wild Child, Truffaut portrays Victor’s incapacity to 
hear-and-speak as what keeps him from crossing the human/animal line. 
Some of the framing devices he uses to this end are quite remarkable. 
In the institute sequences, for example, where Itard and Pinel examine 
the newly arrived child, two large anatomical charts—one of the ear, the 
other of the organs of speech—frame the diagnostic scene, marking the 
story as phonocentric from the start. This scene modulates into another 
where Victor stands before a mirror but does not recognize himself in it; 
thus he is incapable, in Jacques Lacan’s terms, of crossing the threshold 
into speech and autonomous subjectivity. Truffaut frames this “mirror-
stage” scene so as to capture the images of Itard and Pinel in the looking 
glass, standing behind the child, the two physicians framed in turn by the 
speech and hearing anatomical charts. The looking glass (“mirror stage”) 
scene sets up the failure with which the film, like the Itard reports, ends: 
Victor’s incapacity to progress from image (imitatio, mimesis) to speech 
(the measure of human rationality, the benchmark of Enlightenment sci-
ence). The film’s closing iris fade-out captures this binary, the boundary 
that the hearing mute Victor cannot cross.
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Ken (Richard Dreyfuss) reacts uncontrollably to the hospital’s medical treatment. 
Whose Life Is It Anyway? Directed by John Badham. MGM Films, 1981.
no life Anyway
Pathologizing Disability on Film
“Deformed bodies depress me.”
 —Nicholas Van Ryan in Dragonwyck, 1946
Many films represent the problem of disability as caused by impairment 
rather than as socially oriented or constructed. Thus the medical model 
of disability has almost total hegemony over the modern definition of 
disability on film: placing “disability” within the individual’s own body 
as its impairment. For the medical model (of disease and deformity), the 
body is a machine with a physiological norm to which the body either 
does or does not conform; if it does not fit the norm, all subsequent prob-
lems are due to its corporeal deviance, not to the social perception of 
deformity and disease. Thus, despite social change, the archetypal and 
stereotypical persist.
 The film Whose Life Is It Anyway? (1981) focuses on the fictional char-
acter ken Harrison, who sustains irreversible quadriplegia in a car acci-
dent, necessitating, in the logic of the film, lifelong hospitalization. The 
hospital doctors, nurses, and technicians impose every possible act of 
objectification and surveillance—medicalization—upon ken to keep him 
alive. The film is a critique of medicalization—it even advocates demedi-
calization—but it bases its critique on people with impairments. The film 
dehumanizes and pathologizes the impaired as a burden, out of a desire 
to demean the technology that keeps them alive. The film argues that 
modern medicine unnaturally keeps certain people alive and that those 
people have to be portrayed as less than human in order to demean medi-
calization. The way the film ascribes certain culturally unacceptable and 
filmically constructed characteristics to the body of ken Harrison makes 
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him—and his type—inhuman and other. Thus medicalization comes 
across as “bad” because it keeps the negative, subhuman disabled body 
alive. The body that becomes disabled in films is routinely devalued and 
degraded (Barnes) by the creation, intimation, or presentation of a glo-
rious past or alternative normality seen in parallel with an abject present 
(Norden). A similar narrative process of negation for an impaired char-
acter appears in almost all films about disease, impairment, and disability, 
whatever date, diversity of style, genre, and production base (Norden). 
Whose Life—the epitome of its genre—achieves this process of negation by 
including before-the-accident and after-the-accident components.
 Whose Life dehumanizes ken by having him articulate his inhuman-
ness himself in a particularly human way: he shows his humanness 
through his ability to be a thoughtful, rational, and intelligent person. 
The film then turns to ken’s body to render him inhuman by depicting 
him as dependent and impotent, as well as characterizing him as “femi-
nine.” keeping ken alive thwarts the ideal of independent living through 
the mise-en-scène implication that medicalization is essential. The film’s 
antimedicalization argument first appears in a scene when Dr. Emmerson 
calls into his office a psychiatrist and Dr. Scott. Emmerson explains to 
the psychiatrist that he wants ken committed on the premise that ken’s 
desire to have the right to die is irrational. At this point the psychiatrist 
immediately agrees to carry out committal proceedings without having 
met ken. Significantly, the psychiatrist overly values a medical doctor’s 
opinion over a clinical evaluation of ken (thereby further reinforcing the 
excesses of medicalization). The scene takes place in Dr. Emmerson’s 
office, an office lined with television monitors of the ICU patients. As Dr. 
Scott starts her speech against such a process, she strides to the monitors 
and points at them. She argues:
[D]oes he look crazy to you? Look at him lying there. I mean, Christ, he’s 
got no privacy at all, he’s got no sense of dignity. I tell you, if that hap-
pened to me I don’t know if I’d have the courage to live either. Would you 
like to live like that?
Significantly, it is a generalized argument: she is speaking not merely 
about ken but about all ICU patients and, ironically, about all non-
disabled people who cannot conceive of living with impairment. The 
validity of Dr. Scott’s perspective is clearly established in this scene and 
by her prior and subsequent character development. For example, in this 
scene, Dr. Scott, a stereotypical WASP, walks into the light as she speaks 
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windows. Her adversary, which is what Dr. Emmerson becomes, is in 
the shade and, significantly, has a much darker ethnic appearance. This 
additional stereotype element of ethnic representation also plays into 
imagery that constructs certain ethnicities as evil. Further, it reveals how 
most stereotypes—especially, though not exclusively, gendered ones—are 
often interdependent and/or work interdependently (Norden 315). Since 
Emmerson has just ordered a psychiatrist to commit a man established 
in the film as highly rational and perhaps even illuminated by intellect, 
the lighting and mise-en-scène contrast—literally and metaphorically—
with the light in which the audience sees Emmerson. Emmerson is also 
smoking—allowing himself (with legal consent) to self-destruct, yet he is 
the one who decides whether to “allow” ken a similar right.
 The monitors in Emmerson’s office appear as screen representations 
of what Foucault calls the clinical gaze, a gaze that is on the individual 
at all times and in all places (The Birth ix–x). Dr. Scott herself states that 
for ken, privacy and dignity are nonexistent. Some writers (e.g., Arm-
strong 8) argue that the modern hospital is a panopticon writ large (fol-
lowing Foucault, Discipline and Punish): Emmerson’s hospital signifies the 
epitome of such a hospital. The name “Emmerson” itself is ironic because 
it conjures the philosophy of nineteenth-century transcendentalist poet 
Ralph Waldo Emerson. The film problematically uses disability as the 
perspective through which to examine medicalization; further, it prac-
tices in its discourse an extreme form of normalization by demeaning the 
successes of medical advances. The film conflates the technological ben-
efits of medicine with the excessive potential for dehumanizing. Whose 
Life’s normalization is highly prescriptive in that it sets up a rationale for 
preserving a life only if the life has a certain degree of both bodily and 
intellectual control.
 Ironically, all the characters who “befriend” and “love” ken are those 
who eventually support his wish to die: the young, attractive female Dr. 
Scott; a petite white female student nurse named Joey; his white male 
lawyer; and a black Caribbean hospital porter called John. John empha-
sizes the film’s agenda when, while trying to get Joey to go out with him, 
he asks her, “How much does it cost to keep [ken] alive; thousands of 
dollars a week?”
Joey: That’s not the point.
John: Well the point is that in Africa people die of the measles, ya know, 
little babies even. Only cost a few pennies to keep ’em alive. No, 
there’s got to be something crazy somewhere, man!
Joey: Well that’s wrong too.
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Here, then, John aligns the cost of medical treatment with the ethics of 
whether they should keep ken alive: in other words, financial cost equals 
ethics. The choice of low camera angle and John and Joey’s extreme 
friendliness to ken reinforce the power of John’s and Joey’s viewpoints. 
Consequently, as ken’s friends advocate his death on purely economic 
grounds, their argument gains validity as a central theme of the film’s 
criticisms against medicalization and, by implication, marks impairment 
as expensive and unproductive. Equally, Joey’s support for ken soon 
becomes positive support for his wishes to die. By characterizing ken 
as physically dependent, the film reveals how modern medicine incurs 
financial problems in its shift from curing infectious diseases to con-
taining and curing chronic degenerative illness. Significantly, Joey wishes 
ken “good luck” when he goes to court (a makeshift court in the hospital 
library) to plead for the right to die.
 Whose Life consists predominantly of long takes, some lasting up to 
nearly two minutes and emphasizing that ken’s needs are time-con-
suming. One such scene starts with a fairly static long take of Joey giving 
ken his coffee, which ken spills. ken then falls out of bed while Joey cleans 
him. The simple visualization that ken needs special canned (sterile) 
coffee makes specific the high cost of keeping him alive; he requires not 
just technology but special people and special nourishment. When ken 
starts to fall out of bed, the pace of the music increases, the positions 
and angles of the camera shift sharply, and the cuts become increasingly 
rapid. Between ken’s starting to fall, and his falling and being put back 
in bed into his former position, there are twenty-seven shots that together 
last under seventy seconds. They consist of straight-on medium shots of 
Joey, who is panicking; long shots of male and female nurses coming to 
rescue Joey/ken; and shots of ken’s body slipping down to the floor, 
from the bed, from under the bed, and from the opposite side of the bed. 
Most important, though, are the point-of-view shots from where ken is, 
shots that involve the camera panning left, tilting ninety degrees, rapidly, 
and shots canted from the floor as ken’s head rests upon it. The disori-
entation suggested by the movement of the camera, and the pace and 
rapidity of the shots, combine to emphasize the helplessness and terror 
that a lack of body control—in ken and the disabled—entails in circum-
stances where control would be advantageous. Rather than offering the 
rare point-of-view shot from the perspective of a person with an impair-
ment, this sequence depicts ken as simply helpless; he becomes a spec-
tacle for the camera, initially, and then for the medical gaze: Emmerson, 
his students, and Dr. Scott walk in upon ken hanging from his bed.
 Upon falling out of bed, ken first seems to feel embarrassed, but his 
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emotion turns to outrage when Emmerson walks in with the student doc-
tors. ken orders them all out. Christopher Ricks’s assessment of keats’s 
art and its use of embarrassment is applicable here to how ken feels, and 
what the art of the film achieves, when he states that embarrassment is 
connected with feelings of “defenselessness” and that art “uses embar-
rassment to help [the spectator] deal with it, not by abolishing or ignoring 
it, but by recognizing, refining and putting it to good human use” (1). 
ken’s embarrassment is rooted in his defenselessness. The art of the film 
assumes and takes advantage of the audience’s defenselessness against 
developing quadriplegia (an impairment) to make the audience feel as 
uncomfortable in observing ken’s defenselessness as ken is in experi-
encing it. A socially constructed reaction such as embarrassment, in this 
case, is the embarrassment of witnessing the deformed or non-control-
lable body, as individualized in ken. When ken decides that it is “right” 
for his embarrassment to be removed (by his committing suicide), the 
film imposes closure. This resolution relieves an audience’s embarrass-
ment and discomfort and restores the ideal world (of entertainment and 
normality). The embarrassment in the scene is not only what the audi-
ence witnesses but also what the audience’s required emotional response 
is, because embarrassment is both personal and social in all contexts. No 
other single scene in the film more explicitly combines its philosophy and 
imagery to greater effect.
 Mary Douglas claims that the human body is a symbol of society and 
that “we cannot possibly interpret rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, 
saliva and the rest unless we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of 
society, and to see powers and dangers credited to social structures repro-
duced in small on the human body” (115). Although Douglas talks of 
the typical—normal—body, the anxiety about the impaired body can be 
understood only as part of a range of available bodies that act as potential 
cultural symbols. ken’s body has been normal and now is not; its value 
as a symbol is both as a metaphor and as a potentially lived reality.
 In keeping with Douglas’s argument, it is impossible now to enjoy 
death or dignity as a “natural” part of living. After all, it is death that 
has become ken’s root desire. In contrast, Emmerson, in an earlier scene 
with his student doctors, cites death as “the enemy,” whereas death is, 
more radically for Foucault (Power and Knowledge), the last resistance 
to power. This gives rise to a crux in interpretation: as seen through a 
social model of disability analysis. The film posits death as the release 
from abnormality and not as Foucault meant it: as a last stand against 
the tyranny of normality. ken’s body symbolizes failure because his body 
projects anxiety about the social state in order to criticize medicalization. 
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ken’s dependence and inability to protect himself from potential danger 
relate to his lack of freedom of choice (the “right to die”) in that ken is 
also a metaphor for a society “paralyzed” by its construction of people 
so dependent (while nevertheless keeping them alive) that they become 
“useless eaters.”
 Returning to the earlier scene, once ken is back in bed, Dr. Emmerson 
tells him that he will be a quadriplegic for life and that it is hoped he 
will be transferred in the near future to another ward or hospital for con-
tinuing rehabilitation. ken retorts, “[y]ou mean you just grow the vege-
tables here, the vegetable store is somewhere else.” Here, ken’s humanity 
contrasts the content of his own words, but, more importantly, while this 
conversation continues, a new “vegetable” is brought in to an ICU cubicle 
alongside ken’s (in view through the panopticon-like glass construction 
that ICU is). The film shows the medical production line of “vegetables” 
being created and damned in the same process of medicalization ken 
has undergone. Emmerson—in a medium shot from the side—is again 
lit in a cinematically sinister manner with the left side of his face in near 
darkness which, when combined with his ethnic (Italian-American) fea-
tures, gives him an appearance of being obsessed—achieved by the for-
mulaic mise-en-scène taken from horror films. This is in sharp contrast to 
ken, who is well lit in close-up (for extra intensity and feeling, the shot is 
straight on), with no shadow on his face. Thus the lighting lends purity 
to ken’s words, rendering him vulnerable, whereas Emmerson appears 
corrupt. Later in the film, during the court hearing, ken classifies Emmer-
son’s wishes as committing him to “a life sentence.”
 In another scene when nurses change his bed, then wash and dress 
him, the film infantilizes ken. It is important to note that bodies are medi-
ated by social relationships and that ken’s is constructed in the film as 
the root of his social exclusion. Only when what Goffman calls “body 
idioms”—movement, gestures—and “body gloss”—the desire to enact 
those “idioms”—are perceived as natural, rather than constructed, does 
the loss of one’s own standard “idiom” or “gloss” become problematic 
(qtd. in Burns 38–85). A physical change can be interpreted as a loss; how-
ever, it becomes the reason for living—or dying in ken’s case—only if 
the physical change is metonymic of the loss of one’s natural state. Whose 
Life inadvertently demonstrates the acceptance of such norms as natural 
through the film’s portrayal of ken rationally deciding to commit suicide 
because of his inability to maintain the “idioms” and “glosses” that were 
part of his existence before the accident. If one constructs the body as the 
“showcase of the self”—which is in turn a “showcase of a successful life” 
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(Seymour 13)—then one perpetuates an essentialist reading of the depen-
dent body as inherently negative.
 Additionally, clothes increasingly signify the worth of the individuals 
within them, the degree of success and worth manifest in their apparent 
cost or individuality. ken’s apparel singles him out as both a social and a 
physical failure. All the characters in the film wear clothes that vary and 
signify the social multiplicity of individuals, compared to ken in his hos-
pital uniform. Before Dr. Scott has an evening out with ken’s lawyer, she 
first visits ken in her elegant evening dress: this scene only shows that 
the doctor has an external (private) life as well as a professional (public) 
life. Sander Gilman argues that human identity lies in the individuality 
of the body and that the outer man is a graphic reproduction of the inner 
man, allowing an interpretation of ken’s body as symptomatic of his lim-
ited character and performance capabilities. ken’s body has become his 
sole characteristic while all the other characters signify that to be a social 
being requires a multiplicity of social performances. Here and in most 
other impairment-oriented films (Barnes 36–38)—for example, my Left 
Foot (1989)—the individual with an impairment becomes circumscribed 
by his or her body, and, as Gilman argues, the danger is that the cultural 
image can become the self-definition—self-hatred. Whose Life does not 
question how the image becomes the self-definition through social dis-
course and its processes; it merely reinforces the circumscription as the 
logical, natural, essentialist definition that is generic to impairment.
 Robert Murphy states:
[T]he quadriplegic body can no longer speak a “silent language” in the 
expression of emotions or concepts too elusive for ordinary speech—for 
delicate feedback loops between thought and movement have been bro-
ken. Proximity, gesture and body set have been muted, the body’s ability 
to articulate thought has been stilted. (101)
Thus the body, if muted, can place an obstacle on social relationships, 
but the muted version should not become the full expression of the indi-
vidual. If muted bodies are mutations comprehensible only as outsiders 
to interactive social relations, then an acceptance of bodily difference 
becomes increasingly difficult. The film advocates the muted body as 
the equivalent of the dead body. For example, several characters “speak” 
ken’s body language for him: Nurse Joey feeds ken a chicken leg and 
she then licks her fingers; John wipes away ken’s tears for him; and ken 
has to ask a nurse to get his lawyer’s card out of his bedside cabinet and 
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telephone him. The repetition of others carrying out bodily reactions and 
simple tasks either for, or in contrast to, ken places him further into the 
realms of “the dependent useless eater”: the “useless eater” is visually 
equated with the dead body. In addition, any understanding of dialysis—
depicted in the film—would lead the spectator to realize that even ken’s 
bodily functions occur on his behalf. In this case a machine is the sur-
rogate.
 ken’s physical poise prior to his accident is energetic and strong, 
showing assurance in its movements and posture. He holds his head 
high and he has a darkish beard covering a strong chin. Once the acci-
dent occurs, his posture reflects the change in the nature of his person-
ality: ken’s constant supine position emanates hopelessness, and he is 
often portrayed in a manner that is not, medically speaking, related to 
his quadriplegia. After the accident ken’s chin always rests on his chest 
and his beard has paled—apparently in order to signify the waning of his 
masculine health. yet ken can hold his chin up (he is shown having phys-
iotherapy to strengthen his chin/neck) in a way that would drastically 
change the way the spectator perceives his posture and, by extension, his 
character. His given (changed) character is inextricably linked with his 
posture to reinforce the ideology of the film that his condition is hopeless 
and abject.
 Most other disability films (Barnes 36–38) use the same techniques and 
constructions to make their disabled characters abject. The impaired are 
easily fatigued, totally dependent, socially isolated, asexual, and infan-
tilized, and have an impaired posture (see The Raging moon [1970] and 
The Elephant man [1980]). Consumer culture needs a plastic body that will 
buy decay-delaying products: consumer culture needs the consumer to 
be productive as well as merely a consumer (unlike ken in Whose Life). 
ken cannot consume freely and repeatedly. ken does consume but does 
so by using a high-cost, low-demand technology (i.e., dialysis). Thus ken 
consumes in a way that drains capital from a more rapid product con-
sumerism. Even so, ken still has a function in consumerism, as does the 
film itself, to take the point of Mike Featherstone et al. (eds.) that con-
sumer culture “needs to stimulate the fear of decay and incapacity which 
accompanies old age and death by jolting individuals out of complacency 
and persuading them to consume body maintenance strategies” (186). 
ken, and the film, facilitate this process by signifying all that is horrific 
about not controlling one’s own body functions and not having specific 
control over one’s own body idioms. This perspective extends to fashion 
and body garments within Whose Life, where, for example, ken is almost 
always in his hospital gown—in his wheelchair he has a particularly taste-
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less dressing gown over it—which ensures that he is never represented as 
anything other than a sick person. Equally, the “sick person” implies loss 
of bodily control, dignity, privacy, and freedom, but also implies decay 
and mess due to its chaos of fecal and urinary excreta (bodily decay). The 
failure of the impaired body to play the “sick role” (cited in Murphy 19)—
where the individual promises to make the effort to recover in return for 
the temporary abdication of responsibility to work—clearly participates in 
the overall negation of impairment as a validated state. And within Whose 
Life this notion (and process) of the “sick role” becomes the crux of ken’s 
argument to die, as he will never “recover” from his present bodily reality.
 The film disables and objectifies ken as a body and as an individual 
through movement, and primarily through the visualization of the move-
ment of others. The mise-en-scène of movement, to degrade ken, lies 
both in the characters’ direction and in the movement of the camera, in 
the lighting and in the editing. Only when ken gets closer to winning 
his battle to die (the ultimate in non-movement) do the camera angles 
and lighting and sound slow down. The mise-en-scène is striking in that 
a large number of scenes together create a style of camera movements 
that, in itself, validates movement over stillness (right up until stillness—
death—is seen as the perfect denouement).
 The immobile body is expertly negated in Whose Life—among 
a myriad of other scenes that include ballet and ken’s prior ability to 
sculpt, draw, and be sexually “alive”: in one very short scene in which 
ken’s lawyer, Carter Hill, tries to talk to an uncooperative Dr. Emmerson, 
Emmerson, trying to dissuade Hill from continuing to represent ken’s 
case, walks very rapidly along a hospital corridor. The two then turn a 
corner. The scene is shot from behind the two professionals as they quite 
literally hop-skip-and-jump up five steps and immediately turn another 
corner. Next to the five steps, to the left of them and the screen, is a hos-
pital porter slowly pushing another patient in a wheelchair up a ramp. 
The design and existence, socially and filmically, of the juxtaposition of 
steps/ramp project obvious parallels. The virtual non-movement of the 
wheelchair-user up the ramp juxtaposes the short period that Emmerson 
and Hill take to climb (jump) the stairs. And this clarifies the difference 
in ability and efficiency between the two types of mobility: the “normal” 
and the “abnormal.” In this sequence the camera moves as rapidly as the 
non-disabled characters, with the whole Emmerson and Hill conversation 
filmed on the move, cinéma vérité style. Significantly, as if to reinforce the 
idea of the burden of impairment, one non-disabled character “forfeits” 
his mobility to cater to the needs of the wheelchair user.
 Although ken fleetingly mentions that all he wants is choice, his 
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liberal demands are lost in the plethora of “normal body” images that 
the film puts forward for him to have the right to terminate any choice 
at all in the future: the “right to die.” ken’s body, at the same time as 
being represented as a reality, is also a symbolic representation of the 
danger to society of medical technology. From a social model of disability 
viewpoint, the film negatively and one-sidedly fails to consider indepen-
dent—or any—living as an option.
 Georges Canguilhem’s claims that “strictly speaking a norm does 
not exist, it plays its role [, a role . . . ] which is to devalue existence by 
allowing its correction” (77). ken’s body is devalued by not embodying 
the adult human “norm” of the ordinary male/masculinity. Although 
Canguilhem’s point is that all existence is devalued—even those who can 
closely fit the norm—I argue that the norm is specifically used on film 
to devalue the disabled body. Canguilhem’s suggestion that the norm 
devalues the norm is important in that the norm devalues itself by making 
an individual’s body an object rather than a subjective, lived experience. 
The devaluation of the normal body by the normal body occurs through 
its generalization, as in this film when the impaired and the nonimpaired 
characters are offered up to the viewer in order to be compared and con-
trasted. I argue that the liberation of the disabled body from a negative 
generalization (medicalization and normalization) would, above all else, 
free the body of normality from the tyranny of itself. If ken were allowed/
encouraged to live, without stigma, then the film would suggest that all 
impaired (and disabled) people could live free of the dread of embarrass-
ment of either others or themselves.
 In conclusion, I argue that the “good cripple” for culture comes 
across on film as the cripple who does his/her utmost to overcome his/
her abnormality of body, in contrast to the “bad cripple” who is happy 
to be a cripple. ken Harrison overcomes his abnormality by preferring 
death to impairment in Whose Life. The film represents the impaired and 
abnormal body as the paradigm through which normality is created, 
validated, defined, and reinforced as superior by having the impaired 
body disqualified and invalidated by its inability to be, as a consequence, 
normal. A list of films that follow this logic would be so extensive and 
diverse in so many ways—including impairment subject, country, era, 
genre, and form—that its length alone would reveal that the nature of 
disability representation is astoundingly static.
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Text eclipses the ill body of Vivian Bearing (Emma Thompson). Wit. By Margaret 
Edson. Adapted for film by Emma Thompson and Mike Nichols. Directed by Mike 
Nichols. Home Box Office Network, 2001.
Vivian: I want to tell you how it feels. I want to explain it, to use my words. It’s 
as if . . . I can’t . . . There aren’t . . . I’m like a student and this is the final exam 
and I don’t know what to put down because I don’t understand the question 
and I’m running out of time.
 —Margaret Edson, W;t, 1999
introduction
Physical pain, as cultural critic Elaine Scarry writes, “has no voice” 
because it constitutes a sentient experience that “comes unsharably into 
our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot 
be confirmed” (3, 4). Representation, on the other hand, seeks to give voice 
to lived experiences, to translate those experiences into action that circu-
lates among authors, actors/characters, and spectators/readers who are 
themselves engaged in the process of making meaning. The antithetical 
relationship between physical pain and its representation, says feminist 
theorist Elisabeth Bronfen, ensures that “the violence of the real is trans-
lated only precariously into representation” (53). As Bronfen explains, 
“representation attempts to attach the dying, decomposing body, destabi-
lizing in its mobility, to a fixed semantic position” (53). Bronfen suggests 
that attempts to fix the body-in-pain to a “semantic position” necessarily 
are doomed to fail because “signifying nothing, [pain and death] point to 
the indetermination of meaning so that one can speak of death only by 
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speaking other. At the point where all language fails [pain and death are] 
also the source of all allegorical speaking” (54).1
 For both Scarry and Bronfen, physical pain initiates a representational 
vanishing point, a site within representation at which sentient experiences 
(seem to) cease to exist. As a felt-experience rooted within the body, phys-
ical pain destabilizes any representational apparatus that seeks to codify 
and contain its meaning. As an empirically verifiable experience, death 
too enters “precariously into representation” (Bronfen 53), its visibility 
rendered unstable by the “indetermination of meaning” that constitutes 
the very nature of the experience. Unrepresentable because they signify 
no tangible referent in the physical world, then, physical pain and death 
enter into representation through extended allegories, whereby sentience 
takes the form of a concrete image, its abstract qualities personified by 
characters who signify “meanings independent of the action in the sur-
face of the story” (Holman and Harmon 11).2
 1. While I would not want unconditionally to conflate physical pain and death, given that 
there are many sentient experiences (e.g., torture) that do not necessarily posit an equivalency 
between the two, terminal illness (the focus of this essay) constitutes a sentient experience that 
links pain and death. As Scarry has written, “pain is the equivalent in felt-experience of what 
is unfeelable in death” (31). Therefore, the apparent collusion between theories of bodily pain 
(Scarry) and death (Bronfen) here is an intentional means of framing the larger argument I assert 
in the body of the essay.
 2. Terminal illness constitutes perhaps the most frequently allegorized sentient experience in 
film. Although the medium of film is, as Mary Ann Doane writes, “characterized by an illusory 
sensory plentitude (there is ‘so much to see’)” (231), cinema has historically relied on a limited 
range of allegorical narratives to “translate” the lived experiences of terminal illness. Some films 
intimate that terminal illness grants wisdom and serenity to an individual whose life prior to diag-
nosis was chaotic, due to misplaced priorities (e.g.,  and Terms of Endearment). Other films posit 
terminal illness (and the concomitant death of the terminally ill individual) as the means through 
which conventional social structures (especially heteronormativity and the “nuclear family”) are 
recuperated (e.g., Stepmom, An Early Frost, and In the Gloaming). And still other films identify ter-
minal illness and death as retribution for transgressions of firmly entrenched social norms (e.g., 
the Camille narrative, as in Beaches and As Is). While each of these examples spins a slightly 
different “existential” narrative about the personal/collective meanings of terminal illness and 
death, all have one telling common denominator: they elide any consideration of how terminal 
illness impacts the fleshy, material body. In each of these examples, the material body and the lived 
experiences of illness become vehicles through which to convey a philosophical/spiritual message 
about the “meaning of life,” rather than a means to analyze the body’s journey through sickness 
and death. Stated differently, in each of these films a character personifies illness, rendering the 
real (but abstract) experience of pain concrete through an allegorical narrative that references 
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 Not surprisingly, critics of Margaret Edson’s W;t3 read the play/film4 
as an allegory of death.5 The play and film follow Dr. Vivian Bearing—a 
professor of seventeenth-century literature and a specialist on the poetry 
of John Donne—through her diagnosis of, treatment for, and eventual 
death from fourth-stage ovarian cancer. In a discussion of the play, high 
school teacher Carol Jago suggests that “[a]nyone who has seen or read 
W;t has no doubt that playwright Margaret Edson knows quite a lot 
about literature, but also about life” (21). Similarly, in The North American 
Review, critic Robert L. king suggests, “If W;t’s premise seems contrived 
and Bearing’s interests arcane, the play in performance is a deeply felt, 
human and humane experience” (49). For American Theatre critic James 
S. Torrens, the “humanity” of the play rests on a thematic link between 
Donne’s poetry and Bearing’s medical condition. As Torrens explains, 
“At the conclusion [of W;t Edson] ties up a thematic thread of the story, 
John Donne’s habit of hiding from God behind his wit, with a children’s 
tale that E. M. Ashford [Bearing’s graduate school mentor] reads to the 
barely conscious Vivian Bearing. It is a fable of young animals trying to 
run away from their parents and always being found—an allegory, says 
Ashford” (28).
 Such readings of W;t are, I argue, deceptively (and erroneously) 
simple precisely because they ignore the more complex representational 
strategy undergirding the film’s narrative. I contend that W;t constitutes 
a rare addition to the corpus of films about terminal illness, an example 
of what Scarry says is “an isolated play, an exceptional film . . . that is not 
 3. Readers might note that the titles of the stage play and the teleplay differed in one important 
respect: the teleplay substituted an “i” where in the original stage play title a semicolon appeared 
(i.e., W;t). Throughout this essay I employ throughout the title of the original stage play, semicolon 
included, not in order to render hazy the important and noteworthy differences between W;t-as-
stage-play and Wit-as-teleplay (a topic that I take up and explore in the section titled “Textual 
Differences” below); rather, I retain the original spelling in recognition of the central role that close 
textual reading and, in particular, punctuation plays in Vivian Bearing’s interpretation of Donne’s 
Holy Sonnets (and in my own reading of W;t that follows).
 4. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that while Emma Thompson and Mike Nichols 
are the credited adapters for the teleplay version of W;t, this teleplay is almost identical in both 
structure and content to the original stage play (with only one major exception, which I discuss 
below in the section titled “Textual Differences”). For that reason (as well as for the sake of clarity 
and simplicity), I refer to Edson as the “author” of both the teleplay and the stage play throughout.
 5. Interestingly, Edson has herself encouraged such readings. In an interview with American 
Theatre writer Adrienne Martini, for example, Edson has commented, “The play is about redemp-
tion, and I’m surprised that no one mentions it. . . . Grace is the opportunity to experience God in 
spite of yourself, which is what Dr. Bearing ultimately achieves” (24, 25). Given that Edson is the 
author of the play, some credence must be attributed to her comments here. However, the play 
encourages a New Critical reading (one akin to Bearing’s reading of Donne’s poetry), and critics 
must resist the urge to equate the meaning of the play/film with the author’s feelings, intentions, 
or worldviews (what New Critics disdainfully regarded as the “Intentional Fallacy”). Instead, 
the play must be regarded as “a public text that can be understood by applying the standards of 
public discourse” (Bressler 41) (here, specifically, the public discourse of literary explication).
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just incidentally but centrally and uninterruptedly about the nature of 
bodily pain” (10). What makes W;t so rare is the author’s insistence on the 
analogical, rather than the allegorical, properties of sentience. The film 
attempts to render felt-experience meaningful by comparing a wholly 
unfamiliar and strange experience (i.e., sentience, pain, death) with some-
thing more familiar, at least for the I-narrator of W;t, Bearing: literary 
explication. By juxtaposing personal diary and literary explication in the 
direct-address asides (the film’s central dramatic conceit), Edson suggests 
that poetics offers an analogical means through which to read the termi-
nally ill body/text.6
 In the film, Bearing’s New Critical approach to literature is central to 
the plot, as it informs her understanding of Donne’s Holy Sonnets and her 
experiences with terminal cancer. By alternating between scenes in which 
Bearing’s oncologists diagnose and treat her body and scenes in which 
Bearing herself explicates Donne’s poetry, W;t foregrounds the parallels 
between the sentient experiences of terminal cancer and the analytical 
process of literary explication. But like allegory, analogy ultimately proves 
insufficient for explaining the felt-experiences of terminal cancer as each 
of Bearing’s attempts to draw parallels between textuality and ontology 
fail. While analogy proves as insufficient as allegory at explaining the 
felt-experiences of terminal cancer, W;t does recognize (through Bearing’s 
direct-address asides) that “the only external sign of the felt-experience 
of pain . . . is the patient’s verbal report” (Scarry 6). Through these direct-
address asides, W;t charts the struggles that derive from any attempt to 
document the ravages that terminal illness exacts upon the material body. 
I argue that W;t does not provide a “documentary” through which the 
experience of living with cancer is translated onto celluloid; rather, the 
film voices a metafilmic commentary on how instances of pain and suf-
fering complicate the process of cinematic creation.
 6. The distinction that I seek to draw between analogy and allegory is slight but significant. 
Analogy, as Holman and Harmon illustrate, constitutes a literary device “by which something 
unfamiliar is explained or described by comparing it to something more familiar” (20). On the 
other hand, allegory is a “form of extended metaphor in which objects, persons, and actions in a 
narrative are equated with meanings that lie outside the narrative itself. Thus, it represents one 
thing in the guise of another—an abstraction in that of a concrete image” (11). Both analogy and 
allegory rely on comparison as the means through which to convey meaning. Both point to the 
similarities between two objects/things that are alike in certain respects. But whereas analogy 
foregrounds the comparison as a means through which to generate meaning about and facili-
tate understanding of an experience/object that is unfamiliar, allegory “attempts to evoke a dual 
interest, one in the events, characters, and setting presented, and the other in the ideas they are 
intended to convey or the significance that they bear” (11).
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Bodily Poesis
Bearing is a New Critic—a point that is made clear early in the play during 
a flashback scene depicting Bearing’s first encounter with her graduate 
school mentor, the esteemed E. M. Ashford. In the scene, Ashford criti-
cizes Bearing’s essay on Donne’s Holy Sonnet Six, claiming, “you have 
entirely missed the point of the poem, because, I must tell you, you have 
used an edition of the text that is inauthentically punctuated” (13). Ash-
ford reveals her own training as a New Critic:
you take this too lightly, Miss Bearing. This is Metaphysical Poetry, not 
The Modern Novel. The standards of scholarship and critical reading 
which one would apply to any other text are simply insufficient. The 
effort must be total for the results to be meaningful. Do you think the 
punctuation of the last line of this sonnet is merely an insignificant detail?
 The sonnet begins with a valiant struggle with death, calling on all the 
forces of intellect and drama to vanquish the enemy. But it is ultimately 
about overcoming the seemingly inseparable barriers separating life, 
death, and eternal life. In the edition you chose, this profoundly simple 
meaning is sacrificed to hysterical punctuation.
 And death—capital D—shall be no more—semicolon!
 Death—capital D—comma—thou shalt die—exclamation point!
 If you go in for this sort of thing, I suggest you take up Shakespeare. 
(13–14)
 In this passage Ashford abides by a strict and rigorous attention to 
detail in her systematic dissection of texts. Dripping with disdain, her 
comments about both The Modern Novel and Shakespeare also convey 
the gate-keeping mentality with which she approaches the study of lit-
erature. In Ashford’s mind, “good” and “bad” literature are as clearly 
demarcated as “authentic” and “inauthentic” punctuation.
 Through discussions about her research and teaching, Bearing reveals 
how thoroughly she has internalized the close textual reading strategies 
professed by her esteemed mentor. Toward the beginning of W;t, Bearing 
describes her “immeasurable contribution to the discipline of English 
literature” (17): “a volume on the twelve Holy Sonnets in the 1633 edi-
tion, which I produced in the remarkably short span of three years” (19). 
With great pride Bearing reveals to the audience that in the volume, 
titled made Cunningly, she “devote[s] one chapter to a thorough exami-
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nation of each sonnet, discussing every word in extensive detail. . . . It 
is exhaustive” (19). That each chapter of Bearing’s book centers on one 
sonnet—as opposed to a theoretical concept, a thematic concern, generic 
conventions, or a cultural phenomenon—echoes not only Ashford’s ear-
lier edict [“you must begin with a text” (13)] but also the New Critic’s 
guiding premise [“The natural and sensible starting point for work in 
literary scholarship is the interpretation and analysis of the works of 
literature themselves” (Wellek and Warren 139)]. That Bearing dissects 
each sonnet word by word (and punctuation mark by punctuation mark) 
in “extensive detail” demonstrates the “uncompromising way” (Edson 15) 
that New Critics (such as Ashford) seek “truth” in intricate phraseology, 
punctuation, scansion, rhyme, and/or meter. In other words, Bearing’s 
close attention to (textual) detail demonstrates, as Cleanth Brooks once 
wrote, that for a New Critic, “The meaning must issue from the particu-
lars” (“Irony” 75).
 In her teaching Bearing demonstrates the same rigorous attention to 
textual detail. Toward the middle of W;t, Bearing “stands still, as if con-
juring a scene” (48), in this case a scene from one of her undergraduate 
seminars on metaphysical poetry in which Bearing lectures her uninter-
ested students on the minutiae of Donne’s Holy Sonnet Five:
The speaker of the sonnet has a brilliant mind, and he plays the part con-
vincingly, but in the end he finds God’s forgiveness hard to believe, so he 
crawls under a rock to hide.
 If arsenic and serpents are not damned, then why is he? In asking the 
question, the speaker turns eternal damnation into an intellectual game. 
Why would God choose to do what is hard, to condemn, rather than what 
is easy, and also glorious—to show mercy?
 (Several scholars have disputed Ashford’s third comma in line six, 
but none convincingly.)
 But. Exception. Limitation. Contrast. The argument shifts from clev-
erness to melodrama, an unconvincing eruption of piety: “O” “God” 
“Oh!”
 A typical prayer would plead “Remember me, O Lord.” (49–50)
 Throughout this lecture Bearing remains an earnest New Critic, 
holding steady to the belief that “the goal of formal analysis is to show 
how the various elements in the poem fit together, how the parts cohere 
to produce the whole” (keesey 67). Word by word, Bearing winds her 
way through the sonnet, searching for the answer to the speaker’s ques-
tion (“If arsenic and serpents are not damned, then why is he?”) in the 
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formal features of the poem. For Bearing, the denotations and connota-
tions of specific words (e.g., “But. Exception. Limitation. Contrast.”) pro-
vide insight into the speaker’s attitude/tone (e.g., “The argument shifts 
from cleverness to melodrama.”).
 Interestingly, during the lecture scene Edson makes explicit the 
analogy between the analytical process of literary explication and the 
sentient experience of terminal cancer. Bearing begins the lecture with a 
brief introduction to the metaphysical school, its central conceit (“wit”), 
and its “greatest wit” (John Donne) (48). Afterwards, “The lights dim. A 
screen lowers, and the sonnet ‘If poisonous minerals,’ from the Gardner 
edition, appears on it” (49). As Bearing nears the climax of her lecture 
where she will reveal the “truth” expressed by the poem (“how the parts 
cohere to produce the whole”), she “moves in front of the screen, and the 
projection of the poem is cast directly upon her” (50). At this moment in 
the film, textuality and ontology collude through the visual projection 
of Donne’s sonnet onto Bearing’s terminally ill body. The distinguishing 
features of metaphysical poetry transfer from Donne’s sonnet to Bear-
ing’s body, indicating that the lecture—itself an attempt to “embody” the 
poem—is, for Bearing, analogous to her attempts to understand the lived, 
bodily experiences of terminal cancer. The analogy, then, reveals Bear-
ing’s desperate attempts to use her training as a literary critic to render 
her sentient experiences tangible.7
Textual Embodiment
In addition to developing a somewhat interesting thematic parallel, the 
collusion of textuality with ontology, and of formal analysis with medical 
practice, serves as a potential means through which Bearing can gain 
access to the sentient experiences of terminal cancer. Late in the film 
 7. One scene later Bearing reiterates the interrelationship between textuality and ontology 
when she remarks on “the journal article [kelekian and Jason] will no doubt write about me”: 
“But I flatter myself. The article will not be about me, it will be about my ovaries. It will be about 
my peritoneal cavity, which, despite their best intentions, is now crawling with cancer. What we 
have come to think of as me is, in fact, just the specimen jar, just the dust jacket, just the white 
piece of paper that bears the little black marks” (53). Bearing compares her material body to “the 
white piece of paper that bears the little black marks” and renders her body a poem/text whose 
meaning derives from the interrelation between its component parts. Like Bearing, kelekian and 
Jason believe that if they dissect Bearing’s body into its component parts (tumors, symptoms, 
organs, etc.), then that body can be reassembled into a coherent (if not ultimately healthy) whole. 
The medical data implicitly compare to literary interpretation—a similar type of truth statement 
expressed through the constituent parts (“the little black marks”) that constitute the body/text 
(“the white piece of paper”).
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Bearing reveals in direct-address asides, “I want to tell you how it feels. 
I want to explain it, to use my words” (70). Although the specific referent 
for the repeated pronoun “it” is unclear within the context of this aside, 
several options present themselves. “It” could refer to the physical pains 
associated with her illness since, several lines later, Bearing explains, 
“I am in terrible pain. . . . Say it, Vivian. It hurts like hell. It really does” 
(70). “It” could also refer to the more general experiences of living with 
terminal cancer. In that same direct-address aside, for instance, Bearing 
explains, “Susie says that I need to begin aggressive pain management 
if I am going to stand it. ‘It’: such a little word. In this case, I think ‘it’ 
signifies ‘being alive’” (70). Or “it” could refer to the process of death. All 
these possible referents have one telling common denominator: sentience. 
Through the film, then, Bearing seeks “to use [her] words” to express the 
experiences of terminal cancer, bodily pain, and death.
 Ironically, although close attention to textual detail once allowed 
Bearing to “draw so much from the poems” (48), that same attention to 
detail now works to complicate her understanding of the body-as-text.8 
From the opening scenes of the film, Edson emphasizes the inapplica-
bility of formalist reading strategies to sentience by highlighting how ter-
minal illness strips language of its traditional meanings and methods of 
signification. In one scene, for example, Dr. Harvey kelekian, “chief of 
medical oncology, University Hospital” (3), explains Bearing’s diagnosis 
while she, only half-attentive, dissects the diagnosis word by word:
Kelekian: Now then. you present with a growth that, unfortunately, 
went undetected in stages one, two, and three. Now it is an insidious 
adenocarcinoma, which has spread from the primary adnexal mass—
Vivian: “Insidious”?
 8. In his review of W;t, Dr. Abraham Philip offers an alternative reading of how irony functions 
in the play:
The most awesome irony is that while Vivian Bearing is sterile (emotionally, physiolog-
ically, and symbolically)—she never had a love affair, has not given birth or accepted 
anyone into the essence of her body—she ultimately succumbs to ovarian cancer, a 
malignancy of a life-giving or renewing organ. (3261)
On the most superficial level this reading does characterize the action of the film—that is, Philip 
has his facts straight, so to speak. But what disturbs me about this reading is how it so blatantly 
and unapologetically recapitulates harmful cultural narratives about femininity, the body, and 
illness (specifically the Camille narrative). Implied in Philip’s reading is the suggestion that Bear-
ing’s cancer is metaphorically the result of her inability to conform to the “natural” roles pre-
scribed by her sex—that is, an emotional, passive (note Philip’s use of a certain passivity of action 
in the following: “she has never accepted anyone into the essence of her body”) mother figure. 
Although the play does not, this reading that has found its way into the Journal of the American 
medical Association speaks to the stronghold the Camille narrative continues to have over represen-
tations of unruly (here, specifically, intellectual) women and terminal illness.
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Kelekian: “Insidious” means undetectable at an—
Vivian: “Insidious” means treacherous . . . Insidious. Hmm. Curious word 
choice. Cancer. Cancel. (7–8)
 Several lines later, as kelekian describes the effects of the proposed 
treatment cycle, Bearing muses: “Antineoplastic. Anti: Against. Neo: new. 
Plastic. To mold. Shaping. Antineoplastic. Against new shaping” (9). As 
she did with Donne’s poetry, Bearing assumes she can render her termi-
nally ill body intelligible and meaningful through the precise explication 
of its particulars. She adopts a questioning, analytical stance in relation to 
her object of scrutiny (i.e., her material body and its health), interrogating 
kelekian’s word choice and dissecting the complicated medical jargon 
he employs. Ever the devout New Critic, Bearing in both instances plays 
with kelekian’s language, mulling over the denotative meanings and ety-
mological origins of specific terms in order to arrive at the “truth” of her 
condition (namely, the extent of tumor growth and her prognosis).
 This detailed explication proves insufficient for explaining the sen-
tient experience of terminal cancer when, in the scene following kele-
kian’s diagnosis, Bearing “hesitantly” explains to the audience, “I should 
have asked more questions, because I know there’s going to be a test. I 
have cancer, insidious cancer, with pernicious side effects—no, the treat-
ment has pernicious side effects” (12). Interestingly, Bearing here echoes 
kelekian’s explanation of her diagnosis and treatment almost verbatim, 
conceding to the very language that she interrogated and contested in 
the previous scene. When she strays from kelekian’s “script,” she quickly 
corrects herself (“no, the treatment has pernicious side effects”), indicating 
the degree to which the embodied experiences of terminal illness resist 
(if not annihilate) the expressive language of literary criticism and neces-
sitate the construction of a “less evocative” but “more potent arsenal of 
terminology” (43–44). Stated differently, Bearing appropriates the lan-
guage of her oncologist, much as she does in the lecture scene where she 
explains the words of Donne.
 Bearing frequently draws lines connecting literary devices to her 
medical condition in an effort to discover the “truth” of her sentient 
experiences, but these parallels too prove insufficient. After the “Grand 
Rounds” scene, for example, Bearing explains the role that she plays in 
the medical drama: “I receive chemotherapy, throw up, am subjected to 
countless indignities, feel better, go home. Eight cycles. Eight neat little 
strophes. Oh, there have been the usual variations, subplots, red herrings: 
hepatoxicity (liver poison), neuropathy (nerve death). (Righteously) They 
are medical terms. I look them up” (41). In this passage Bearing tellingly 
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likens her “treatment modality” (kelekian’s words, 8) to a “strophe,” or 
“stanza,” and compares the side effects of the “chemotherapeutic agent” 
(again, kelekian’s words, 8) to “subplots.” By offering these analogies to 
literary devices, Bearing emphasizes again her desire “to explain it, to use 
my words.”
 However, these analogies to literary devices only illustrate how com-
pletely alien Bearing’s sentient experiences of terminal cancer are. Like 
the strophe/stanza, Bearing’s “treatment modality” consists of a series, 
or “recurrent grouping” (Holman and Harmon 454), of individual units 
(in poetry, verse lines; in oncology, chemotherapy cycles). But whereas 
in poetry the interaction among various strophes produces unity, coher-
ence, and “truth,” in oncology the treatment modalities often lead to a 
disintegration of unity, coherence, and truth (i.e., health). Herein lies 
another irony in the film: as Bearing remarks, “My treatment imperils 
my health” (47). As a side effect of the chemotherapy, Bearing suffers 
from “[f]ever and neutropenia” (44); in fact, Bearing ultimately succumbs 
not to the cancer—at least, not directly—but to the liver failure and sub-
sequent cardiac arrest induced by chemotherapy (81). She also endures 
fierce vomiting spells during which she can only “[moan] and [retch] in 
agony”: “Oh, God— . . . Oh, God. Oh. Oh . . . Oh, God. It can’t be . . . Oh, 
God. Please. Steady. Steady” (32).9 For Bearing, the “treatment modality” 
proves to be anything but “neat little strophes,” as they subvert their own 
purpose (making the body healthy) and force the body to overflow its 
boundaries (through vomiting). Unlike strophes, which provide order 
and coherence to a poetic text, the chemotherapy cycles render the body-
as-text less manageable and understandable, and the analogy ultimately 
proves ineffectual for explaining to the audience “how it feels.”
 Edson highlights Bearing’s increasing inability to express in her 
words how cancer “feels” by reducing the intellectual acumen of the 
direct-address asides, as well as by gradually de-emphasizing the role of 
those asides as the plot unfolds. As Bearing’s pain increases, her attention 
to semantic detail becomes increasingly less pronounced: “Oh, God, it is 
so painful. So painful. So much pain. So much pain . . . Am I in pain? I 
don’t believe this. yes, I’m in goddamn pain. (Furious) I have a fever of 
101 spiking to 104. And I have bone metastases in my pelvis and both 
 9. Here, Bearing reverts to the same kind of eruptive emotion evidenced in the “inaccurately 
punctuated” edition of Donne’s poetry mentioned above (in which the translator was prone to 
“hysterical punctuation”). The implicit parallel that Edson draws between bodily pain and textual 
inaccuracies signals what Scarry has termed “the unmaking of the world”—that is, how physical 
pain initiates “an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a 
human being makes before language is learned” (4). In other words, the dissolution of Bearing’s 
literary acumen (i.e., her rigorous standards for objective, non-emotive criticism) mirrors the dis-
integration of her material body.
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femurs. (Screaming) There is cancer eating away at my goddamn bones, 
and I didn’t know there could be such pain on this earth” (71). Unlike 
earlier asides, this outburst does not consist of clever turns of phrase or 
semantic squabbles; instead, Bearing equivocally repeats the same dec-
laration over and again, “So painful,” without specifying the location, 
extent, or nature of the pain. The comparison between these two very dif-
ferent direct-address asides clearly demonstrates how Bearing’s vocabu-
lary over the course of the film “[takes] a turn for the Anglo-Saxon” (32), 
how words and language once considered her “only defense” (44) lose 
meaning.
 Near the end of the film Edson breaks completely with the asides 
when Bearing, overwhelmed by pain, relinquishes her role as the I-nar-
rator. In her final spoken lines Bearing “weakly” addresses the audience: 
“These are my last coherent lines. I’ll have to leave the action to the pro-
fessionals. It came so quickly, after taking so long. Not even time for a 
proper conclusion” (72). Her lines signal a radical shift in the nature of 
W;t’s narrative—from a story by Bearing to a story about her. Herein lies a 
third irony of the film: that a woman who has built her entire professional 
reputation on the precise usage of language is, in the end, rendered silent. 
Without words to express the sentient experiences of terminal cancer, and 
without the physical capacity to endure the tremendous pain, Bearing 
consents to a large dose of morphine for pain management and eventu-
ally slips into a coma from which she will never awaken (72). This shift 
in narrative strategy startles spectators partly because Bearing “guides” 
them from the opening lines of the film, and partly because she loses 
coherence and voice before she can offer a “proper conclusion” (i.e., some 
“truth” statement about the meaning of life, death, or both).
Textual differences
To this point, I have focused on how W;t thematically presents the body-
in-pain through an analogous relationship between ontology and New 
Criticism.10 In the final section of this essay, I want to turn my attention 
 10. Edson has commented that at first she was a bit leery of the adaptation, noting, “I thought 
they would have to jazz it up, add different themes and different places and a car crash” (qtd. 
in Peyser). Sharing Edson’s skepticism was actress Emma Thompson, who was approached by 
director Mike Nichols to star in and co-author a screenplay version of W;t. As Thompson revealed 
to Newsweek reporter Marc Peyser, “It’s quite rare that plays work when filmed. They’re designed 
for a different kind of experience.” Despite Edson’s and Thompson’s misgivings, the HBO adap-
tation of W;t has been labeled a “faithful adaptation” of the stage play and has received near-
unanimous praise from reviewers. People Weekly critic Terry kelleher dubbed W;t “one of the finest 
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to one noteworthy difference between the stage and screen versions of 
W;t—the final sequence of events that depicts Bearing’s death—in order 
to speak specifically to the cinematic mode.
 At the close of the play Edson abandons analogy, opting instead to 
posit an allegorical narrative by which Bearing’s death personifies the 
Judeo-Christian belief in eternal life and salvation. After Bearing has 
coded and been pronounced dead,
SUSIE lifts the blanket. VIVIAN steps out of the bed. She walks away from 
the scene, toward a little light. She is now attentive and eager, moving 
slowly toward the light. She takes off the cap and lets it drop. She slips off 
the bracelet. She loosens the ties and the top gown slides to the floor. She 
lets the second gown fall. The instant she is naked, and beautiful, reaching 
for the light—Lights out. (85)
 What is perhaps most striking about this final sequence of events is 
Bearing’s concession of the narrative-I position, indicated by her silence. 
The lack of voice accentuates her passive narrative position and indicates 
how death renders her an object made meaningful. The shedding of her 
hospital gown visually marks the shedding of illness and bodily pain 
as well as identifies death as a release from worldly/material suffering 
(during the disrobing process, Edson describes Bearing as “attentive,” 
“eager,” “beautiful”). Death, though, does not simply signify an end to 
worldly suffering; it also gestures toward the beginning of eternal life and 
redemption, a point made manifest in Bearing’s move toward a white 
light which symbolizes a spiritual realm, a realm beyond the material 
one, that gives purpose and meaning to life.
 The final sequence of filmic events differs markedly from that of the 
play. In the film, once Bearing has coded and been pronounced dead, the 
camera records a long shot of Bearing’s hospital room. In the immediate 
foreground Bearing’s lifeless, seminude body is sprawled out across a 
gurney; in the background Susie stands motionless over Bearing’s body, 
looking down upon her. After lingering over this tableau for a few beats, 
the camera abruptly shifts perspective, cutting to a bird’s-eye view of the 
gurney. Once again, the camera maintains this shot for a brief moment 
before cutting to a wide exterior shot of the hospital room, filmed from 
films I’ve seen in recent years—on big screen or small,” citing Thompson’s “consummate skill 
and unshakable commitment” to the role of Bearing as one of the highlights of the film. Simi-
larly, Variety reviewer Eddie Cockrell described HBO’s adaptation as “[a] shrewd and triumphant 
retooling of Margaret Edson’s 1997 Pulitzer Prize–winning play” and noted that while “[t]he risks 
in filming such a theatrical experience are enormous,” “the original material has been carefully 
and smartly reworked by Thompson and Nichols.”
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the adjoining corridor. From this angle spectators see Susie through the 
closed glass doors leading into Bearing’s room; silently but with purpose 
she closes the drapes. The next cut returns spectators to the interior of the 
hospital room. This time, however, the camera captures a tight close-up of 
Bearing’s face in death. Her eyes are closed, her head turned slightly to the 
right, as if in death Bearing avoids the persistent gaze of the camera. Her 
head is bald, her skin pallid, and her lips parted slightly. Slowly the view 
cross-fades to a black-and-white, bust-shot photograph of Bearing in life. 
In the photograph her gaze is firmly directed into the lens of the camera, 
her expression held between a smirk and a grimace. The only soundtrack 
that runs beneath this series of cuts and cross-fades is Bearing’s voice-over 
recitation of Donne’s Holy Sonnet Six, “Death, be not proud.” Immedi-
ately following the final lines of the sonnet the screen fades to black and 
the credits begin to flash.
 The final sequence of filmic events clearly suggests that analogy 
remains the chief tool of W;t’s narrative method;11 indeed, aside from 
the lecture scene during which Donne’s sonnet is visually projected onto 
 11. Despite the noteworthy differences between film and play that I outline here, some critics 
insist on attributing an allegorical narrative to the conclusion of the film. In one particularly 
scathing, and I would argue ill-informed, review, Entertainment Weekly columnist ken Tucker 
writes:
I saw the original Off-Broadway production of Wit [sic], which starred kathleen Chal-
fant in a heroically unsympathetic performance that Thompson has softened. Don’t get 
me wrong—Thompson is excellent—but in reshaping Edson’s play, she and Nichols 
emphasize the element that bothers me about Wit [sic]. It’s the play’s central devious-
ness: While filled with admiration for Donne’s poetry, Wit [sic] ultimately says that 
well-reasoned, ferociously disciplined scholarship is inferior to what one character calls 
“the meaning-of-life garbage”—that is to say, that Professor Bearing’s life would have 
been less lonely, more full, if she had loved her students as much as her subject. To 
which I say: Oh, phooey.
Here, Tucker suggests that in reworking the play for the small screen, Thompson and Nichols 
foregrounded the allegorical narrative deviously undergirding Edson’s stage play. As I note above, 
this reading has been fostered by Edson, who claims that the play is principally about grace and 
redemption, though few (if any) critics have commented on that fact.
  For me, Tucker’s statement speaks more to the persistence of allegory as a means to under-
stand texts about terminal illness than it does to the “truth statement” advocated by the film. 
Indeed, the few moments in the drama when Thompson and Nichols might appear to advocate 
what Tucker terms “the meaning-of-life garbage” (e.g., when Bearing and Susie share a Popsicle or 
when Ashford reads The Runaway Bunny to Bearing) are undercut by Bearing’s simple but telling 
aside, “That certainly was a maudlin display. Popsicles? ‘Sweetheart?’ I can’t believe my life has 
become so . . . corny” (69). A few lines later Bearing admits that such overwrought dramatics “can’t 
be helped” since “[w]e are discussing life and death, and not in the abstract either; we are dis-
cussing my life and my death, and my brain is dulling, and poor Susie’s was never very sharp to 
begin with, and I can’t conceive of any other . . . tone” (69). My point here is that, for Bearing, the 
effusive, existential statement that Tucker attributes to the play is never an option (her “I can’t con-
ceive of any other . . . tone” implies a tone other than that engendered by her overweening intel-
lect). Other characters (Susie when she rubs the lotion on the hands of a comatose Bearing) may 
succumb to the “meaning-of-life garbage,” but for Bearing these moments are perhaps unavoid-
able, but nonetheless “corny.”
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Bearing’s ill body, this scene offers the most explicit comparison of mate-
rial body/ontology and sonnet/New Criticism. The film’s juxtaposition 
of Bearing’s lifeless body with Donne’s “Death, be not proud” reinforces 
the analogy. However, death and the concomitant disappearance of the 
material body (one variable in the initial analogical equation) necessitate a 
shift in analogy. In the absence of the material body—an absence visually 
recorded in the cross-fade from motion picture to still photograph—the 
conditions of analogy shift from expressed (simile) to implied (metaphor), 
so that the body is not like the sonnet but instead the body is the sonnet.
 Because the film not only foregrounds literary explication as its cen-
tral thematic and narrative concern but also advocates that methodology 
for its readers, to explicate the body-in-pain spectators must employ the 
same reading practices Bearing uses when she interprets Donne’s Holy 
Sonnets. The central presupposition of New Critics is that every “good” 
poem must achieve “organic unity,” defined as “the concept that all parts 
of a poem are interrelated and interconnected, with each part reflecting 
and helping to support the poem’s central idea” (Bressler 43). In “The 
Formalist Critics,” for example, Cleanth Brooks articulates some “articles 
of faith” that guide and direct the work of formalist critics, chief among 
them being “the problem of unity—the kind of whole which the literary 
work forms or fails to form, and the relation of the various parts to each 
other in building up this whole” (52). To achieve organic unity, the critic 
must identify the central tension in a poem and then, by exploring par-
ticular devices of irony, paradox, and wit through which that tension is 
conveyed, the critic must resolve the tension and arrive at a statement of 
the poem’s chief effect.
 I contend that the central tension in W;t is expressed through the anti-
thetical relationship between physical pain and its representations. On 
one hand, pain (to paraphrase Scarry) has no voice because it is located 
within the invisible (and unknowable) terrain of the material body; on the 
other hand, representation foregrounds the voice as one central device 
through which meaning is produced. This struggle between voice and 
silence perhaps is most succinctly articulated in the epigraph that opens 
this essay. For Bearing, who has built her professional career on a precise 
and judicious application of language, the experience of terminal cancer 
and its radical medical treatment is devastating because those experiences 
are, as Scarry claims, “world-destroying” (29). Bearing’s unbearable pain 
compromises her ability to translate experience into language, a point 
underscored by the repetition of ellipses in the epigraph. Like her stu-
dents who struggle with close textual analysis, Bearing “flounders” (48) 
in her attempt to express what pain feels like.
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 The film sustains this narrative tension in the final scene through the 
persistence of asides. As a narrative convention, the aside presupposes 
a certain degree of agency. As kaja Silverman explains in The Acoustic 
mirror, “Western metaphysics has fostered the illusion that speech is able 
to express the speaker’s inner essence, that it is ‘part’ of him or her. It 
locates the subject of speech in the same ontological space as the speaking 
subject, so that the former seems a natural outgrowth of the latter” (43). 
Typically, the act of speaking (i.e., the narrative-I) confers upon an indi-
vidual the status of “subject.” The voice is, in this way, identified as the 
central locus for the production of both identity and subjectivity, and the 
realization/execution of that voice is assumed (by the individual and 
those with whom that individual engages) to be evidence of the individ-
ual’s subject status. Thus the I-subject of the speech and the I-as-point-
of-view speaking subject are conflated, or, in Silverman’s parlance, are 
located in “the same ontological space.” Direct-address asides emphasize 
this process of conflation so that Bearing’s recitation of “Death, be not 
proud” projects the body-in-pain/-death as a speaking subject.
 At the same time, several additional aspects of the mode of address 
undercut the sense of agency implied by Bearing’s direct-address asides. 
This final aside is spoken posthumously, and death, as Bronfen persua-
sively argues, typically effaces “the subjectivity of the dying woman, her 
position within the death process, her body, and her pain” (49–50). In 
addition, the recitation is framed by the objective rather than the sub-
jective/nominative case. By speaking Donne’s words, Bearing marks her 
body as an object to which something is don(n)e, as a text to be read. 
Through careful instruction and rigorous example, Bearing aids and abets 
spectators in reading the body, but she herself retains little power over the 
outcome of the interpretive process or her medical treatment. Note, for 
instance, her dismay at “leav[ing] the action to the professionals” without 
“even time for a proper conclusion” (72).
 The use of portrait photography in the final moments of the film visu-
ally underscores the oscillation between subject and object. On one hand, 
the photograph produces a fixed visual record of the material body, one 
framed in space by the ocular perspective of the photographer and one 
framed in time by the present progressive tense of the shutter’s click. The 
spatial and temporal fixity of the photograph places in relief the literal 
death and disappearance of Bearing’s material body; in other words, the 
permanence of the former sharply contrasts with the provisionality of the 
latter. On the other hand, photography manufactures presence as an end-
lessly reproducible visual image of the material body. Through the pro-
cess of cropping, photographic negatives can be framed and reframed to 
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accentuate a particular bodily feature or to emphasize a unique camera 
angle. By manipulating light and shadow during the developing process, 
the photographer can (sometimes radically) alter the visual composition 
of a negative, and digital enhancement can modify the photographic 
image. Thus the “reproductive possibilities of photography” (Phelan 38) 
suggest that the process of signification, of meaning making, does not pre-
suppose a one-to-one correlation between signifier and signified. Even in 
the absence of the material body (signified), the photograph (signifier) 
continues to re-produce Bearing’s body as a meaningful text-to-be-read.
 Formalist approaches to literature insist that narrative tensions must 
be both explicated and resolved (several times throughout the film Bearing 
and Ashford claim that their methodology produces meaning as Truth); 
however, I argue that W;t presents an unresolvable tension. To suggest 
that the narrative tension in W;t is left unresolved, though, is neither 
an uncritical reiteration of Scarry’s and Bronfen’s theses nor a nihilistic 
proposition of my own (i.e., pain can never be translated into representa-
tion). Rather, I suggest that the film constitutes an exercise in wit, one in 
which representational (rather than metaphysical) quandaries are posed 
but never resolved. In this respect the film calls attention to itself as a form 
of representation that is doomed to fail in its address (given its subject 
matter: pain and the treatment of terminal cancer), but one that can none-
theless chart the struggles within its mode of address that derive from 
any attempt to document the ravages that terminal illness exacts upon the 
material body.
 From the initial scenes of the film, Edson calls attention to the cinematic 
apparatus not simply as a vehicle through which to convey the story, but 
rather as a force that shapes the action. In her first aside Bearing apolo-
getically notes, “It’s not my intention to give away the plot; but I think 
I die at the end” (6). Later in this same aside Bearing reveals, “I’ve got 
less than two hours. Then: curtain” (7). Similarly self-reflexive comments 
recur throughout the film, such as when Bearing refers to her hospital 
gown as a “costume” (6), designates flashback sequences as “scenes” (63), 
and challenges the absent author (Edson) by noting, “If I were writing this 
scene, it would last a full fifteen minutes. I would lie here, and you would 
sit there” (35). By foregrounding the operations of the dramatic and then 
the cinematic apparatus, Edson effectively disallows an empathetic bond 
between spectators and character. In effect, spectators’ attention is divided 
between the unfolding narrative and its self-reflexive construction. If spec-
tators are made aware of the operations of the cinematic apparatus, then 
they also are made aware of their own situatedness as onlookers of the 
drama. But, given the nature of Bearing’s profession (teaching) and given 
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the shape of W;t’s plot (much of it reads like a lecture in seventeenth-
century poetry and New Critical explication),12 spectators are not simply 
voyeurs but rather students, and W;t constitutes the final exam.
Conclusion
W;t challenges traditional theories of the body-in-pain which suggest 
that the two primary means of representing the felt-experiences of pain 
are the weapon (or causal agent— cancer) and the damage (or effects/
wounds—vomiting, nerve death, liver damage). Indeed, the final scene of 
the film invokes neither the weapon (since cancer is an internal medical 
condition that happens at the microscopic level of cellular activity) nor its 
damage (since the camera refuses to linger over Bearing’s corpse). Rather, 
it proposes a third means of representation, one that locates itself precisely 
within the moment that pain is inflicted and death is experienced. In the 
film the cinematic apparatus provides a multitude of possibilities for how 
to represent the body-in-pain, just as New Criticism provides a multi-
tude of tools for rendering the poetic text meaningful. The text provides 
a cautionary note: when the focus of the representation is misdirected (on 
either the weapon or the damage), the body-in-pain remains untranslated 
and sentience remains unsharable. And while analogy ultimately fails to 
convey to spectators what it “feels like” to be terminally ill and to receive 
radical and invasive medical treatment, the self-reflexive analogy in W;t 
more directly acknowledges the failure to produce meaning, knowledge, 
and Truth than does allegory.
 The film also challenges the traditional ways in which the patient 
(especially the female patient) is codified and contained within medical 
discourse (itself a specific mode of representation) and rendered an object 
of the (usually male) physician’s gaze.13 Bearing’s lifeless body, then, sig-
 12. Edson herself describes W;t as “90 minutes of suffering and death, mitigated by a pelvic 
exam and a lecture on 17th-century poetry” (Zinman 25).
 13. Outside theatre circles, W;t has captured the attention of medical practitioners for its relent-
less and “deft satire of doctors, who are depicted as concerned but detached, viewing their patient 
more as a scientific case study than as a person” (Hornby 297). In fact, it is precisely Edson’s cogent 
critique of palliative care that has prompted a number of this country’s top medical schools to 
use W;t as a teaching tool for residents and interns. As Marianne Szegedy-Maszak explains in her 
article “A Lesson Before Dying”: “At 30 of the top U.S. medical schools, the play is performed as 
part of a broader national effort to teach medical students—and their professors—that the heroic 
saving of life is only half their job. The other half is dealing with the dying when a cure proves 
impossible” (48).
  For more responses to the play from the medical community, see: M.	J. Friedrich, “Wit: A 
Play That Raises Issues,” 1611–12; Suzanne Gordon, “Viewpoint,” 9; Dr. Abraham Philip, “Cancer 
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nals the ways in which illness and the representational forms of illness 
render the patient an “unwitting accomplice” in her treatment and return 
to health.14
 Edson suggests that one need not hide from the inherent failures of 
representation, but rather should acknowledge them. W;t’s chief effect is 
simple. Suspiciously simple. At the close of the film, spectators perhaps 
want (or need) further clarification. But it is too late. Like Bearing, the 
audience has run out of time and the cinematic encounter is over. The final 
image of the still photograph of Bearing, whose insistent gaze bears down 
at viewers, questions what audience members have “learned.” The final 
exam is over; to wit: time’s up.
Patient,” 3261.
 14. Through the explicit display of the female body, the final image of the film also gestures 
toward the ways in which gender socialization renders the female body a shameful terrain that 
must be hidden behind both clothing and euphemism—that is, the way in which biological pro-
cesses that are unique to women (e.g., ovulation, menstruation, conception, menopause) are con-
sistently and unwaveringly linked to the “failure and dissolution” of the material body (Martin 
32). It is precisely this history of shame that often compromises women’s health care, leaving many 
maladies (especially those centered on “taboo” areas such as the breasts and vagina) undetected 
until they are too advanced to treat.
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Bess (Emily Watson) flees torment from local children. Breaking the Waves. Directed 
by Lars von Trier. Zentropa Film Entertainment, 1996.
For the love of beauty is a deep-seated urge which dates back to the beginning 
of civilization. The revulsion with which we view the abnormal, the malformed 
and the mutilated is the result of long conditioning by our forefathers. The 
majority of freaks themselves are endowed with normal thoughts and emotions.
 —Dwain Esper, Freaks Prologue
In the well-known American classic film Freaks (1932), characters with dis-
abilities working in a circus claim revenge on “the normals” because of the 
way the normals swindle and attempt to kill Hans, “the midget” (Harry 
Earles). He has an “innocent” desire for a “beautiful” and “big” non-
disabled female aerialist, Cleo (Olga Baclanova). The opening prologue 
of the film, excerpted in the epigraph above, cautions viewers that their 
revulsion toward the film will no doubt invoke a mere historical construct. 
The prologue was not a statement made by the director Tod Browning 
himself, but instead was added by distributor Dwain Esper later in the 
1940s for the exploitation circuit1 to “pacify the audience” (after MGM 
gave him a twenty-five-year license on the film). Although David Skal 
and Elias Savada desribe it as a “cynical attempt to position the picture 
I thank Sally Chivers and Nicole Markotic´, Michael Gill, David Mitchell, Tobin Siebers, Mark Sherry, 
Sharon Snyder, the fellows of the Global Ethnic Literature Seminar at the University of Michigan at 
Ann Arbor, and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful suggestions and discussions.
 1. Eric Schaefer describes the exploitation films as having a “forbidden” topic, as the subject 
matter includes “sex, sex hygiene, prostitution and vice, drug use, nudity, and any other subject con-
sidered at the time to be in bad taste” (5). The classical exploitation films were also made cheaply and 
distributed independently. After Dwain Esper, an exploitation film director, acquired Freaks, he gave 
the film new titles, including Forbidden Love, The monster Show, and Nature’s mistakes, in the 1940s to 
appeal to the exploitation film viewers (387).
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with a moralistic, ‘educational’ defense” (223), Esper’s textual scroll cap-
tures how the historical construction of “the love of beauty” as a cause of 
revulsion toward the “abnormal” evokes the audience’s empathy with 
the “freaks” who have “normal thoughts and emotions.” This comment 
aligns the able-bodied audience with the disabled man (Hans) who expe-
riences “normal” (able-bodied and heterosexual) desire. Ironically, while 
attempting to challenge the love of beauty, the film’s narrative depends 
upon a “normal” sexual desire for the non-disabled feminine beauty of 
Cleo in order to humanize Hans. As the opening scroll ends, disability 
and undesirability converge: “We present the most startling horror story 
of the abnormal and the unwanted” (Esper, Prologue).
 After the appended prologue, the external frame story of the film starts 
with a carnival barker gesturing toward a box to which guests respond in 
horror. The scene implies the tragic destiny of a “once-beautiful woman” 
turned into a “monstrosity.” Later the audience learns that the mon-
strosity on display is the woman Cleo, mutilated because she has mis-
treated one of the “freaks,” Hans. The fact that this able-bodied woman 
was turned into a “monster” as a moral punishment implies a reversal of 
revulsion that capitalizes on a misogynistic tone in the main story that fol-
lows. The film shapes Hans’s manhood (as gendered humanity) through 
his aspiration to love Cleo while he is engaged to Frieda (Daisy Earles), 
also a “midget.” In a crucial scene where Hans is first linked sexually to 
Cleo, he is attracted to her body, and his fiancée Frieda is jealous. Hans 
gazes at Cleo when she intentionally drops her cape in front of him in 
order to seduce him to gain access to his inherited fortunes. When he lifts 
the cape for her, Cleo turns her back to him, smiles, kneels down, and 
allows him to drape it on her shoulder. Hans nervously asks, “Are you 
laughing at me?” When Cleo asks why she would laugh at him, Hans 
replies, “Most big people do. They don’t realize I’m a man, with the same 
feelings they have.” The scene’s depiction of Frieda is ambiguous. Frieda 
is a “good woman,” presented as a counter-image to Cleo whose “inner” 
badness is made conspicuous and combined with her future embodiment 
of monstrosity. The film does not necessarily depict Frieda as asexual; 
however, she is not “woman enough” to establish Hans’s normative het-
erosexuality because she does not appear to be an “object” of his sexual 
desire.
 By taking for granted men’s desire for women of a certain size and 
shape, the film attempts to overcome disability, and through this effort 
it lends to Hans’ status as a “real” man. More importantly, it visualizes 
the assumption that, because of their presumed undesirability, disabled 
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they receive sexual enabling. Problematically, the setup of this gender 
entitlement through momentary yet necessary sexual transgression con-
tradicts the opening statement about the film’s intention to enlighten 
the audience with the idea that revulsion toward “the abnormal” and 
“the love of beauty” is a historical product rather than human nature.2 In 
Freaks, Hans is made vulnerable to Cleo’s exploitation because his sexual 
desire transgresses the boundary of his community of disabled people. 
At the end of the film, having failed to be sexually incorporated into the 
normate world but also having paid the price for his attempt to seek out 
love with an able-bodied woman, Hans successfully and safely returns 
to Frieda to form the ultimate heterosexual bond. This move secures the 
sexual boundary of disabled people and the binary between disabled and 
non-disabled femininity that both enables and threatens disabled man-
hood.
 Cinematic representation of disabled men’s sexuality often aims to 
externalize their humanity by presuming that heterosexual male desire is 
universal. The dichotomy between a sexually promiscuous, non-disabled 
woman and a chaste, disabled woman plays a pivotal role in establishing 
this desire. As briefly illustrated in the example of Freaks, this essay closely 
interrogates the connections between heterosexualizing apparatuses and 
disabled manhood and womanhood in four films: Breaking the Waves 
(1996), Born on the Fourth of July (1989), Breathing Lessons: The Life and Work 
of mark O’Brien (1996), and Oasis (2002). By “heterosexualizing appara-
tuses,” I refer to filmic story telling and visualizing methods including the 
employment of certain characters, plot development and cinematography 
that inscribe heterosexual desire, thus setting up the prior trouble with 
(or absence of) heterosexuality in association with disability. In the first 
three films commercially and medically available forms of sexual services 
provide heteronormative means to integrate disabled men who are oth-
erwise positioned outside the realm of sexuality. These films display this 
logic in different ways and, at the same time, provide critical reflections 
on the supposed necessity of such integrating intervention, according 
to a view that physical disability naturally desexualizes. I argue that in 
two of these films, one featuring a disabled man in religious Scotland 
 2. Sharon L. Snyder and David T. Mitchell see this contradiction as an unchallenged myth of the 
oversexed nature of dwarfs, saying, “[W]hile Freaks depicts the social rejection of people with dis-
abilities as inhumane, it leaves more established myths—such as the oversexed nature of dwarfs and 
the desire of disabled people for revenge against the able-bodied—unchallenged” (380). Snyder and 
Mitchell argue that the film displays two impulses to normalize and to exoticize its disabled acting 
ensemble. I add an important point here: the female characters with and without disabilities play 
an important role in Hans’s momentary but necessary enabling in a way that fortifies the separated 
worlds between the “freaks” and the “normals.” Hans needs both women, as his reunion with Frieda 
is presented as a true form of resolution.
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(Breaking the Waves) and the other featuring an American disabled male 
veteran after the Vietnam War (Born on the Fourth of July), newly disabled 
men are positioned in a desexualized terrain from which they must be 
rescued and then escorted into the heterosexual world through different 
forms of prostitution. Next I examine a documentary film about the life 
of an American disabled man (Breathing Lessons). This film explicitly dis-
cusses sexual exploration using sex surrogacy services. By connecting 
discourses of sexual liberalism within and outside the film, I examine 
how disabled manhood and desire are reconfigured within sexual-access 
rhetoric. I question the way in which disabled men’s sexuality is assisted 
and imagined through the terms of heterosexual normativity in cultural 
representations. Finally, turning to the South korean film Oasis, I examine 
the representation of a socially outcast male character’s violation of a dis-
abled woman and his love and care for her following the violation. I dem-
onstrate how his actions humanize him and in turn enable the disabled 
woman’s humanity visualized through her able-bodied fantasies.
lovemaking and Curing disability 
Through Surrogate Prostitution
While Freaks relies on the binary of a desirable, promiscuous, deceitful, 
able-bodied woman and an undesirable, innocent, disabled woman prop-
ping up a disabled male character’s humanity, Breaking the Waves (1996) 
deftly fuses good womanhood into a disabled woman’s body that has 
been prostituted in order to intervene in a man’s physical and sexual dis-
ablement. The first film produced as part of his “Good Woman trilogy” 
or “Golden Heart trilogy”3 (with The Idiots [1998] and Dancer in the Dark 
[2000] following), Lars von Trier’s Dogme 95 film depicts disability in 
relation to religion, love, salvation, and gender politics, all of which create 
a separate sexual realm for a disabled man. Within ambiguous power 
dynamics between a “feeble”4 woman and a physically disabled man, 
 3. “Golden Heart” is a Danish children’s story about “the role of a martyr in its most extreme 
form” (von Trier). A little girl goes into the woods with a few things, including pieces of bread, in her 
pockets. On her travels she gives away all she has to people in need. Naked and bereft, Golden Heart 
says to herself “I’ll be fine anyway” (Faber 59–60). Alyda Faber compares this children’s story with 
Shel Silverstein’s The Giving Tree, the story of “goodness as female self-sacrifice” (60).
 4. Bess’s mother calls her “feeble girl” when she discovers her promiscuous behaviors. Bess is 
also described as “psychotic” in the film. The juxtaposition of the emotionally vulnerable individual 
attached to the physically disabled person is employed as the representational strategy to highlight 
the “sublime innocence” of the relationship which also appears in reversal in Oasis. One can identify 
Bess as a disabled character because the narrative refers to her becoming “mentally ill” after her 
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the film initially juxtaposes sexuality and disability as conflicting forces. 
Scholarship on Breaking the Waves focuses on divinity, female character-
ization and religious suppression of sexuality, and eros as sacrifice (keefer 
and Linafelt 1999); sexual transgression (Heath 1998); and valorized male 
domination and sexual violence with redemptive meaning (Faber 2003). 
To elaborate the last example, Alyda Faber argues that in the film, “Bess’s 
goodness [is represented] as masochistic debility, a dubious construc-
tion” that is “a persistent male creation of women’s social reality” (59, 
74). However, not much attention is paid to the disabilities of either male 
or female characters in the film. The way the film represents disability, 
I argue, is a crucial setup in order to reconfigure the values of sexuality, 
spiritual cures, gender norms, and desire.
 Set during the 1970s in Scotland, the film interweaves “the cure of dis-
ability” with the concept of the sexual surrogate body of a prostitute. In a 
closed village populated by characters with fundamental Christian beliefs, 
Bess McNiell (Emily Watson) marries an unwelcome outsider and oilrig 
worker Jan Nyman (Stellan Skarsgård). When Jan returns to his work at 
the oilrig, he is paralyzed from the neck down in a work accident; Bess 
believes that the accident is her fault because she had asked God to bring 
him home. While Jan is frustrated with his new body, Bess does not seem 
to be upset by the fact that her husband is disabled. Telling her the news of 
his paralysis, the doctor gives her the legitimacy to grieve by stating that 
it would have been better if he had died. But what matters to Bess is the 
fact that he is alive and will live. Here Bess celebrates Jan’s survival and 
transgresses the commonly imagined “misery” of disablement, which the 
doctor labels as a “life not worth living.”
 The most overpowering and devastating consequence of disablement 
for Jan is the fact that he is, presumably, deprived of having sex. Sexu-
ality in the film is made incompatible with his disability, thus creating a 
condition that requires mediation. Suffering over the fact that Bess will 
also be deprived of sexual acts, he laments to her: “I’m finished Bess. you 
could take a lover without anybody noticing. But you can’t divorce me. 
They’d never let you.” After resisting this idea of finding a lover as an 
alternative to religiously prohibited divorce, she leaves him alone in the 
room. Jan attempts to commit suicide in order to free Bess, thinking that 
it is the only way to liberate her from a matrimonial bond. Jan’s nurse, 
brother dies and her husband becomes physically disabled. She often becomes “delusional” when 
she impersonates God’s voice. The film critic Bryant Frazer suggests that to the villagers, Bess is a 
suitable case for treatment because she fails to follow the rule that women must be silent in church. 
That Bess seeks to hear from God through her own self-voicing is perhaps not considered deviant but 
rather religious in that local context. However, later on, her sexual acts lead her to become an outcast.
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Bess’s loving sister-in-law Dodo McNiell (katrin Cartlidge), intervenes 
and prevents Jan’s suicide and then persuades him to live by telling him 
that Bess would do anything for him. Dodo unknowingly facilitates Jan’s 
suggestion that Bess have sex with a stranger when she also tells Bess, 
“you could give him the will to live. That’s more than any doctor could 
do.” Then Jan again attempts to persuade Bess to go out and find a man to 
have sex with:
Love is a mighty power, isn’t it? If I die, it will be because love cannot keep 
me alive. But I can hardly remember what it’s like to make love, and if I 
forget that then I’ll die. . . . Bess, I want you to find a man to make love to 
and then come back here and tell me about it. It will feel like you and me 
being together again. Now, that . . . that will keep me alive. . . . It will be 
you and me Bess. Do it for me.
 Bess now believes that she is put to the test by God of proving her love 
for Jan. The voice of God (spoken aloud by her), shown as a sign of her 
delusion, is the only command she obeys, while she defies the church and 
medical authority. First, she attempts to carry on her mission by having 
sex with her physician, Dr. Richardson (Adrian Rawlins), as demanded by 
God to prove that she loves Jan. Her attempt fails because the doctor does 
not cooperate, so she fabricates an implausible coital story for Jan, to his 
disappointment. Desperately believing that an actual sexual foray may 
improve Jan’s deteriorating health, Bess gives a male fellow bus traveler 
a “hand-job.” This scene initially solidifies Bess as Jan’s surrogate body, 
sent into the world outside the hospital in order to explore the sexual 
pleasures that, in his mind, his disability has made impossible.
 Seeing him improve after he hears the bus story, Bess now believes 
that she can save Jan. She transforms her attire and makeup to look 
like—to become—a prostitute. When her physician confronts her about 
her prostitution, Bess adamantly but softly tells him, “I don’t make love 
with them. I make love with Jan and I save him from dying.” The project 
of saving Jan through her sexual acts and her narrations to him of what 
the sex is like renders all possible johns as Jan’s surrogates. While most of 
the characters around Bess, including her mother and Dodo, disapprove 
of Jan’s “sick fantasy” and condemn her “stupidity,” Bess continues to 
seek sexual activities as Jan’s condition worsens. Her behavior alone, not 
that of the many anonymous customers who indulge in “sinful” activi-
ties, creates a scandal in the religious community, to the extent that she is 
forbidden to enter the church.
 When Dodo tells her that Jan, now in critical condition, is dying, Bess 
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hurries to a ship, where she was previously assaulted and barely escaped, 
to engage in another sexual exchange, thinking this will save Jan’s life. 
Bess no longer believes that she needs to even tell Jan stories of her 
exploits. In her mind the act itself transforms Jan’s health. In this climactic 
moment of crisis Bess is dreadfully and violently assaulted by a group of 
sailors. Barely surviving the attacks, she returns to Jan’s hospital, where 
she dies of her injuries. Bess paradoxically achieves the status of “good“ 
woman by prostituting herself because she believes herself to be under 
the power of divine command. As expected, the film depicts Jan recov-
ered from his critical condition, sitting in a wheelchair and later walking 
with crutches, assuring the audience that her sacrifice indeed saved him 
and he is on the way to being entirely cured of his disability.
 The film speaks within the tradition of prostitution as spiritually and 
psychologically therapeutic to men, not only by restoring Jan’s mascu-
linity but also by maximizing the degree to which Bess’s prostitution 
cures his paralysis. At her burial site church elders declare Bess a sinner 
and consign her to hell. Wishing to free Bess from religious dogma once 
again, Jan steals her corpse and holds a funeral for her on a ship so that 
he can then release her body into the sea. The next morning Jan and 
everyone else on the ship hear a heavenly bell ringing in the middle of the 
sea. The film ends with the miracles of Jan’s recovery (if one had believed 
the physician’s prognosis of him as terminally quadriplegic) and Bess’s 
salvation, celebrating the fact that her love is ultimately rewarded by a 
higher power.
 “The film creates an image of Bess as the template of bittersweet sexu-
ality,” Faber argues, “that heals and wounds deeply—from her childlike 
‘sexless’ sweetness in the opening scenes to her disillusioned suffering 
in the hospital after she has been tortured and raped” (67). Faber further 
argues, “von Trier creates the image of Bess as sexual martyr through 
a peculiar valorization of feminine abjection as madness, formlessness, 
malleability, hysteria” (69). Disturbed by a sadistic God as crafted by von 
Trier, Faber invokes kristeva to criticize the film by stating, “The spec-
tacle of feminine masochism becomes irresistible in sensations of horror 
and suffering in the spectator, hence the irresistible ‘truth’ of feminine 
abjection within the male rational order” (73). However, the associations 
among Bess’s disability, prostitution, and abjection are not free from the 
longstanding yet unfounded psychoanalytical condemnations of dis-
ability as a fragile, hypersexual condition. Faber describes Bess’s anguish 
when Jan leaves town to return to his oilrig work as an “animal intensity 
of emotions” and her prostitution as a symbol of a self-destructive psyche 
(69). Faber’s argument about gendered sexual violence and male domina-
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tion is accurate; however, her argument is deeply influenced by the con-
ventional understanding of disability as necessarily damaged and abject. 
The violence Bess undergoes in her search for sexual “pleasure” is neither 
necessitated by her project of salvation nor leads directly to masochism. 
Rather, the violence of the sailors and the community’s stigmatization of 
her and other prostitutes in the name of religion exist beyond Jan’s and 
Bess’s psychological characterizations in the film.
 The medical and religious communities’ perception of disablement as 
desexualization creates anxiety toward Bess’s sensual pursuit of sexual 
pleasure. Within that closed fissure, prostitution yields the only pseudo-
solution for both a sexual woman and a man with disabilities. Other 
changes that follow Jan’s disablement enter the narrative only when he is 
frustrated in front of his friends by not being able to lift a beer can. While 
both the marriage and Jan’s non-disabled body are privileged by the com-
munity as the only sanctioned places for sexual pleasure, Jan is seem-
ingly left without a choice for Bess’s continued sexual pleasure since, con-
strained by rigid religious tenets, they cannot divorce. His masculinity 
is diminished in front of a group of male friends; he is compelled to be 
a man who can satisfy his wife only by relying on other, non-disabled 
male bodies. How, then, is Bess convinced that her sexual experiences 
with strangers can provide Jan a cure with—or even without—delivering 
these narratives of sexuality to Jan? Rather, how does the director present 
the film as “a simple love story” and say, “I prefer to work with unassail-
able ideas. And I wanted to do a film about goodness” (von Trier 12)? 
Faber argues that von Trier’s characterization of Bess reiterates a common 
image of the female martyr, constructing her power as debilitating mas-
ochism (59). In contrast, however, the film relies on the common and per-
sistent belief that impairment damages the personhood of disabled men 
in its incompatibility with sexuality, creating a necessity for cure.
Prostitutes as rehabilitators
Unlike Breaking the Waves, which centrally engages the question of salva-
tion and sexuality when a disabled woman engages in prostitution to cure 
her disabled husband, Hollywood cinema has symbolically capitalized 
on disabled men purchasing sex as part of the process of physical and 
psychological rehabilitation after disablement. Coming Home (1978), Born 
on the Fourth of July (1989), The Waterdance (1992), and One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (1974) have an inconspicuous commonality beyond simply 
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portraying disabled male characters. The films all posit prostitution/
stripping and a non-disabled female sex worker as a fleeting and neces-
sary rite of passage in the physical and psychological rehabilitation of 
disabled men. In Coming Home, for example, before showing Luke Martin 
(Jon Voight) engaged in passionate and fulfilling sexual activities with 
Sally Hyde (Jane Fonda), the film depicts him casually greeting a white 
prostitute in his apartment.5 He awaits his regular prostitute, but when 
a new woman comes instead, he does not reject her after learning that 
she is experienced in having sex with disabled customers. This very brief 
exchange indicates that purchasing sexual service has become an ordi-
nary aspect of his life of rehabilitation outside the hospital; it is also a sign 
of his active sexual life after disablement. Unlike many films depicting 
non-disabled men who hire prostitutes for pleasure, thus imperiling their 
morals and their reputations, Luke’s role—seemingly as a regular john—
does not diminish his morality or personable characteristics. Rather, pre-
sented as a positive sign of his rehabilitation, the scene crucially chal-
lenges common assumptions that disabled people are uncomfortable 
with their sexuality because of their disability. Thus the scene prepares 
the audience to encounter his full ability to make love to the woman he 
actually loves. His ability to satisfy Sally is contrasted with her psycho-
logically traumatized yet physically able-bodied husband’s inability to 
do so. Luke is presented as confident and skilled in enticing Sally into 
his first sexual affair immediately after his brave, solo antiwar protest, 
prompted by the suicide of one of his friends, also a Vietnam veteran. 
 Although the connection between male disabled characters and female 
able-bodied prostitutes is pervasive in film, the relationship between dis-
abled masculinity and prostitution is not monolithic. For example, Scent 
of a Woman (1992) depicts the engagement of a blind man, Lieutenant 
Colonel Slade (Al Pacino), with a high-class prostitute—who does not 
appear in the film—as a last wish to experience sexual satisfaction before 
he attempts suicide. However, he had frequently hired prostitutes’ ser-
vices before his disablement, and his descriptions of the experience to a 
young, inexperienced Charlie (Chris O’Donnell), whom Slade hires as a 
personal guide, build him up as a passionate and virile character rather 
than merely rehabilitating him. Slade is rehabilitated through playing the 
 5. This film’s depiction of Sally and Luke’s sexual fulfillment has been celebrated as the tradition 
of “alternative phallic heterosexual narrative.” Subsequently, murderball’s (2005) sexual story of dis-
abled men was presented as life-affirming as opposed to “dogmatic asexuality” (Garland-Thomson 
122). I question the alternative nature of such heterosexuality and the problematization of asexuality; 
however, my emphasis on the role of a prostitute does not negate the representational importance of 
the sexual relationship between Sally and Luke. My analytic focus concerns the presence of prostitu-
tion as a precursor to idealized heterosexuality through which Luke’s sexual ability is confirmed.
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role of father to Charlie, who is in trouble at his prep school for failing 
to reveal the names of fellow students whom he saw committing acts of 
vandalism. After Slade’s heroic defense of Charlie and his integrity at his 
disciplinary hearing, the previously suicidal Slade meets a female love 
interest and becomes lively and flirtatious.
 The prostitute-as-rehabilitator logic plays out more simply and melo-
dramatically in Born on the Fourth of July than in Coming Home or Breaking 
the Waves. Ron kovic (Tom Cruise) returns paralyzed from his tour of 
duty in the Vietnam War. While trying to adjust to civilian life with his 
new body, he is initially disturbed by the U.S. antiwar atmosphere. How-
ever, fraught with guilt about killing villagers and a fellow soldier, he 
slowly realizes the problem of warfare and grows cynical about his past 
role as a soldier and his country’s current participation in global con-
flict. One night, after fighting with another marine in a bar and falling 
from his wheelchair in the middle of a dancing crowd that literally looks 
down upon him, Ron returns home intoxicated and angry. He holds his 
religious mother’s cross in his hand, ranting to her about the war and 
the government’s deception, writing off his past religion and patriotism 
altogether. He then holds his catheter in one hand and the cross in the 
other and shouts, “It’s a lie. . . . There is no God, no country . . . just me 
and this dead penis.” While effectively establishing able-bodiedness and 
the phallus as hidden pillars of the nation-under-God, the scene shows 
that Ron has lost all his normative foundational identities but has not yet 
found ways to understand his new body or to gain a new perspective, a 
critical reimagining, of American society. When a calmer Ron says to his 
father, “I wanna be a man again,” Ron’s struggle with his disability is 
summarized as his sexual frustration. The meaning of disability is trans-
lated as the loss of his phallus, and the translation presents a potential 
solution as Ron’s father prescribes him a visit to Mexico for a “rest.”
 In the scenes that follow, the film depicts a Mexican town as “para-
dise” for American disabled veterans, mostly represented as white, sur-
rounded by prostitutes of color who appear to restore the veterans’ man-
hood. Ron’s journey to become “a man again” takes him to a brothel. 
While Ron is lying in bed with a naked prostitute, Maria Elena (Cordeliá 
Gonzáles), he stops her from unbuttoning his pants, saying that “there 
is nothing down here at all, nothing happens.” Maria assures him, “We 
are gonna have a good time.” While Maria continues to make a moaning 
sound sitting on top of him, the camera focuses on his face covered with 
tears. It appears that Ron has successful penetrative sex with Maria, ful-
filling her promise of “a good time.” While it does not make clear how 
the audience should interpret his tears, the film portrays the experience of 
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purchased sexual service as a complicated event (Ron loses his virginity, 
and he later futilely seeks out a romantic relationship with Maria). Paired 
with a fight in the desert with another veteran, which makes Ron face his 
own sinister past of the time he spent in combat, this ambivalent sexual 
experience serves as a gateway through which Ron can be reintegrated 
into civil life as a prominent antiwar activist upon his return.6 After this 
Mexican double-rendezvous, Ron is fully rehabilitated into manhood 
and transformed politically; he visits and apologizes to the family of the 
fellow soldier whom he killed.
 Peter Lehman provides a relevant explanation of the film’s symbol-
ization of Ron’s phallic rehabilitation: the “melodramatic penis on the one 
hand challenges conventional representations, and on the other hand con-
stitutes a troubled site of representation that contains disturbing contra-
dictions” (26). In Born on the Fourth of July, the penis becomes a metaphor 
for damaged masculinity as visualized through the catheter swinging in 
Ron’s hand. Maria’s orgasmic performance and upright posture on top of 
Ron during intercourse represent Ron’s erect penis to the viewers, thus 
visualizing Ron’s return to self-assurance in his masculinity through 
sexual performance.
 Ron’s experience with Maria can be seen as transformative—as much 
as it is vain and temporary—with a full range of race, national space, 
and class significance embedded within that transaction. Ron’s Amer-
ican whiteness serves as an asset that compensates for his disability in 
the sexually saturated exotic space of a brothel and on the streets where 
women of color are passively portrayed as lined up and waiting to be 
chosen. The gender and the whiteness of disabled men are consolidated 
and reasserted when desexualized disabled bodies need to be rehabili-
tated through prescriptive heterosexualization. In this process certain 
 6. Nick Allen’s film review describes this scene as exactly such a rehabilitating pathway. He 
writes: “Cruise reaches dark recesses as the tears flow for real during his liaison with a Mexican 
whore[;] it is here in a[n] oasis of hope in the desert that the character finally decides to face his pre-
dicament.” In the autobiography by Ron kovic with the same title, kovic describes the experience in 
Mexico and the “whorehouse” in the Village of the Sun. When he first had an encounter with a sex 
worker, it was she who cried at the sight of his disability and left him. He proceeded to find another 
sex worker, Maria, who asked him to come back the next day and live with her. In the autobiography 
kovic narrates his time with Maria in the third-person voice. In contrast to the portrayal of the pen-
etrative sex in the film, he notes that he did not take off his pants but shared intimate time touching 
upper bodies, rolling, and talking. However, unlike his naïve courting gesture in the film, kovic 
never returned to Maria, knowing that she did not really mean her invitation. Rather, he sought out 
a new woman every night until he found himself thrown out of a bar with another disabled veteran 
who had a violent fight with “one of the whores” by punching her. kovic and the disabled veteran 
became lost in the desert after they left the bar together (kovic 126–28), and they found their way 
back to the Village of the Sun. The autobiographical depiction of the encounters with sex workers 
maintains an unflappable tone about the disposable nature of relationships and the violence preva-
lent in the sex industry.
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cultural depictions enforce the sexuality of disability as a unique aspect 
that differs from non-disabled existence, like many other benign factors 
of life experience of disabled people. This is not to suggest that all filmic 
depictions of disabled people’s sexuality unfold in the same way. And 
certainly many films challenge the heteronormative framework of dis-
abled people’s sexuality, such as the affirming portrayal of the asexuality 
of a woman with autism in Snow Cake (2006) and the portrayal of a sexu-
ally inactive, short-statured man in The Station Agent (2003) which has an 
ending that implies a potential sexual relationship. Queer intimacy and 
disability are portrayed in several films, such as Gaby, A True Story (1987); 
Philadelphia (1993); Girl, Interrupted (1999); and F**k the Disabled (2002).
What is at the center of my inquiry is the logic behind the relationships 
among disabled masculinity, heterosexuality, and the normalization of 
humanity displayed in certain films. Prostituted women who participate 
in this process are marginalized as instruments of such humanizing proj-
ects without being fully characterized.
Sexual Surrogacy
Simulating Sexual Relationships and the Limits
of Sexual Liberalism
Jessica yu’s documentary film Breathing Lessons: The Life and Work of mark 
O’Brien (1996) addresses the unlikelihood of heterosexual bonding of a 
disabled man through a technique of verisimilitude. Breathing Lessons 
provides an opportunity to give one account of the emergence of sex sur-
rogacy to “specially” manage disabled men’s sexuality. Here, the well-
known American disabled poet, journalist, and activist Mark O’Brien7 
depicts sex surrogacy as one liberating aspect of his life in Berkeley.8 In 
describing his experience of hiring a sex surrogate, Mark explains his 
interest in hiring her again:
Cheryl was very kind to me. She kissed me on the chest after we had inter-
course. I felt my chest was very unattractive. But she kissed me right there. 
The intercourse was so quick. It wasn’t as great as I thought it would be. 
But being naked in bed with a woman who was being extremely friendly 
 7. In order to differentiate between the documentary character and the writer, I use “Mark” to 
refer to the character in the film and “O’Brien” to refer to the author of the essay.
 8. For a more complete discussion of O’Brien, including his sexuality, gender identity, and lit-
erary works, see Tobin Siebers, “Sex, Shame, and Disability Identity.” 
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was the most fun I’ve ever had. I think I’d like to do it again.
 However, as Mark continues his narration, he demonstrates less enthu-
siasm for the encounter because of the temporary nature of the pleasures 
he experienced:
About a year after I saw her I just felt terribly depressed. I had expected 
somehow that seeing the surrogate would change my life. I had started 
wearing cologne, and I thought everyone would be able to tell I was sexy 
and handsome, but nothing happened.
 With this narration a series of point-of-view shots feature, in slow 
motion, a pair of female legs walking in a short skirt. This image shows 
the audience what Mark longs for, and it invites the audience to empa-
thize with him when he tells the story of one woman whom he loved. 
Although Mark expected that sex with a surrogate would transform his 
life, he observes that no overall change has actually occurred, and he 
still experiences isolation due to a lack of social infrastructure because he 
spends most of his life apart from people his own age. Unlike Ron in Born 
on the Fourth of July, who shows anger toward his emasculated body, Mark 
explains his anger as directed toward society, and toward women: “I just 
felt very crazy. I was angry at all women ’cause I’d fall in love with several 
attendants and they all said it was a business relationship.”
 In this way the film problematizes the limited access of disabled men 
to sexual experiences. This sexual oppression is also investigated in the 
scholarship on disability and sexual access. While Western disability 
activism has focused on access to public space, utility, resources, and soci-
etal power, it has also considered sexuality as a site requiring access for 
disabled people. The notion of sexual access is theorized as equal access 
to sexual relationships and sexual activities (Shuttleworth and Mona). In 
any sexual experiences and relationships, general access to all activities 
that include transportation, education, employment, virtual and physical 
access to socializing spaces, diverse modes of communications, availability 
of accommodations, subcultural spaces of diverse sexual orientations, and 
the right to domestic and community living must be brought into and 
considered as part of the picture. However, the consideration of gendered 
sexual politics has been ambiguous, since many options to enable sexual 
experiences through services depend on the image of the biologically dif-
ferent needs and risks of disabled men and women.
 Sexually liberal discourses for disabled people’s sexual access have 
also engaged with various options, especially for people “who may not 
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have access to sexual partners and who are seeking greater personal ful-
fillment” (Shapiro 78). Suggested options include government-sponsored 
personalized funding for hiring sex therapists or sex surrogates (Shapiro); 
displaying pornographic magazines and adding “adult viewing chan-
nels” in nursing homes (Edwards 18); free escort services, creating pri-
vate spaces in institutions for sexual intercourse, and equal access to sex 
workers (Hamilton); a specialized “Touchers Project”;9 legalizing prosti-
tution for disabled people;10 behavior management and support group 
therapy (Shaw); and match-making services such as DateAble, “a dating 
service with heart.” Some disability organizations such as Accsex Net-
work, headquartered in Australia, argue for accessible brothels and for 
funding so that disabled people have the means to consume pornographic 
materials.11
 All these practices are interrelated with the gendered cultural repre-
sentations of disability and the imagined need to be sexualized in order 
to be fully rehabilitated. If the focus on sexual access is limited to the dis-
abled male’s access to commercially and medically available sex services, 
the importance of current diverse forms of the sexual/asexual lives of 
disabled people is inevitably underestimated. In addition to the commer-
cially available options, the social construction of disabled sexuality as a 
separate entity seems to call for specialized medical or commercial inter-
vention.
 Although many disabled veterans have received sexual rehabilitation 
education in medical settings, the employment of sex therapy to allow 
disabled people sexual experience or “fulfillment” along with rehabilita-
tion is a relatively recent idea. Sexology experts have rarely invested in a 
major way in sex therapy for disabled people, except when it involved cat-
aloguing so-called “deviant” sexual beings. Early sex therapy, in the days 
as far back as Victorian times, focused on reducing sexual desire because 
 9. In June 2003, a Swiss organization in Zurich called Pro Infirmis launched the “Touchers 
Project.” Pro Infirmis’s Zurich branch announced the pilot scheme, which involved training twelve 
professional “Touchers.” The Touchers were then expected to offer sexual and emotional relief to the 
Zurich disabled community. Services included massage and erotic games but not “sexual relations.” 
However, financial donations dropped significantly after the project was publicized. The project and 
the organization were swamped with an uproar of criticism. Pro Infirmis said that it will continue to 
try to address the issue and that it intends to find legally recognized and independent financial sup-
port for the project (Swissinfo, “Zurich Disabled”).
 10. I observe that there is a stronger connection and easier acceptance of this connection between 
disabled men’s “consumption” of prostitution than non-disabled men’s. See kim and Sherry (2006).
 11. BBC News Asia-Pacific reported on an Australian brothel (2003): “The Pink Palace in Mel-
bourne is thought to be the first in the country to carry out such modifications and campaigners for 
the disabled in the hope that others will follow suit. The new features also include enlarged doors to 
accommodate wheelchairs and installed a sit-down shower. George Taleporos, a researcher into sexu-
ality and disability, said many disabled people used prostitutes and brothels because it is difficult to 
date in the usual way.”
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women’s sex drives were considered dangerous (kilmann and Mills 16). 
In contrast, sex therapy in contemporary history is dedicated mostly to the 
problems of able-bodied males and their general anxiety about fulfilling 
cultural standards of masculine sexuality. In Human Sexual Inadequacy 
(1970), Masters and Johnson introduce the concept of surrogacy as a thera-
peutic method. Their term “partner surrogate”12 indicates a partner—usu-
ally female—provided for an unmarried man in treatment who has no one 
to provide the psychological and physiological support deemed necessary 
during the acute phase of his therapy (135). The term “surrogate” can also 
apply to instances when a woman plays a sexual role in the place of an 
“authentic” partner. The surrogate’s function is “to approximate insofar as 
possible the role of a supportive, interested, cooperative wife” as a means 
of psychological support, without judging the physiological function of 
the man (150). In the rationale of sex therapy, emphasizing the therapeutic 
effect and the enhancement of self-esteem shifts the focus away from a 
desexualizing social context and instead individualizes the problem. The 
rhetoric of sex therapy often assumes that disabled people experience dis-
comfort with their own bodies and suggests that this discomfort is the 
cause of an unsatisfactory sexual life.
 Several years before the documentary was released, O’Brien wrote 
about his experience of hiring Cheryl in his essay “On Seeing a Surro-
gate,” and he is more reflexive in his writing than he seems to be in the 
film. After his first session with Cheryl he writes, “For the first time, I felt 
glad to be a man,” implying the connection of sexual experience to his 
manhood. Later he reflects, “but my life hasn’t changed.” Then he further 
poses a question along the lines of a continuum of sex surrogacy and pros-
titution:
Where do I go from here? People have suggested several steps I could 
take. I could hire prostitutes, advertise in the personals, or sign up for a 
dating service. None of these appeal to me. Hiring a prostitute implies 
that I cannot be loved, body and soul, just body or soul. I would be treated 
as a body in need of some impersonal, professional service—which is 
what I’ve always gotten, though in a different form, from nurses and 
attendants. 
Here O’Brien presents the critical insight that the therapeutic idea of sex 
service is related to other forms of professional medical services.
 12. “Sex therapist” can occasionally refer to the person who engages with the client in a form of 
body labor, but it more likely refers to a person in a medical setting who works with patients and 
prescribes a range of therapy to a surrogate partner.
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 Although the concept of sex surrogacy arose from medical discourses 
put forth by a team therapist and a licensed and/or certified professional 
with an advanced degree, sex surrogacy is now more likely to be part of 
the continuum of the sex-service industry than it is to be found in clinical 
discourse in North America and Western Europe. Disability communi-
ties’ employment of sex surrogacy as a method for enhancing disabled 
people’s sexual access is situated within the massive, worldwide effort 
to profit financially from sex and the specialized branding based on cus-
tomer groups. At the same time, pro-prostitution discourses use the dis-
abled population to justify the necessity of sex labor. Even though medical 
rhetoric removes some forms of stigma and moral judgment associated 
with the sex trade, it is important to note that sex surrogacy, when posi-
tioned alongside medicalized professional services, further contributes to 
the medical model of disability as suggested by O’Brien.
 After winning an Oscar for Breathing Lessons, director Jessica yu 
offered her “deepest thanks to Mark O’Brien, 41 years paralyzed in an iron 
lung.” She continues, “Mark, it was not your bravery but your humanity 
that earned this award.” The film introduces sexual surrogacy as a way of 
depicting his humanity, sexual desire, and sadness without investigating 
their complicated social contexts (Breathing Lessons, “Introduction”). Fur-
thermore, the documentary—aiming to emphasize Mark’s humanity 
through his heterosexual desire toward an able-bodied woman—none-
theless does not include his critical viewpoint about sex surrogacy as just 
another form of professional service. The film ends the sequence with his 
passive remarks that hand over the authority to recognize disabled people 
as sexual beings to a ubiquitous, able-bodied “they” who determine desir-
ability:
They tell us to think of ourselves as sexual and beautiful but it doesn’t do 
any good. Unless someone else sees us as sexual and beautiful. you just 
can’t demand love. you have to be lovable. I’m still trying to figure out 
how to do that.
The documentary’s simplified version of O’Brien’s narrative repeats a pat-
tern that appeared in Freaks’ highlighting of desire as a tool for human-
izing men with disabilities and constructing disability as causing sexual 
frustration.
 The film narrative ignores O’Brien’s reflexive thoughts about sexual 
desire and broader social contexts expressed throughout his essay and 
poetry. He poses a question that potentially challenges the logic of hetero-
sexual rehabilitation in his essay:
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What do I seek? I don’t know. Someone who likes me and loves me and 
who will promise to protect me from all the self-hating parts of myself? 
An all-purpose lover-mommy-attendant to care for all my physical and 
emotional needs? What one friend calls a “shapely savior”—a being so 
perfect that she can rescue me from the horror that has been imposed upon 
me and the horror I’ve imposed upon myself? Why bother? I ask myself. 
I don’t. Not anymore.
 His ceasing to desire sexual experiences is a complicated decision 
shaped within the social oppression of disabled people, isolation, his own 
complicity, and heteronormative sexuality as able-bodied sexuality. The 
rescue rhetoric that he problematizes also alludes to an image of a sexual, 
able-bodied woman since he states that he does not feel attracted to dis-
abled women (although he later admits that he is attracted to one of his 
female therapists who has a disability).
 The management of sexuality through “scientific knowledge and the 
complexity of normative systems” strongly determines what constitutes 
the experience of “an ordinary sexual life” (Hamilton 44). When one rec-
ognizes that the history of disability oppression includes gender, race, 
sexuality, and class, then contemporary sexual experience becomes more 
than just another site of exclusion. Acts of sexual exchange produce or are 
based upon power differences that subsequently create needs and desires. 
In addition, a hierarchical set of bodies and norms at the core of disability 
oppression maintain these power differences. In “Sex and the Emergence 
of Sexuality,” Arnold Davidson explains how, in the last half of the nine-
teenth century, a set of psychiatric concepts emerged that made sexual 
identities a matter of impulses, tastes, aptitudes, satisfactions, and psychic 
traits (96). Subsequently, sexuality became an object of clinical knowledge. 
As a result of this emergence, an entirely new grouping of sexual diseases 
and disorders came into existence that intersects with disability catego-
ries (96). For example, it was not uncommon for medical diagnoses up 
through the nineteenth century to include drawings depicting hermaph-
rodites and deaf-mute persons as sexual perversions, directly translating 
bodily differences into abnormal sexuality (118). In a similar way, scien-
tific inquiries committed themselves to proving gender difference in order 
to produce the knowledge required for a fully operational binary system 
of masculinity and femininity—both terms interrelated with heterosexu-
ality (Butler, Gender Trouble 22). The category of disability functioned as 
a dumping ground for people who did not fit into the normative sex/
gender/heterosexuality system. Simply put, without the classification of 
the abnormal, there was no way to classify “normal” sexuality. In other 
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words, medical knowledge created the category of normative sexuality by 
creating the category of deviant sexuality.
 This construction then allowed for the suppression of disabled sexu-
ality in the eugenic sense through the medical control of disabled popu-
lations via marriage restrictions, segregation, and sterilization methods. 
A combination of active suppression and political fear shaped disabled 
sexuality as a menace. In this regard the formation of disability is strongly 
related to the scientific development of sexology as well as to the emer-
gence of the “normative body” as defined by its functions, reproductive 
privileges, and heteronormative desires and behaviors. O’Brien’s experi-
ences with a sex surrogate and the filmic representation of the experiences 
are located within this intersection of the simultaneous and mutual con-
struction of disability and sexuality. This intersection presents the desexu-
alization and hypersexualization of disabled people and their disqualifi-
cation from mating with non-disabled, heterosexual counterparts not as 
coincidental but as necessary in maintaining the mutuality of able-bodied-
ness and heterosexuality.
An oasis needs a desert
Because disabled female sexuality is socially invisible, filmic narrative 
requires excessive effort to demonstrate its existence and significance. 
The internationally screened South korean film Oasis, produced in 2002, 
depends on the absence of disabled women’s voices in public about 
their desires, diverse sexual experiences, and frequent violence. The film 
closely depicts a disabled woman’s life and its common experiences of 
family rejection and exploitation, inaccessible environments, and the stig-
matizing gaze of and hatred from the public.
 In the beginning of the film Hong Jongdu (Sol kyung-gu) is released 
from prison after serving time for manslaughter in a hit-and-run accident; 
he learns that his family moved during his incarceration without leaving 
any forwarding address. When he locates them, he is greeted with hos-
tility and disgust. Jongdu is a societal misfit because his behavior and 
mannerisms do not follow social decorum. Jongdu visits the family of the 
deceased from the accident and finds the daughter, Han Gongju (Moon 
So-ri), a woman with cerebral palsy, living alone. As part of a courting 
ritual, Jongdu brings her flowers, which her neighbor takes to her. After 
the neighbor is gone from her house, he breaks into her house, tells her 
that he is interested in her, and posts his phone number on her mirror. He 
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then goes on to sexually assault her. Frightened, Gongju resists the attack 
and loses consciousness in her terror. Jongdu regrets his behavior immedi-
ately, slaps his own face, and tries to wake her up by spraying water on her 
face. Jongdu runs away, leaving her on the bathroom floor. The audience 
members later see her phoning him. When he visits her again, she asks, 
“Why did you bring me flowers?” The scene suggests that her unfamiliar 
experience of receiving sexual attention from a man blurs the boundaries 
between violence and affection, because the image of the flowers gains 
importance through the trope of courting. While the film disallows com-
munication between the audience and the central disabled character with 
a speech difference, viewers depend on Jongdu to intrinsically understand 
her and to reiterate what she says.
 It is important to take a look at several dehumanizing events ante-
cedent to Gongju’s phone call to Jongdu: Her neighbors use her small 
apartment to have sexual intercourse away from their children while 
ignoring her presence in her room. She is forced to pretend that she lives 
in her brother’s house (a better house which her brother’s family took 
away from her when she received it as a disability welfare benefit); she 
must pretend that she lives there so that when the social worker comes 
to inspect her house, the worker can confirm that Gongju, the beneficiary, 
lives there. These scenes portray her social barrenness and exploitation, 
the movie positing the encounter with the unlikely Jongdu as her oasis. 
Similarly, Jongdu suffers ostracism from his family, who has taken advan-
tage of him in the interest of the family and its survival. When his older 
brother, the breadwinner of the family, kills Gongju’s father in a traffic acci-
dent, the family conspires to lie to the police that Jongdu was the driver. 
Then audience members find out that unproductive Jongdu already has a 
prior conviction of rape, and the family believes that sending him, instead 
of the family breadwinner, to prison is the best choice for the sustenance 
of the family.
 The combination of Jongdu’s and Gongju’s vulnerability and exploited 
status allows the film to highlight their relationship as innocent when 
viewed in the midst of their families’ and neighbors’ rejection and dehu-
manization. Nevertheless, the director relies on gendered violence occur-
ring between the two outcasts to challenge contemporary korea’s indif-
ferent, exploitative, and hypocritical workings of family. The film draws 
on Gongju’s disability in order to complicate Jongdu’s character and to 
avoid an overly simplified identification of good or evil. The film portrays 
Gongju vividly only during her intermittent fantasies of having a non- 
disabled body and dancing and playing with Jongdu. He is vulnerable 
and exploited, and he earns the audience’s sympathy through his pas-
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sionate attention to Gongju. After the initial assault he is no longer violent 
and transforms into a caring person.
 The popular media perceived Oasis as explicitly about disability, and 
the film does provide a unique representation of disability in relation to 
the “reality” of disabled lives. Being far from melodramatic in portraying 
a disabled woman’s life in contemporary korea, Oasis pretends to be closer 
to reality by using documentary-style filming. The use of a handheld 
camera, realistic diegetic sounds such as TV and radio rather than music, 
the predominance of dark scenes through low-key lighting, the choice of 
a less stylistic mise-en-scène, and the casting of unfamiliar actresses and 
actors—with the exception of the two protagonists—all mimic reality or 
at least create a sense of verisimilitude. The film’s unprecedented choice 
of a woman with spastic cerebral palsy as the main female character gives 
Oasis its distinctive flair that differentiates it from other trends in the 
visual portrayal of disability. Disabled women in the korean film tradition 
have been dominantly portrayed with muteness, deafness, and blindness. 
Nevertheless, because few other images and narratives about disabled 
people’s lives are available, the fiction film is understood as providing an 
informative, factual depiction of the sexuality of disabled women. Critics 
read this film in relation to the real lives of disabled women with regard 
to their isolation and alienation. However, in the midst of scarce cultural 
representations of disabled women, the director, Lee Chang-dong, faced 
fierce criticism from a group of disabled women. Activist Pak Chuhui 
writes that she was appalled by the film’s blatant misrepresentation of 
disabled women’s sexuality—particularly since the sexual violation leads 
to a positive relationship. Although what constitutes misrepresentation 
or correct representation is fraught with the impossible determination of 
reality, and although women do quite frequently form relationships with 
their violators, Pak’s claim challenges the validity of the film’s representa-
tion of disabled women’s lives. In a theatre in Seoul a group of disabled 
women went to watch the film, and they felt threatened by the audience’s 
laughter at Gongju’s spastic facial movements and at the attack scene 
that depicts Jongdu as comical.13 Because of Jongdu’s embarrassment the 
non-disabled audience is supposed to see the attack as one of the benign 
mistakes of a fool that makes his antisocial characteristics more humane. 
The lack of his awareness of the seriousness of the situation makes him a 
cognitively or at least socially disabled character, later fully humanized 
through the representation of his care for Gongju. Further, the film pre-
sents the sexual attack as an ambivalent interaction and as an innocent 
 13. Personal communication with disabled women’s rights activist Jung youngran.
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act that uniquely acknowledges Gongju’s personhood and femininity 
while also signifying Jongdu’s naïveté. In one poster advertising the film, 
Jongdu is lifting Gongju. Viewers see the expression of joy in his face but 
are not able to see Gongju and her expression. She is held and elevated 
by him as a way of being fully embraced, illustrating that the focus of 
the film is not Gongju and her disability but Jondu’s transformation. In 
contrast, in the promotion picture two characters are sitting on a bench, 
posing with their hands together on their thighs. Gongju’s disability is no 
longer present, and Jongdu seems to be compliant. This picture visualizes 
the rehabilitated humanity of both characters through their intimate bond 
and caring, manifested when the bodily characteristics of disability and 
social deviancy are removed.
 Later in the film, as they continue to grow closer, Gongju engages in 
consensual sexual intercourse with Jongdu at her apartment. Her brother 
and his wife come in unannounced, interrupt the act, and accuse Jongdu 
of rape. They do not think of Gongju as a consenting adult in a sexual rela-
tionship. The representation of her consensual sexual intercourse with him 
being misunderstood as rape ironically parodies the earlier attack scene 
that frames sexual assault as an expression of compassionate interest. 
During the police investigation, the interrogating detective reproaches 
Jongdu in front of Gongju: “Are you a pervert? How do you even get 
aroused seeing that kind of a woman?” His statement captures the social 
configuration that denigrates disabled women as “unqualified” for sexual 
assault. Gongju’s struggle to voice that what happened was not rape is too 
easily dismissed by her family and police.
 The film ends with Gongju cleaning her bright room, waiting for 
Jongdu to return from prison where he has been sent for a rape conviction 
as a result of the above-described scene. Gongju’s brother and his wife are 
antagonists, obstructing the supposedly unselfish relationship between 
Gongju and Jongdu. What may appear to be sexual assault is portrayed 
in the movie as being at worst “innocent curiosity” instead of intentional 
violation toward a lonely and sexually ignored female character. The film 
tries to challenge public assumptions that disabled people are asexual or 
victimized. Instead, by portraying the two “deviant” characters having 
a “normal” desire for love, the film affirms the prevalent denial of the 
sexuality of disabled women. The film substantiates the idea that sexual 
violence helps disabled women “escape” from undesirability and become 
“true women.” The film plays on the belief that disabled women are not 
recognized as sexual; therefore sexual abuse of disabled women is utilized 
as a way of recognizing their heterosexuality, because sexual objectifica-
tion is considered a part of heterosexual experience.  By reifying the rela-
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tionship between two “abject” characters, the film reinforces the invis-
ibility of sexual violence against disabled women and the unlikelihood 
that they will have intimacy in their lives.14
 Despite the prevalent understanding of disabled people as asexual, 
the asexuality of disabled people is a relatively new concept in South 
korea as explored by disabled women’s activism. Moreover, until 
recently, asexuality itself has not emerged as a problem of disabled 
people that must be fixed in social discourse. Interestingly, efforts 
toward heterosexualization in korean cultural representations simulate 
that disabled women lie outside the gender matrix. Normative sexu-
ality, already gendered, is repeated within the cultural representation 
of the sexual practices of gendered and disabled individuals. Because 
the sexualization of individuals with disabilities occurs on the basis of 
a presumed asexuality, almost every sexual exchange with the oppo-
site sex is perceived as exerting a positive influence on disabled people. 
Because the recognition of woman as sexual object is seen as delivering 
the social approval of femininity and adulthood, the arena of women’s 
sexual objectification emerges as an important and violent place for the 
integration of disabled women in korea.
Conclusion
While prostitution and sex surrogacy offer fleeting but strong connections 
to manhood for disabled men in cultural representations, they enable dis-
abled manhood at significant political cost by ignoring gender and race 
in heterosexual politics, such as those illustrated in Born on the Fourth of 
July. Overwhelmed by the presence of disability, forwarding the value 
of heterosexuality is reconfigured as a curing intervention to the “dam-
aged,” “emasculated” other. Simultaneously, the imagined need for the 
heterosexualization of disabled men reinforces the belief that disability 
naturally desexualizes the body. Breaking the Waves presents an unconven-
tional relationship between prostitution and a disabled man by making 
the disabled wife a sexual mediator. It embraces the concept of the sur-
 14. Gender theory points out that a “sphere of legitimate intimate alliance is established through 
the producing and intensifying regions of illegitimacy” (Butler, Undoing Gender 105). And this is why 
inclusion of illegitimate alliance in legitimate areas cannot eliminate illegitimacy of certain alliances. 
The intimacy and normalcy of undesired and sexually disenfranchised outcasts do not bring about 
a change in sexual hierarchy, a hierarchy which is enabled through the creation of sexual disenfran-
chisement in the first place.
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rogate body employed for sexual experience and also demonstrates how 
interchangeable a wife and a prostitute can be. In this film the belief in 
the curative powers of sexuality makes it possible for Bess’s narration of 
sexual conduct to “cure” Jan’s paralysis. Indeed, by the end of the film 
Bess has accomplished the ultimate sacrifice when her death enables 
Jan to walk. The film offers a complicated incompatibility between dis-
ability and sexuality, highlighting the mediating role of prostitution while 
leaving unchallenged the “authentic” sexual pleasure that “surrogate” 
sexual experience summons.
 The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the produc-
tion of a binary gender system, where masculine and feminine are under-
stood as expressive attributes of male and female (Butler, Gender Trouble 
17). Likewise, gender differentiation “is accomplished through the prac-
tices of heterosexual desire” (22–23). Robert McRuer argues, however, that 
compulsory heterosexuality also depends on able-bodied norms (2). In 
providing the groundwork for understanding how able-bodiedness and 
heterosexuality are intertwined, he argues that both systems work to (re)
produce the able body and heterosexuality (31). The cultural location of 
gender and heterosexuality in able-bodied norms creates a gap between 
individuals with disabilities and their cultural mapping to become fully 
gendered according to this binary logic. Film representation of disability 
seizes the imagined desire to fill this gap with characters’ pursuits of 
iconic gender qualifications, as if the narrative can rehabilitate its char-
acters. Thus able-bodied heterosexuality is further strengthened to the 
degree that heterosexualization completes the making of the rehabili-
tated self with disability. Sexualization through prostitution succeeds to 
some degree in transforming the disabled person into a fully heterosexual 
disabled man, thereby reflecting the tendency to think of gender as it is 
expressed in sexual practices. Inevitably, the traces of purchasing sex and 
the prostitute disappear rather quickly in the film after they have been 
utilized and exhausted.
 While the Western disability sexual rights movement tends to chal-
lenge the norm of able-bodiedness, it does not as often seek to chal-
lenge the power relations inherent in “normative sexuality,” because 
this norm is configured as the position many disabled people wish 
to access. To view disabled people as a group of people sharing the 
same sexual oppression (i.e., exclusion from heterosexuality) is mis-
leading and ignores tremendously diverse positions of disabled people 
in relation to heteronormative society. O’Brien’s complex desire to be 
wanted and to feel like a man, as well as his coming to terms with an 
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“asexual”15 life, captures the failure of the heterosexualizing project. Sim-
ilarly, in the South korean context, Gongju’s relationship with Jongdu in 
Oasis illustrates the complexity of her sexual social relations. When het-
erosexual apparatuses can remedy disabled manhood and womanhood, 
sexuality is narrowly considered to be a psychologically and physically 
necessary aspect. This logic does not valorize the diverse sexual lives of 
disabled people—heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, asexual, celibate, 
or otherwise. Rather, such circumscription begins with the contradic-
tory assumptions that disabled people are undesirable, and thus ordered 
to be asexual, and that asexuality is a deprived way of life. Moreover, 
gendered, racialized, and medicalized forms of sexual intervention in 
cultural representations construct disabled sexuality itself.
 As films represent disabled people exploring sexuality, who should 
own the subjectivity to find erotic energy and pleasure while deciding 
how to identify self-image and locate the body within and outside the 
realms of sexuality? Hypervisible, simplistic, and heteronormative sexual-
izing apparatuses in films emphasize the desexualized status of disabled 
people, forging the imperative to bring disabled people into the normal-
ized sexual realms in order for them to be humanized and recognized.
 15. O’Brien alludes to his asexuality when he declares that he no longer waits for his desire to be 
fulfilled. In this case his celibate life does not come from the absence of sexual desire; rather, it is a 
result of social desexualization. However, I argue not that asexuality is inherently negative or even 
indicative of the absence of desire itself, but that it must be respected as one form of identification and 
embodiment.
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The filmmakers procure authenticity for Maggie (Hilary Swank) by having her 
purchase her training bag with rolled coins. Million Dollar Baby.  Directed by Clint 
Eastwood. Warner Bros., 2004.
million Dollar Baby, a Warner Bros. production released in December 2004, 
could be said to sell itself short, as far as its title is concerned. The pro-
duction budget alone exceeded the titular $1 million thirty times over. 
Undoubtedly far more important to Warner Bros. and to director Clint 
Eastwood, however, was the film’s domestic and foreign gross: exceeding 
$200 million U.S. dollars. This baby—to invoke an ableist metaphor appro-
priate to the film’s anti-disabled ethos—had legs.
 Of course, “million dollar baby” itself, as a metaphor, is intended to 
mark something so unique as to be well-nigh priceless; the million dollar 
figure, in other words, is paradoxically here a measure used to call up 
for audiences a value seemingly beyond measure. Despite this apparent 
desire for the immeasurable, however, the film is ultimately (and unsur-
prisingly) fairly recognizable as a banal Hollywood blockbuster. Maggie 
Fitzgerald (Hilary Swank) is a poor boxer who beats the odds against her 
to achieve international success; her success is largely propelled by the 
fact that she has convinced trainer Frankie Dunn (Eastwood) to work with 
her, even though he initially claims he will not “train girls.” In the final 
third of the film, after a spinal-cord injury resulting from an accident in 
the ring, Maggie—unable to move her arms and legs without assistance—
asks Frankie to help her end her life. Frankie struggles briefly with his 
decision and then complies.
 A rags-to-riches story, a story of pluck and perseverance, and ulti-
mately a story of triumph and bittersweet loss—there was very little about 
million Dollar Baby that contemporary moviegoers had not seen dozens if 
not hundreds of times before. Even the disability protests of the film that 
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emerged soon after its release, in fact, could be positioned in relation to 
both the film’s measurability and its accolades: yet another film adored 
by the majority and opposed by only a supposedly small minority, mil-
lion Dollar Baby overcame opposition to be showered with Oscars at the 
2005 Academy Awards—Best Supporting Actor (Morgan Freeman), Best 
Actress, Best Director, and of course Best Picture.
 My apparent cynicism, or pessimism of the intellect, in temporarily 
positioning even the vibrant disability protests of million Dollar Baby in 
relation to the film’s recognizability should not belie one of this essay’s 
goals, which is precisely to account for the gap between the almost-uni-
versal adoration of the film, emanating from the moviegoing public at 
large, and the almost-universal condemnation of it, emanating from dis-
ability activist communities. The disability critiques of million Dollar Baby 
(some of which I will work through in this analysis) are not difficult to 
understand; indeed, although my own experience is by no means repre-
sentative, I generally found even in casual conversation that fans of the 
film quickly understood why disabled people were critical of it: Maggie’s 
death by lethal injection following her spinal-cord injury is both unneces-
sary and completely dependent on the cultural assumption that disabled 
lives are not worth living. Disability activists had nothing like the media 
control of Warner Bros. or Eastwood, certainly, but fans who nonethe-
less came in contact with disability critiques (a relatively small number 
compared to the film’s viewership as a whole) were not incapable of 
comprehending them. Instead, fans were for some reason simply resis-
tant to having their pleasure in million Dollar Baby, their recollection of 
what they experienced watching it, interrupted. This article, positioning 
million Dollar Baby within the cultural logic of neoliberalism, attempts 
to understand why. In the process my goal is ultimately to counter cyni-
cism, affirming and extending the immeasurable value of an increasingly 
global—and at times, as I imagine briefly in conclusion, daringly anti-
national—disability movement.
 That million Dollar Baby could generate comforting recollections dif-
ficult to relinquish after a pleasurable first viewing suggests that, on some 
level, the film succeeds by mobilizing nostalgia. million Dollar Baby is, 
however, as Fredric Jameson might say, “technically not a nostalgia film,” 
(“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 117) since it takes place in con-
temporary settings—largely contemporary Los Angeles, but also London 
and Las Vegas. The skyscrapers of contemporary downtown L.A. are vis-
ible in at least one key scene, as Frankie wanders back to the Hit Pit Gym 
after Maggie attempts suicide (biting through her tongue to induce lethal 
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films Jameson famously describes as nostalgic regardless of their contem-
porary setting: “the very style of nostalgia films invad[es] and coloniz[es] 
even those movies today which have contemporary settings: as though, 
for some reason, we were unable to focus our own present, as though 
we have become incapable of achieving aesthetic representations of our 
own current experience” (117). Jameson uses Lawrence kasdan’s 1981 
film Body Heat to exemplify the phenomenon he theorizes, but it’s almost 
uncanny how much his description applies to million Dollar Baby:
[The film does] without most of the signals and references which we 
might associate with the contemporary world, with consumer society—
the appliances and artifacts, the high rises, the object world of late capital-
ism. Technically, then, its objects [are contemporary] products, but every-
thing in the film conspires to blur that immediate contemporary reference 
and to make it possible to receive this too as a nostalgia work—as a nar-
rative set in some indefinable nostalgic past, an eternal 1930s, say, beyond 
history. (117)
 Tellingly, given Jameson’s invocation of an eternal 1930s, one reviewer 
noted that million Dollar Baby’s Hit Pit Gym, in particular, seemed pur-
posefully designed to represent “any decade from the 1930s to the 
present”: “The only direct time-period reference is to prominent real-life 
1980s fighter Tommy ‘Hitman’ Hearns, who the film’s characters state has 
been retired for many years” (Johnson). Of course, women’s boxing in a 
professional boxing association is ostensibly a contemporary topic, and 
the world represented—inside and outside the boxing ring, in the hos-
pital, and in the rehabilitation center—is apparently a post-civil-rights-
era world of multiracial harmony. Gender and race are actually factors, 
however, that contribute to million Dollar Baby’s status as a nostalgia film: 
both certainly have incredibly cacophonous, complicated, and ongoing 
histories in Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and London, but in the world beyond 
history that the film conjures up, that complexity must be disavowed. In 
other words, we may know, as Mike Davis and numerous other com-
mentators have demonstrated, that a masculinist and structural racism 
undergirds downtown and other spaces in “Fortress L.A.” (Davis 221), 
but in this nostalgic story it does not.1
 1. Mike Davis’s City of Quartz remains the foundational study of the relations between spatiality, 
political economy, and culture in Los Angeles; see also Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies; Allen 
J. Scott and Edward W. Soja (eds.), The City; and Raúl Homero Villa and George J. Sánchez (eds.), Los 
Angeles and the Future of Urban Cultures. Fredric Jameson’s own work on Los Angeles also emphasizes 
the fortress-like qualities of downtown spaces such as the Bonaventure Hotel, which “repels the 
city outside” and constitutes an enclosed and disorienting space of spectacle within, a space that is 
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 The film is most obviously and directly nostalgic when the setting 
moves away from Los Angeles, however, in the two scenes where Frankie 
(once with Maggie, once—following her death—poignantly without) 
enjoys homemade lemon meringue pie (“none of that canned stuff,” 
Maggie had insisted) in a diner not far from the small town in Missouri 
where Maggie grew up. Or, I might say, given how absolutely earnest 
million Dollar Baby is about its fabricated authenticity, not far from the 
small town in “Missour-ah” where Maggie grew up (Swank’s accent 
may be inconsistent in the film, but this particular home-grown pronun-
ciation, direct from the backwoods and hills of the Show-Me State, comes 
through every time). I return to that imagined community later, but con-
sider first a minor moment of rupture in million Dollar Baby’s fabricated 
authenticity. With that moment of rupture or interrupted nostalgia as a 
starting point for my analysis, I relocate million Dollar Baby, and what 
David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder might call the “narrative pros-
thesis” that drives it (Narrative Prosthesis 6–10), within our contemporary 
moment, paying particular attention to how this is a neoliberal text rep-
resenting a docile and quite disciplined national identity and, indeed, 
national sexuality.
 After a nod to the remote possibility that there is actually some crip 
humor in million Dollar Baby, I conclude by briefly considering some of the 
ways murderball—an independent documentary focused on the aggres-
sive contact sport known as “quad rugby”—functions as the antithesis of 
million Dollar Baby. murderball was released in the summer of 2005, directly 
after million Dollar Baby’s triumphs at that year’s Academy Awards; the 
documentary was received, on the whole, much more positively in dis-
ability communities (there were certainly no protests by disability activ-
ists outside theatres, and intracommunity reviews like Ed Hooper’s in the 
Ragged Edge, declaring murderball “quite simply the best film ever made 
on disability,” were not uncommon). keeping an eye on just how flexible 
the cultural manifestations of neoliberalism can be, however, I am inter-
ested in considering in conclusion both how murderball might function 
temporally dislocated and even nostalgic in ways similar to the films he discusses (Postmodernism 
42). Although I am drawing on Jameson’s insights for this essay, I want to register at least some 
caution in regard to his recruitment of “schizophrenia” as a metaphor for postmodern subjectivity 
(he is extending and commenting on the work of Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari) 
(“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 118–23; Postmodernism 26–34). The historical emergence of 
able-bodiedness has been disappeared, and able-bodied identity, like heterosexuality, tends, now, to 
be conceptualized as universal or simply “natural.” (I discuss this more thoroughly in Crip Theory, 
1–19.) Given that the naturalization of able-bodiedness allows capitalism to function more efficiently, 
it seems possible to examine the temporalities of late capitalism critically while simultaneously con-
necting those temporalities to able-bodied hegemony, rather than simply metaphorizing the post-
modern condition in toto as somehow “disabled.”
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as the antithesis of million Dollar Baby and, more controversially perhaps, 
how it might not.
neoliberal Currency
The rupture I highlight comes in a scene where Maggie buys her very 
own training bag for boxing. She has saved the pennies and dimes she 
has made working as a waitress, and deposits them in a pile, loose and in 
rolls, on the counter when she pays for the training bag. “It is a strange 
thing to do,” a writer at Movie Mistakes tells us, but “Maggie bought 
the coin rolls from a ‘bank or other vendor.’” Moviemistakes.com is a 
popular website (with about 30,000 hits daily) owned and operated by an 
individual movie buff whose intent is not simply to trash films, but—in 
a way—to generate alternative pleasures; “open your eyes,” the site uses 
as its motto, suggesting in decidedly antinostalgic fashion that seamless 
representations do not exist. The webmaster for Movie Mistakes is no 
Bertolt Brecht; he identifies himself, indeed, simply as a “film lover” who 
tends to like most films that he sees, and he minimizes his critique of the 
industry. The site itself, nonetheless, does invite a kind of Brechtian reflec-
tion on the mechanisms that should, for the ideal viewer of most of the 
films catalogued, remain obscured by pleasurable content.2
 Initially, the writer at Movie Mistakes insisted that the coins in mil-
lion Dollar Baby were clearly “props”: “The coin rolls [Maggie] has are 
the sealed type that can only be produced by a machine and not those 
that are produced when you roll coins from a coin jar. She would have 
had to purchase the rolls directly from a bank or other vendor to achieve 
this and she clearly did not roll them herself.” Realizing that this is pre-
cisely what Maggie has done, the writer concludes that this is exceedingly 
“strange.” Indeed, to dwell on this strangeness, from the filmmakers’ per-
spective, there’s not really a convincing scenario—or rather, there is no 
scenario convincing from within the realist aesthetic upon which the film 
depends—where Maggie would have gotten these coins from a vendor. 
Maggie apparently exchanged paper currency for coins despite the fact 
 2. That the site invites Brechtian reflection does not of course guarantee that those considering 
the “errors” identified at moviemistakes.com, including the designers and writers, respond to that 
implicit invitation. There is, in fact, nothing essentially subversive about moviemistakes.com, and the 
errors catalogued there can easily be used to market a film, or a subsequent DVD release, without 
disruption of its larger ideological project. Nonetheless, even if I am writing at the limit of the critical 
reflections the site could be said to authorize, its motto undeniably encourages alternative, and even 
disloyal, ways of apprehending texts, which would of necessity include the reading I offer here.
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that there could not conceivably be a training bag vendor, in Los Angeles 
or elsewhere, who would appreciate having the transaction conducted in 
pennies. The only conceivable scenario for this exchange would shatter 
the illusion of realism and require Swank playing alongside her character: 
“Listen, I need to buy some rolled coins so that on-screen, when I get 
my training bag, I look like an authentic, hard-working, salt-of-the-earth, 
small-town girl with a dream. Can you help me out?” This exchange, 
then, is in a sense located solely (and necessarily) outside the text of the 
film: the filmmakers procure authenticity for Swank’s character by having 
her use coins to purchase her training bag.
 This particular scene is so precious, in my mind, given how com-
pletely it works as a metaphor for the whole film: the maudlin disability 
story that concludes the film should be just as recognizable as a movie 
mistake—that is to say, million Dollar Baby gives us the same old mass-
produced disability story that you can get prepackaged, ready-made at 
the Hollywood bank (in exchange, this time for 30 million U.S. dollars). 
And as currency of a sort, this disability story circulates, but—like any-
thing that comes in contact with actual currency—with its value homog-
enized.
 The irony that I am excavating here is indebted to karl Marx’s under-
standing of money and value. According to Marx, “Money degrades all 
the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the 
universal and self-constituted value set upon all things. It has therefore 
robbed the whole world of both nature and man, of its original value” 
(41). As I have already suggested, the filmmakers for million Dollar Baby 
desire, on a narrative level, to conjure up an experience or life (Maggie’s) 
and paradoxically value that experience as beyond all measure and cer-
tainly outside of relations of exchange—Maggie’s story should not be 
legible within the degraded processes Marx traces. The coin blooper, 
however, can be deployed to make comically visible the ways in which 
disability representation—especially corporate Hollywood representa-
tion—is inescapably caught up in the homogenization of value Marx 
describes. It would take some pretty serious reading against the grain 
to find alternative economies of disability—the heterogeneous, excessive 
values that disabled people and movements have generated—in this film 
(outside, in the streets, protesting it, yes; but in it, no).3
 3. For a consideration of homogenized value and of the ways in which individuals or groups 
shape alternative, excessive values, see Matthew Tinkcomm’s Working like a Homosexual, especially 
the Introduction (1–34). Tinkcomm analyzes the ways in which capital requires workers to shape 
themselves into blank commodities and to produce objects that erase the history of their produc-
tion; he considers as well the ways in which camp productions exceed those demands and generate 
alternative, queer values. For a more general or global consideration of the generation of excessive 
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 In a more complex sense, though, the coin scene is precious for 
making temporarily visible the confluence of market and state that mil-
lion Dollar Baby and most Hollywood films—whether they are about dis-
ability or not—would mask. The Dream Factory purports to churn out 
stories about, well, dreams, not theses about the ideologies founding con-
temporary political economy or exposés about how Hollywood capital-
izes on the cultural politics of disability. Minted or authorized by the state 
for circulation in the market, these coins are not supposed to distract our 
attention from the sweet pleasures of lemon meringue pie, authentic Irish 
flute music, and excited crowds cheering our Maggie on, or from the bit-
tersweet pleasure, in the end, of Frankie setting a disabled Maggie free as 
he delivers a lethal dose of adrenalin (disability activists, of course, called 
this “murder,” but the ideal or preferred viewer, fighting back the tears, 
is supposed to see the death as a kind of freedom).
 Hiding in plain sight as a prepackaged blooper, however, the coin 
props beg the question of the interest that state and market might have in 
a text such as this. It’s worth pointing out that most scholars in disability 
studies really do not need me, in this article, to excavate the disability 
movie mistake that is million Dollar Baby; give any disability studies 
scholar a computer, a microphone, or a spotlight, and I’m confident she’ll 
convincingly critique the film in a few minutes or so.4 Considering, how-
ever, the ways that million Dollar Baby functions as neoliberal currency, as 
a prime example of what Amitava kumar calls “the literature of the New 
Economic Policy” (xxi)—or more provocatively, “World Bank Literature” 
(xvii)—is, perhaps, work that remains for us to do.5
 I contend that disability is located at the absolute center of the 
emergent “literature” kumar names. million Dollar Baby and the dis-
ability story it tells in fact school us, all of us (regardless of where in 
the world we view the film), in what it meant to be American at the 
particular moment million Dollar Baby was made, when neoliberalism 
had achieved hegemony and the state (particularly the dominant U.S. 
values, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s multitude.
 4. This point is borne out by the cluster of essays critiquing million Dollar Baby in the summer 
2006 issue of Disability Studies Quarterly (Dolmage and DeGenaro). Of course, what is true of dis-
ability studies scholars (that they do not need me to rehearse disability critiques of the film) is not 
necessarily true of film studies scholars or cultural studies scholars more generally; this essay pre-
sumes, however, that even scholars positioned mainly outside disability studies have begun to rec-
ognize its main tenets and ways of reading.
 5. Reading million Dollar Baby as literature of the New Economic Policy entails taking seriously 
Rosemary Hennessy’s response to Amitava kumar’s question “where is the literature of the World 
Bank?” Hennessy writes that “the literature of the World Bank can be found in the World Bank [that 
is, in documents generated by the World Bank]”; however, “the World Bank’s literature may be 
lodged insidiously in places where we had not thought to look” (40–41).
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state) was no longer working to sustain any sort of check on corpo-
rate capital but was instead allied with capital in an ongoing, and geo-
graphically uneven, reconsolidation of class power. Neoliberal theory, 
propagated by the state and other contemporary institutions (such as 
the World Bank), promised for almost three decades that its implemen-
tation would cause wealth to trickle down to all of us, but don’t get 
your coin rolls out too soon: in practice, neoliberalism generated the 
largest redistribution of wealth upward that the world has ever known. 
kumar and many others, asking about the representation of such prom-
ises (asking—essentially—how World Bank literature functions), have 
attempted to theorize the ways in which consent was secured culturally 
to these processes. I confess that I dislike million Dollar Baby enough to 
wish I could blame it all on this one film, which disability activist John 
kelly hilariously described to me as a sad excuse for an after-school spe-
cial, but of course my larger point invoking World Bank literature is that 
neoliberal lessons were perpetuated by an array of texts like this film 
(including, I would say, almost all the other disability films showered 
with, or considered for, awards in 2005: The Sea Inside, Ray, The Aviator).6 
million Dollar Baby, in other words, strikes me as in no way unique but 
rather as representative (as other texts are representative) of the cultural 
logic of neoliberalism.7
 6. These award-winning 2004 films were all disability biopics: Ray focused on the life of blind 
musician Ray Charles; The Aviator depicted the life of entrepreneur and millionaire Howard Hughes 
(particularly presenting Hughes’s life with obsessive-compulsive disorder); The Sea Inside, as I dis-
cuss briefly below, put forward the story of a Spanish quadriplegic, Ramón Sampedro, petitioning 
Spanish courts for the right to end his life.
 7. Neoliberal capitalism, like all the forms of capitalism that have preceded it, is constantly in 
crisis; indeed, the “cultural logic of neoliberalism” emerges to manage (always partially and always 
incompletely) the crises generated by a fundamentally unjust, inequitable system. I have used the 
past tense in the preceding paragraph to highlight that million Dollar Baby speaks to the neoliberal 
crisis at the moment of its release. Less than four years later, of course, a global financial crisis began 
to reveal even more explicitly the fissures in neoliberal logic; this crisis was partly characterized by 
a refreshing and new (or reinvigorated) skepticism regarding many of the main tenets of neoliber-
alism (tenets that I discuss more directly in the next section). The skepticism or fear emerging from 
the global crisis contributed to Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. In the 
wake of all these events, some have even declared the death of neoliberalism (despite the fact that 
Obama, upon taking office, surrounded himself with some of the major figures working to consoli-
date neoliberalism over the past few decades). At the time of this writing, the global financial crisis is 
ongoing and there is a great deal of uncertainty as to what will happen next. I currently align myself 
with those arguing that announcements of the end of neoliberalism are very premature. Although 
I am hopeful about the possibilities opened up by the current crisis, it still seems to me that the 
reconsolidation of class power that neoliberalism marked continues (indeed, that seems to me an 
understatement), even if it is currently taking new forms with the Obama administration.
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hit Me with your Best Shot
Deregulation, Privatization, and Their Discontents
Taking five of the key principles of turn-of-the-century neoliberalism, I 
sketch out in this section some of the ways in which they are operative 
in million Dollar Baby, with my contention that the film teaches us what 
it means to be participants in this system, or—more directly and insidi-
ously—what it means to be an American, remaining in the background 
throughout. By invoking “what it means to be an American,” of course, 
I put forward the conflation of the United States with “America” that 
is part of the political unconscious of any film like million Dollar Baby, 
a point to which I will return. For now, however, I stress what it means 
to be an American simply because neoliberalism functions differently in 
different national locations. Jump cut, for instance, to the Spanish court-
room scene in The Sea Inside, where lawyers for Ramón Sampedro (Javier 
Bardem) are arguing—before literal representatives of the state’s juridical 
power—for his right to end his life. “We are a civilized nation,” the law-
yers insist—words that mark a key moment of consolidation for Spanish 
neoliberalism, but that would be completely beside the point in million 
Dollar Baby.8 million Dollar Baby’s lesson plan, on the other side of the 
Atlantic, is somewhat different, and it is a lesson plan that has no interest 
(in all senses of the term) in proving the impossible thesis that “America” 
is “a civilized nation.”
 The five principles of neoliberalism I draw on for this section were 
drafted and disseminated by Elizabeth Martinez and Arnoldo García, in a 
brief written specifically for activists countering neoliberalism. It is a brief 
intended, as the Zapatistas of Chiapas would have it, “for humanity”; 
indeed, Martinez and García attended the Intercontinental Encounter for 
Humanity and Against Neoliberalism in July 1996, hosted by the Zap-
atistas in La Realidad, Chiapas (since that encuentro, the Zapatistas’ Sub-
comandante Marcos has dispatched numerous communiqués from Chi-
apas addressed “to the people of México,” or even “to the people of the 
world”).9 There is a vast and indispensable scholarly literature on neo-
liberalism at this point—a literature that is one of the conditions of pos-
sibility for my own scholarship.10 I draw on Martinez and García in this 
 8. For an indispensable discussion of neoliberalism in Spain, see Gabriel Giorgi’s article “Madrid 
en Tránsito.” Giorgio’s analysis has strongly influenced my thinking on the uneven global geograph-
ical development of neoliberalism and the ways in which postmodern identities are incorporated 
into geographically located manifestations of neoliberalism.
 9. On the Zapatistas, Subcomandante Marcos, and disability, see my “Wish you Were Here.”
 10. See, for instance, Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality; David Harvey, A Brief History of Neo-
liberalism and Spaces of Global Capitalism; Amitava kumar, World Bank Literature; and Neil Smith, The 
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section, however, to conjure up the productive labor of activists and to 
highlight the alternative forms of circulation and value imagined and put 
in motion by the Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and similar 
events (circulation alternative, in particular, to the homogenizing circula-
tion of capital).
 you can’t stop people from sharing, Naomi klein and numerous 
others imagining alternative globalizations might say, and sharing Mar-
tinez and García’s talking points against neoliberalism is precisely what 
happened not long after the Chiapas gathering: the five points I draw on 
here circulated values irreducible to a cash nexus to and through innu-
merable progressive locations. The sites where the piece is now available, 
for instance, include “CorpWatch: Holding Corporations Accountable,” 
“Global Exchange: Building People-to-People Ties,” “Global Issues That 
Affect Everyone,” “AIDC: Alternative Information and Development 
Centre,” “illegalvoices.org: Anarchist People of Color,” and “Double 
Standards.” These locations are all Internet-based, but it is of course 
impossible to measure fully just how far these resistant ideas have trav-
eled.11 Martinez and García, finally, are part of the National Network for 
Immigrant and Refugee Rights, and I also draw on their talking points 
because, as I move in the conclusion toward “anti-national” sexual posi-
tions (Puar 27), it is important to think about how and why the nation 
might be undone by bodies moving otherwise, bodies moving beyond the 
borders of the contemporary nation-state.
 The first neoliberal lesson of million Dollar Baby, as Martinez and Gar-
cía’s talking points would have it, is that the market is everything. If there 
is a simple or single ideological message in million Dollar Baby, it’s that 
in America you get your shot: you take a risk, you put yourself out there, 
and if it pays off, it pays off, but regardless, you get your shot. The second 
lesson is that you best get that shot in a deregulated environment. Even 
if there are rules (and certainly there are referees everywhere in the film), 
it’s clear that the rules are there to be broken, and nobody really abides 
by them, least of all those who would take risks and get ahead. Maggie’s 
spinal-cord injury itself comes as the result of a broken rule (an illegal and 
decisive blow), and her opponent Billie the Blue Bear (played by real-life 
boxer Lucia Rijker) has secured her reputation and gotten to the top by 
flouting regulation. Maggie too doesn’t play by the book (or, we might 
Endgame of Globalization.
 11. Hardt and Negri’s work on the productive power of multitude is animating my formulations 
in this paragraph; see also Naomi klein, Fences and Windows. While I am drawing on Martinez and 
García’s talking points, I have reordered them for the purposes of my own argument about million 
Dollar Baby’s neoliberal lessons.
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say, she thinks outside the box), from her relentless insistence that Frankie 
train her (despite his policy against training women) to her tendency to 
take opponents down in the first round.
 The first two points—the market is everything and deregulation is 
best—are the most esoteric of million Dollar Baby’s neoliberal lessons; the 
other three points are both more direct and clearer as to the role that 
disability has in these processes. If neoliberalism, like sadism, demands 
a story, then it’s a story that functions on a familiar narrative level, at 
least as far as disability is concerned. Mitchell and Snyder’s theory of 
“narrative prosthesis” suggests that disability functions “as a crutch upon 
which literary narratives lean for their representational power, disruptive 
potentiality, and analytical insight” (49). Extending their theory we might 
recognize that the story or narrative of American neoliberalism absolutely 
depends upon disability. I list Martinez and García’s final three lessons 
here and then explain this thesis more carefully. Third, privatization is 
an unequivocal good; it is functioning, unquestionable common sense. 
Fourth, social services are inefficient, corrupt, and unnecessary, sapping 
not just the coffers but also the vitality of a given culture. And fifth, per-
sonal “responsibility” should be valued far above any more expansive 
notion of the common or public good. Or rather, the common good is best 
realized by individuals acting “responsibly.”
 The third and fourth points—that privatization is an unequivocal 
good and that social services should be slashed—are interrelated, and 
each point, as far as million Dollar Baby is concerned, comes with a rep-
resentative disabled figure. Maggie’s mother, Earline Fitzgerald (Margo 
Martindale), is represented as fat; her fatness is relentlessly discussed, 
exaggerated, and positioned as disability; and she is on both welfare and 
Medicaid (locating Earline here is one of the primary ways the film posi-
tions her fatness as disability). Earline represents the other side of that 
small Missour-ah town, the part of town the nostalgic mist can’t reach. 
Audiences don’t know what she needs medicine for; we simply know 
that she needs medicine and that she’s very concerned, if she’s perceived 
as making too much money (after Maggie buys her a house), that the 
medical and pharmaceutical services she accesses will be terminated. 
Despite how comically she’s portrayed (it’s not funny in the slightest, but 
she’s intended to be read as a comic character), Earline’s worries are legit-
imate. They are worries for innumerable disabled people trying to access 
what Lisa Duggan has called the incredible shrinking public sphere (22).
 According to Jay Dolmage and William DeGenaro, in an analysis of 
how class and disability intersect in million Dollar Baby, Earline represents 
for audiences a working-class body paradoxically “incapable of labor,” 
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suggesting that “people with disabilities cheat the system for money 
because they won’t work, while at the same time people with disabilities 
could never be capable of working.” I am calling this a neoliberal lesson 
because it is a stereotype located in an era when social services were 
being slashed and when consensus around those cuts was being secured 
culturally by positioning figures such as Earline not as members of the 
public themselves, but as always and everywhere threatening to the gen-
eral public’s well-being. Maggie’s disability, in contrast to Earline’s, has 
no connection to the public, or rather no connection to the public as com-
prehended by state and market: when Earline expresses a concern that 
the hospital and rehabilitation center will use up all of Maggie’s financial 
resources, Maggie—in her most docile moment—informs Earline that the 
Women’s Boxing Association (WBA) is paying for everything (it’s Mag-
gie’s most docile moment, even though, or precisely because, it appears 
to be her most confrontational). The good disabled subject, with her 
entirely privatized care, confronts the bad disabled subject, who not only 
drains American resources, but might be merely faking it. The confronta-
tion between the two representatives of contemporary disability comes 
to a head with Maggie’s angry final lines to her mother: “Momma, you 
take Mardell and JD and get home ’fore I tell that lawyer there that you 
were so worried about your welfare you never signed those house papers 
like you were supposed to. So anytime I feel like it I can sell that house 
from under your fat, lazy, hillbilly ass. And if you ever come back, that’s 
exactly what I’ll do.”
 As innumerable disability critics have pointed out, of course, Mag-
gie’s top-notch private care, actually, sucks. To list just a few of the dis-
ability critiques that have circulated quite freely: the doctors and nurses 
seem not to know how to prevent or to treat bedsores, except by letting 
gangrene set in so that they can amputate Maggie’s leg; the wards Maggie 
inhabits are dark and isolated; at times it seems that the workers’ respon-
sibility, in relation to Maggie, can be summed up with the two words 
“suicide watch” (and even with that limited job description, no one is in 
the running for Employee-of-the-Month). No disability activist I talked to 
could think of a single rehabilitation memoir that had the newly disabled 
figure going it solo, yet Frankie, in his brief suggestion that Maggie might 
go to school, is actually the only one moving through this facility who 
ever talks to Maggie about imagining and managing life after rehab.12 
No counselors, no disabled community or professionals, nothing. The 
 12. Prominent counter-examples of the ways in which disability solidarity, as well as—often—
direct critiques of the rehabilitation center itself, include John Hockenberry’s discussion of rehab in 
moving Violations (28–41) and Simi Linton’s in my Body Politic (4–17).
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soundtrack for the film—composed by Eastwood himself and orchestrated 
by Lennie Niehaus—is, predictably, at this point, almost entirely slow vio-
lins (the music is described by the closed captions on DVD, again predict-
ably, as “meditative and melancholy”). Another soundtrack is possible, 
however, and it’s not unthinkable, if we approach the film from the per-
spective of alternative, disabled values, to come away from million Dollar 
Baby singing an adaptation of Bruce Springsteen’s classic “War (What Is 
It Good For?)” (even though it is admittedly the opposite of the message 
you’re supposed to read into the rehab sequences): “Privatization? Huh. 
yeah, what is it good for? Absolutely nothin!” Maggie’s mother, however, 
keeps you from going there: clearly, for the intended viewer, it’s social 
spending that is out of control if U.S. taxpayers’ dollars are paying for the 
prescription drugs of people like Earline. Millions and millions of dollars, 
actually, if in fact Earline stands in for innumerable other poor women or 
men on Medicaid and welfare.13
 Fifth and finally, and related to the above example, personal “respon-
sibility” is valued above any notion of the common or public good, which 
is essentially how both Maggie’s and Frankie’s stories play out—Maggie 
recognizes that she has had her shot and “responsibly” (according to the 
logic of the film) works to ends her life; Frankie recognizes that, despite 
the sovereign regulations imposed by the Catholic Church (he attends 
regularly despite being represented from the beginning as a skeptic), the 
responsible thing for him is to help her achieve that end.14 The hegemony 
of personal responsibility means that neoliberalism’s good disabled subject 
would appear to have three chapters in her narrative: onset of disability, 
brief privatized care, elimination. But hey, in America, she got her shot.
no Sex Please, We’re disabled
million Dollar Baby’s status as American literature of the New Economic 
Policy helps to provide some evidence as to why there is such a proscrip-
tion on sexuality in this text. Anne Heche and Harrison Ford, Helen Hunt 
and Jack Nicholson—May/December heterosexual couplings in Holly-
wood are just about a prepackaged dime a dozen.15 But for some reason, 
 13. For a good analysis of the role that the “welfare queen” has played in public discourse in the 
past few decades, see Ange-Marie Hancock’s The Politics of Disgust.
 14. Duggan discusses the role “personal responsibility,” coupled with privatization, plays in the 
consolidation of neoliberalism in The Twilight of Equality (12–15).
 15. The list of Hollywood films with couples made up of an older man and younger woman is 
potentially endless; the two I nod toward here are Six Days Seven Nights (1998) and As Good As It Gets 
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the erotics of Frankie’s repeated phrase “my darling, my blood” notwith-
standing, Eastwood and Swank must not have sex. “you’re everything I 
got, boss,” Maggie says at one point, but if she’s making a pass, Frankie 
fails to take the hint. The film nonetheless (again, as a contemporary 
nostalgia film) is haunted by how relationships are supposed to be, nor-
matively, even though there is not a single successful heteronormative 
coupling in million Dollar Baby. The closest we come to a successful per-
formance of heterosexuality is Maggie’s sister Mardell (Riki Linhomme), 
who—when she is introduced in the first of the Missouri sequences—is 
waiting for JD (Marcus Chait), the father of her baby, to get out of prison. 
Mardell and JD are later present for the exorcism of the bad disabled sub-
ject and are clearly not held up as models to be emulated; they exit the 
rehab center—and the film—with Earline after Maggie’s outburst. The 
closest we come to a successful performance of heterosexuality as far as 
Frankie and Maggie are concerned is the one moment of potential crip 
humor that I mentioned. When Maggie wakes up in rehab, she starts the 
banter between the two: 
“Growin’ a beard, boss?” 
 “I thought it might help me with the ladies.” 
 “Can’t say it does.”
But, of course, given the prosthetic role a disabled Maggie needs to play 
in this narrative, again the flirtation must go nowhere.
 I contend that disability as prosthesis in the narrative of American 
neoliberalism disallows Maggie and Frankie’s romantic or sexual connec-
tion. There may be no couple, in million Dollar Baby, that comes remotely 
close to getting the repetition of compulsory heterosexuality exactly right, 
but the film is haunted nonetheless by a proper sexuality that would pro-
vide stability in a world made unstable by the cultural, political, and eco-
nomic dislocations of the last three decades. In this sense million Dollar 
Baby is like the 2004 U.S. election year it immediately followed, since the 
year had thousands of frightened voters heading to the polls to restore 
the sanctity of the supposed traditional family through ballot initiatives 
that would prohibit same-sex marriage or codify statewide definitions of 
marriage as “the union of one man and one woman.”
 The primary subplot of million Dollar Baby arguably attests well to its 
thematizing of sexual and gender propriety. Audiences have learned over 
(1997). In Crip Theory, I discuss the ways in which As Good As It Gets serves as a particularly good 
representation of how compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory able-bodiedness are currently 
intertwined (1–32).
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the course of the film that Frankie is alienated from his wife and daughter 
(the letters that he writes to his daughter, in particular, are returned 
unopened). This subplot is resolved (only partially, and of course inad-
equately) by the final scene that nostalgically locates Frankie back in the 
Missouri diner, eating lemon meringue pie served up by a nameless figure 
who nonetheless, in her amorphousness, becomes contemporary patriar-
chy’s desired Everywoman: mother/daughter/lover/waitress, phantas-
matically protecting neoliberal masculinity and familial relations from the 
dissolution that perpetually threatens them.
 Frankie’s assistant, Eddie “Scrap-Iron” Dupris (Freeman), provides the 
voice-over narration for million Dollar Baby. In this concluding scene, as 
Scrap imagines Frankie somewhere far away, “in a place set in the cedars 
and oak trees,” it’s made clear that the narration has “really” been a letter 
to Frankie’s daughter, to let her know, as the final words of the film would 
have it, “what kind of man your father really was.” The nameless figure 
serving Frankie pie in the diner may never be definitively identified as 
Frankie’s daughter, but she doesn’t have to be. Scrap’s letter, regardless of 
the difference Frankie’s wife and daughter have marked throughout the 
film, reaches its target: an American audience invoked as understanding 
proper sexual and gendered positions, the properties we should associate 
with the American heartland (i.e., the stability of American values and 
the reliability of home cooking, not rural poverty or impairment), and the 
difference between good and bad (disabled) subjects.
 This is where murderball is in some ways (and again only partially) the 
antithesis of million Dollar Baby, despite murderball’s extreme (and indeed 
much more explicit) nationalism. murderball’s nationalism is represented 
most obviously by the ongoing battle over whether the United States, 
Canada, or some other nations’s quadriplegic rugby team will emerge 
victorious (despite staging a classic U.S. sports film rivalry between 
“America” and another country, it is ultimately New Zealand that wins 
at the 2004 Athens Paralympic Games). If there’s a pleasurable moment 
of rupture in murderball’s nationalist narrative, however, a moment when 
the state is not directly figuring the positions these men will occupy, it’s 
the now-famous and graphic discussion of sex in the center of the film: 
“so does the girl always have to be on top?” one of the women chatting 
with a quad rugby team player asks at that point in the film. “A lot of girls 
like to be on top,” is his provocative and—in the wake of million Dollar 
Baby and other contemporary texts suggesting implicitly or explicitly that 
“America” cannot sanction non-normative sexual positions—seductively 
anti-national response.
 Neoliberalism is nothing if not flexible, however, and that moment of 
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rupture in the construction of national identity and sexuality is in tension 
with (and contained by) the absolutely integrationist final scene at the 
White House, with the team receiving accolades directly from George W. 
Bush. It’s a scene that has not received much attention in the largely cel-
ebratory disability response to murderball, although—at least in the urban 
locations where I initially viewed the film and in university classrooms 
(and disability studies classes) where I later discussed it with students—it 
is not uncommon for the scene to elicit jeers or hissing from viewers. The 
insidious conflation of “America” with the United States in a film like mil-
lion Dollar Baby is interrupted for many viewers of murderball by the Bush 
scene. The jeers and hissing mark a moment of disidentification with the 
“America” imperialistically imposed upon the world during the Bush II 
administration and a moment of potential identification with the many 
non-U.S. critics of his policies. More importantly, the visceral reactions to 
the Bush scene are in stark contrast to the laughter and other sounds of 
pleasure that generally accompany the discussion of sexual possibilities. 
Affectively, for many viewers, the moment of national and “American” 
consolidation figured by the Bush scene would seem to be in tension with 
the pleasures of disabled sex and the invention of new and perhaps unex-
pected or unsanctioned sexual positions.
 Of course, there is nothing essentially subversive about a quad rugby 
player suggesting that he and a partner (female or male) might author, 
themselves, a variety of sexual scripts. The process of interrupting what 
Brian keith Axel, in another context, has termed a “national-normative 
sexuality” is far more vital than identifying supposedly substantive posi-
tive disability images (qtd. in Puar 27).16 Indeed, substantive “positive 
images” (and identities) will almost invariably be incorporated into the 
narrative of neoliberalism as it is retold in the near future; that is, in fact, 
precisely what the Bush scene attempts to accomplish. Put somewhat dif-
ferently, neoliberalism can accommodate much more easily “the [substan-
tive] best film ever made on disability” than it can ongoing crip processes 
of disidentification and interruption—interruption, in particular, of the 
 16. Axel is specifically discussing the ways in which torture is used to consolidate national-nor-
mative sexuality; Jasbir k. Puar, in an important article on representations of and responses to U.S. 
military tortures at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, uses Axel to consider the “formulation of national 
differentiation as sexual differentiation” (27). My argument in this section is that murderball (read 
generously) flirts with a queer and even potentially feminizing sexual differentiation that would posi-
tion the men at the center of the film otherwise, but that the film’s emphasis on both athletic virility 
and patriotism essentially rehabilitates them for integration into the national-normative sexuality 
they might otherwise disrupt. Beyond that, I am suggesting that any “positive images” approach 
is founded on the desire for integration and national belonging and betrays both the interruptive 
potentiality of queerness and disability and those subjects, such as Earline Fitzgerald, who are made 
to figure that interruptive potentiality.
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uses to which disability is put in normative and national scripts.
 It seems to me that these crip processes are crossing borders and 
that the protests of million Dollar Baby are more generatively read in this 
larger context. If earlier, in other words, I took stock of the protests and 
suggested they had little impact on the issues at hand (the popularity of 
this one egregious Hollywood film), I would now affirm that they are 
more productively read through the widespread, increasingly global gen-
eration of alternative disabled values and futures.17 As we celebrate (and 
hopefully continue to generate) our alternatives to the lessons of an able-
bodied, neoliberal primer like million Dollar Baby, it’s incumbent upon 
us to attend to the tensions surrounding current uses of disability in cul-
ture. As other, less remarked, disability spectacles of 2005 attest (Hurri-
cane katrina, Guantanamo, Iraq), disability communities (communities of 
color far more than the largely white team represented in murderball) can 
rightfully claim that the bridge to the new world order is still called our 
back.18 “Nothing about us without us” always echoing in the background, 
however (and I imagine we always have yet to recognize just how radical 
that watch phrase is), we can continue to insist that integration into that 
order, or any order, is unacceptable if it leaves so many of “us” behind. 
 17. My thinking on the increasingly global generation of disabled values and futures is indebted 
to David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder’s essay on transnational disability film festivals, “How Do 
We Get All These Disabilities in Here?” as well as to their important book The Cultural Locations of 
Disability.
 18. I am framing my conclusion in this way given that million Dollar Baby, along with the Terri 
Schiavo case, in many ways became “representative” disability spectacles of 2005; indeed, this essay 
first appeared as a panel presentation at the Modern Language Association Convention given over 
to consideration of these two high-profile disability events from that year. I contend that these two 
events became representative because it is still difficult (in part because of the limitations of iden-
tity politics as it has increasingly consolidated in and around disability studies) to perceive certain 
events—such as Hurricane katrina or the tortures associated with Guantanamo or other U.S. military 
prisons—as “disability” events or spectacles.
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Spectacular disabilities
One of the more memorable scenes from Robert Zemeckis’s Forrest Gump 
(1994) concerns the double-amputee war veteran Captain Dan lifting him-
self from a seated position on the floor into his wheelchair. The scene is 
pointed for a variety of reasons: First, the capacity to move one’s body 
from the floor to a wheelchair solely with one’s arms involves the execu-
tion of a substantial feat of strength. Second, the scene provides the viewer 
with a unique opportunity to stare at the dynamics of a physical transition 
we rarely witness—particularly from the safe social perspective offered 
by a movie theatre seat (or one’s own furniture). And, finally, a view-
er’s knowledge of Gary Sinese’s able-bodiedness encourages viewers to 
marvel at the special effects required to simulate amputation in not using 
one’s legs to effect such a transfer.
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Body Genres
An Anatomy of Disability in Film
S h A r o n  l .  S n y d E r  A n d  d A v i d  T .  M i T C h E l l
l
This essay is excerpted from a chapter in our book titled Cultural Locations of Disability (University 
of Chicago Press, 2006). The book examines cultural spaces set out exclusively on behalf of disabled 
citizens, for example, charity systems; institutions for the feebleminded during the eugenics period; 
the rise of an international disability research industry; sheltered workshops for the “multi-handi-
capped”; medically based and documentary film representations of disability; and current academic 
research trends on disability in the academy. We characterize these sites as cultural locations of disability 
in which disabled people find themselves deposited, often against their will. At the very least, each 
of these locales represents a saturation point of content about disability that has been produced by 
those who share largely debilitating beliefs about the value of human differences. We trace these 
beliefs back to the eugenics era when disability began to be constructed as undesirable deviation from 
normative existence. Even in the face of the most benign rhetoric about disabled persons’ well-being, 
these locations of disability have resulted in treatment (both in the medical and cultural sense) that 
has proven predominantly detrimental to the meaningful participation of people with disabilities in 
the creation of culture itself.
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 The identification of the latter two layers of imaginative involvement 
and spectatorial pleasure involved in performances of disability supplies 
an unanalyzed nexus of viewer identification—or dis-identification, as 
the case may be. As a witness to this spectacle the viewer is offered a 
unique opportunity in that the physical prowess of the accomplishment is 
rivaled only by the technological wizardry of erasing the actual legs of an 
able-bodied actor. Special effects threaten to overwhelm the more tried-
and-true filmic spectacle: a disabled body navigating an environment in 
its own unique manner.
 To interrogate this nexus between spectator and the filmed disabled 
body as a spectacle, we must inevitably delve into the psychic structures 
that give meaning to disability as a constructed social space. This space 
of psychic interaction does not exist universally, but a limited theoret-
ical foray into this well-traversed arena of film criticism should provide 
opportunities heretofore unrecognized in disability studies.1 In main-
stream fiction film—identified in this essay as U.S.-based productions 
organized around principles of continuity editing associated with Holly-
wood industry—disability supplies an important opportunity to feed two 
seemingly antithetical modes of visual consumption: the desire to witness 
body-based spectacles and a desire to know an object empirically as an 
aftereffect of viewing. Whereas mainstream fiction film productions have 
been exclusively associated with the first viewing position—entertain-
ment through the witness of spectacle—film technology’s long historical 
relationship with the scientific gaze also needs to be theorized.
 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, what we have 
called cultural locations of disability have been produced primarily 
through the scrutiny of disabled bodies as research objects in the investi-
gations of medicine, rehabilitation, and other fields devoted primarily to 
empiricisms of the body. Film spectatorship borrows from these weighty 
disciplinary practices in that bodies marked as anomalous are offered for 
consumption as objects of necessary scrutiny—even downright prurient 
curiosity. As Elizabeth Cowie contends regarding modes of spectator-
ship in documentary film, “In curiosity, the desire to see is allied with the 
desire to know through seeing what cannot normally be seen, that is, what 
is normally veiled or hidden from sight” (28; emphasis added). Disability 
plays this primary role in most Hollywood film productions in that it 
provides an opportunity for viewers to witness spectacles of bodily dif-
 1. The probing of psychic identifications in film criticism has produced a significant body of 
work, including Teresa De Lauretis’s work in Technologies of Gender and Alice Doesn’t; the analyses 
of Linda Williams discussed at length in this article; Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye; William 
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ference without fear of recrimination by the object of this gaze. In fact, 
social conventions of normalcy as products of historical viewing practices 
are highlighted in mainstream film representations of disability by the 
cultivation of a belief that one is witnessing a previously secret or hidden 
phenomenon.
 Cowie’s repetition of the term “normally” in the above quotation 
provides a key to theorizing film spectator relationships to the screening 
of disabled bodies. To a significant degree, film produces interest in its 
objects through the promise of providing bodily differences as an exotic 
spectacle. What can “normally be seen” or “what is normally veiled or 
hidden from sight” secures a privileged position for disabled bodies on 
film because they promise an opportunity to practice a form of objecti-
fying ethnography. That which is created as off-limits in public spaces 
garners the capital of the unfamiliar. Film promotes its status as a desir-
able cultural product largely through its willingness to recirculate bodies 
typically concealed from view. In this way the closeting of disabled 
people from public observation exacts a double marginality: disability 
extracts one from participation while also turning that palpable absence into the 
terms of one’s exoticism. Film spectators arrive at the screen prepared to 
glimpse the extraordinary body displayed for moments of uninterrupted 
visual access—a practice shared by clinical assessment rituals associated 
with the medical gaze. Consequently, the “normative” viewing instance 
is conceived as that which is readily available for observation in culture. 
To a great extent, film’s seduction hinges on securing audience interest 
through the address of that which is constructed as “outside” a common 
visual parlance.
 In this essay we intend to chart some critical modes of spectatorship 
generated by conventions of disability portrayal in film. This is not an 
exhaustive effort by any means, and we do not intend to imply that these 
are the only viewing positions available. Rather, we intend to identify 
some significant viewing relationships commonly cultivated in main-
stream film. Visual media analysis in disability studies has made some 
initial efforts to critique filmic portrayals of disability as predominantly 
negative and stereotypical;2 yet, in focusing interest exclusively in this 
area, little attention has been paid to the dynamic relationship between 
viewers and disabled characters. Since, as we have argued, most people 
make the majority of their life acquaintances with disabled people only 
in film, television, and literature, the representational milieu of disability 
 2. For a critical assessment of this strategy of identifying positive and negative stereotypes 
of disability in visual media, see our analysis “Representation and Its Discontents,” namely, the 
discussion on pages 17–21. 
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provides a critical arena for disability studies analysis (Mitchell and 
Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis 52). The analysis of film images of disability 
provides an opportune location of critical intervention—a form of discur-
sive rehab upon the site of our deepest psychic structures mediating our 
reception of human differences.
Excessive Film Bodies
To a significant extent this essay owes a debt to the work of feminist film 
critic Linda Williams. Williams has followed up feminism’s efforts to anat-
omize the complex space that exists between images and their spectatorial 
reception by audience members. In particular, Williams concentrates—
following on the heels of work by film theorist Teresa de Lauretis (Alice 
Doesn’t)—on women as imbibers of their own filmed images. Whereas de 
Lauretis theorized this psychic structure as the site of a “double pleasure” 
where women identify with both the masochistic objectification of female 
characters and the sadistic position of the prototypical masculine viewer 
to whom film is often addressed, Williams probes a variety of genres, and, 
thus, a variety of potential modes of viewer identification. In essence, 
Williams’s analyses fracture the act of viewing into a rich multiplicity 
of visual relations based on cross-genre comparison—particularly with 
respect to films she identifies as existing to elicit extreme bodily sensa-
tions in audiences. This attention to cross-genre structures of audience 
identification allows Williams to de-universalize the more monolithic cast 
of de Lauretis’s influential analysis. Here we want to briefly review Wil-
liams’s arguments as a predecessor text to our own deliberations. Wil-
liams’s film bodies provide a key entry into our own speculations about 
the imagery of disability in mainstream Hollywood visual texts.
 In her essay “Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, and Excess,” Williams 
opens by arguing that film bodies play at a critical nexus in film viewing 
practices. Rather than abstracting the body at a distance, “body genres” 
such as melodrama, horror, and pornography focus on the production of 
palpable sensation. Their filmic power depends upon the ability to sit-
uate the body in the throes of extreme sensation characterized by stimuli 
produced by pain, hysteria, terror, or sobbing, in other words, those 
sensations that involve our bodies in wrenching sensations that might 
be characterized as excessive. This constitutive excess produced as the 
key commodity in body genres allows Williams to stipulate heightened 
somatic involvement as the goal of certain visual genres (although this 
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may also function as the critical product of visual genres high and low 
as well). In other words, films participating in the body genres target the 
visceral emotional life of the body both on the screen and in viewing 
audiences. This analysis situates a phenomenological mode of spectator-
ship as a process that is critical to the interpretation of cinema and other 
visual media.
 According to contemporary film criticism, a film’s success depends 
upon its ability to generate sensations as well as replicate successful for-
mula plotlines. Hence we can best understand films as body genres in that, 
for example, melodrama, horror, and pornography are experienced pri-
marily in terms of the spectacular moments that generate sensations in 
the bodies of their viewers (Williams 702). For example, in melodrama a 
character’s loss overtakes audience members, who are also encouraged 
to experience a similar sensation—usually toward another human being 
or a body function. In horror films the terror of an unexpected meeting 
with the villain (often disabled), and anxiety over potential or actual vio-
lence, produce an accord of sensations between characters and members 
of a viewing audience. In pornography, sexual arousal and orgasm per-
formed by the film’s characters are likewise intended to produce similar 
responses for the viewers. Each of these genre formulas depends upon its 
ability to cultivate an over-identification between viewer and imperiled 
character on-screen to achieve its desired effects. The body is endangered 
as a staple plot element in these works, and the degree to which audi-
ences identify with the impending loss of control in their own bodies 
will determine the ultimate “success” of the film in question. Body films 
attempt to situate the filmed body in the throes of excessive emotion as 
an object of mediation for the anticipated viewer’s own experience of 
embodied peril.
 What is often deemed “inappropriate” by critics of such films is what 
Williams defines as “an apparent lack of proper esthetic distance, a sense 
of over-involvement in sensation and emotion” (5). The viewer surfaces 
from such film experiences betrayed by a sense of manipulation; audience 
members find themselves immersed in the “violence” of emotional excess 
and, in doing so, experience the aftermath of such immersion as a “cheap 
thrill.” One could analyze Williams’s analysis as a theory of guilty plea-
sures in cinema. All these generic forms depend on the portrayal of body 
spectacle to one degree or another: the horror movie provides violence 
as a visceral mechanism of terror; the melodrama uses pathos toward 
bodily loss as the primary tool to evoke intense grief or sadness; and 
pornographic film involves the explicit portrayal of body functions usu-
ally ruled out of bounds by classical cinema. Each form of bodily display 
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provides film viewers with an opportunity to “surrender” to extreme sen-
sations rarely available in our non-film-mediated lives.
 Rather than follow certain feminist approaches to such spectacles as 
condemnatory or as matters of “false consciousness” in female viewers 
who participate in the consumption of such genres, Williams contends 
that a multiplicity of viewing spaces exist within such products. In other 
words, rather than castigate such products as merely replicating the 
female viewer as “passive victim,” body genres offer more than a sim-
plistic formula of masochistic objectification. On the one hand, “identifi-
cation is neither fixed nor entirely passive” (8); on the other, a viewer’s 
oscillation among positions of power and passivity provides an oppor-
tunity to reconcile the splintering of self and other—at least for a while. 
Genre films set a field of signifiers into motion, and viewers try out var-
ious vantage points during the story. A pleasure of the multiple is at play 
in even the most hackneyed of formulas; therefore Williams encourages a 
more complex examination of “the system and structure” of sensation (2).
 In addition, by addressing historically persistent problems such as 
sexuality, desire, and vulnerability, Williams argues that body genres 
provide a variety of “temporal structures [that] constitute the different 
utopian component of problem-solving in each form” (11). By taking 
up social issues that continue to resonate in the public context as “diffi-
cult,” body genre films address the defining ambiguity of these problems 
through a perpetual recycling of their existence within the parameters 
of their plot structures. Thus, for Williams, the pleasure of horror results 
from its exposure of adolescent sexuality as not yet fully prepared for an 
encounter with a monster (as a symbol of insatiable sexual appetite); the 
investment in melodrama stems from a “quest for connection . . . tinged 
with the melancholy of loss” (11); and in pornography one might charac-
terize the dilemma as the coincidental encounter between “seducer and 
seduced” at just the right moment for the pursuit of mutual gratification. 
In each formula, timing becomes critical to the structural parameters of 
the genre. The screen bodies “suffer” at the hands of time where pursuits 
are defeated, deferred, or satiated. The popularity of these plots pivots on 
their ability to dredge up longstanding (albeit dynamic) social problems 
that expose viewers to irresolution as a “solution.” Thus the “resolution” 
comes about through the repetition of exposure to a social dilemma that 
can only be exposed rather than resolved.
 To organize her thoughts on the operations at work in body genre 
films, Williams provides a diagram titled “An Anatomy of Film Bodies” 
which categorizes the predominating mechanisms at work in each for-
mula. Using bodily sensation as a tool for assessing each genre’s opera-
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tion, the chart anatomizes gendered responses. For the purposes of this 
essay, what is critical in Williams’s anatomy chart is the degree to which 
the sensations experienced both by bodies on the screen and by the audi-
ence coincide. The ecstatic shudder supplied by the horror film, the tears 
produced by the melodrama, and the orgasm of the pornographic all 
situate the body as seismic register of the genre film’s successful applica-
tion.
 While mapping out the gender of each genre’s presumed target audi-
ence—melodrama = girls, women; horror = adolescent boys; pornography 
= men—the diagram also identifies the prototypical affect associated with 
each formula from sadism (pornography) to sadomasochism (horror) to 
masochism (melodrama). In each case the dominant production of the 
gendered viewer reinforces cultural scripts targeted at an audience’s rela-
tionship to norms of gender and sexuality extant in Western narratives of 
heterosexuality.
 Thus Williams’s “anatomy of film bodies” refuses simplistic dis-
missals of body genre films as crass or merely ideologically duplicitous, 
while also using their fantasy structures as a means to expose ideologi-
cally invested formulas. As she explains in the conclusion of the article, 
“body genres which may seem so violent and inimical to women cannot 
be dismissed as evidence of a monolithic or unchanging misogyny, as 
either pure sadism for male viewers or masochism for females” (12). In 
doing so, body genres offer an instructive entry into the complex struc-
ture of film fantasy within which we participate as members of a media 
culture.
 If such a model can prove instructive for analyses of gendered plea-
sures and popular myths, we want to argue a similar utility for explora-
tions of disabled bodies as staple characterizations within these popular 
formulas. Williams’s own analysis hits upon a number of conventions 
pertinent to disability in film without recognizing film’s investment in 
what Elaine Scarry terms the “body in pain” within her own gendered 
analytical system. Through “An Anatomy of Film Bodies,” gender 
eclipses disability because Williams bypasses an analysis of the body’s 
different pivotal function in the development of each genre.
 Because body genres rely so intrinsically on extreme sensation, we 
argue that disability is certainly as crucial as gender in the primal struc-
turing fantasies that comprise these formulas. In fact, body genres are so 
dependent on disability as a representational device (a process we have 
elsewhere termed “narrative prosthesis” [Narrative Prosthesis 6]) that each 
formula can also be recognized by its repetitious reliance on particular 
kinds of disabled bodies to produce the desired sensational extremes. 
| Body Genres186
Whether it be the “bumbling fool” of comedy (as in the screwball plots 
of the 1960s that featured later disability telethon sycophant Jerry Lewis), 
or the disabled avenger of horror (as showcased in any number of psy-
chological thrillers or monster plot formulas), or the long-suffering victim 
of melodrama such as in the plot of Dark Victory (1939) which has Bette 
Davis’s character dying from some indistinct, non-terminal condition (!). 
Within such an analytical scheme one might also contemplate the various 
anatomical anomalies that drive pornography plots searching for the ulti-
mate sexual encounter.
 In every one of these cases we come upon a familiar body genre 
formula identified by Williams in her analysis of gender and sensation. 
yet one can also identify representations of disability in each of these 
cinematic scenarios as a key form of embodiment that gives shape and 
structure to body genre formulas. Quite simply put: disabled bodies have 
been constructed cinematically and socially to function as delivery vehicles in 
the transfer of extreme sensation to audiences. In doing so, an anatomy of 
disabled bodies can provide a further deepening of our comprehension 
of the system and structure of body genres.
An Anatomy of Cinematic disability
Whereas Williams’s essay focuses primarily on the nature of sensations 
produced by body genres, a full analysis of their impact includes a discus-
sion of the means by which such sensations are produced. This implies 
not only the undertaking of a theoretical analysis of psychic investments 
between characters and viewers, but also a scrutiny of the embodied con-
ditions that play host to the generation of sensation in the first place. As 
a vehicle of sensation, disabled bodies play an important role as either 
the threatened producer of trauma (such as in the case of the monstrous 
stalker) or the threat toward the integrity of the able body. The extreme 
sensations paralleled in screen bodies and audience responses rely, to a 
great extent, on shared cultural scripts of disability as that which must 
be warded off at all costs. Bodies are subjugated to their worst fears of 
vulnerability, and/or the already disabled body is scripted as out of con-
trol. The order and mastery associated with the non-disabled body often 
becomes the threat posed in these film formulas. This fantasy of bodily 
control among audience members becomes the target of body genres as 
a fiction deeply seated in the desire for an impossible dominion over our 
own capacities. What Michel Foucault refers to as the government of the 
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body is at stake wherein individuals are produced as subjects responsible 
for policing their own bodily aesthetics, functions, and controls (48). In 
either case the disabled body in body genres surfaces as the locus of ten-
sion and the source of excessive sensation.
 If productions of body genres display sensations that are, as Williams 
contends, on “the edge of respectable” (2), then one must contemplate 
the degree to which disabled bodies are made to demarcate the culturally 
policed borders of respectability itself. In fact, the designation of extreme 
sensations might be best characterized as a response to the “excesses” of 
human bodies displayed on the screen. In this manner we are discussing 
not a fact of bodies but rather a social investment in certain bodies’ 
presumed proximity to abjectness. The “edge” implied by matters of 
respectability pivots on the fact that questions of social propriety always 
depend—to one degree or another—on something over which one has 
little to no control. A body of behaviors or actions deemed inappropriate 
depends on the degree to which one manages or masks the conditions of 
one’s own materiality. Thus, in Tobin Siebers’s terms, the disabled body 
is expected to engage in public “masquerades” of its own normalcy. “Suc-
cess” in regard to disability (and all bodies in general) is judged according 
to one’s ability to dissimulate actions or behaviors deemed aberrant and, 
thus, unrespectable.
 The “body genres” relate directly to the degree to which one com-
mands the behaviors and capacities of one’s own body. We know that 
such command is elusive at best, yet the “non-excessive” body is defined 
by virtue of its ability to oversee and appropriately manage its own by-
products. For instance, when John Belushi performs the role of a human 
“zit” by stuffing his mouth with mashed potatoes and then violently 
ejecting the contents onto all those around him in Animal House (1978), the 
comedic value of the scene produces a mixture of disgust and laughter 
that one equates with the essence of “gross” in comedy. The degree to 
which one experiences this reaction of disgust and laughter may be gen-
dered in Williams’s schema, but the vehicle of the sensation is a bodily 
function gone awry. The performance of a “zit” brings the question of 
such bodily operations into a public forum that is usually shielded from 
such discussions as unseemly, while the characterization reveals a bodily 
“outburst” no longer under the complete dominion of a fully socialized 
body. Bodies must remain within certain boundaries, and their “leakage” 
beyond such parameters violates social expectations of propriety (i.e., the 
appropriate self-mastery of one’s bodily functions, fluids, and abilities).
 In the chart in figure 1, we adapt Williams’s structural dissection of 
film bodies for disability studies. Whereas her essay focuses on the body 
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genres of pornography, horror, and melodrama, our own chart substi-
tutes comedy for pornography in order to apply disability to the three 
foundational genres of film narrative, although, as we mentioned earlier, 
anomalous bodily anatomies are also on display in pornography as well. 
This chart details the psychic structures at play in popular Hollywood 
representations of disability.
 From a disability studies perspective, one can readily recognize the 
significance of disabled bodies to the body genre formula. Rather than a 
generalized psychoanalytical theory, these plots depend upon the signi-
GENRE COMEDy HORROR MELODRAMA
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FIGURE 1. Body Genres: An Anatomy of Disabled Bodies in Film
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fying affect of disabled bodies as a staple feature of most (we might almost 
dare to say “all”) body genres. Bisecting the columns of three key genre 
formulas, the chart identifies nine rows of common characteristics found 
in disability portrayals. The opening category, “Bodily Display,” typifies 
each genre with respect to the source of a character’s disability (comedy = 
performed; horror = inborn/acquired monstrosity; melodrama = maimed 
capacity). The second row—“Emotional Appeal”—designates the antici-
pated emotional response toward disability display to which each genre 
appeals. Row three, “Presumed Audience,” characterizes the intended 
viewers’ gender and agency with respect to formulaic disabling specta-
cles. In “Disability Source,” row four, we catalogue the degree of visibility 
characterizing the representation of disabilities across the three genres. 
As identified previously, row five (“Originary Fantasy”) designates the 
presumed spectatorial role or affect experienced by viewers in relation to 
disability portrayals. Row six, “Resolution,” refers to most typical forms 
of erasure that “resolve” the central disabling predicament in the binary 
cure-or-kill scenarios that all of these genre films take up. Row seven iden-
tifies the pervasive motivating force that compels disabled characters into 
action. “Body Distortion,” row eight, lists the most common disability 
“etiologies” deployed in each body genre. In the final category—“Genre 
Cycles, ‘Classic’”—we have noted the specific genre character types com-
monly associated with the mechanism of plot formulas.
 In other words, every genre develops its own dependency on a spe-
cific disability type or two. These types function to give these genres shape 
and coherency. They become one of the primary means by which genres 
become recognizable as successful formulaic ventures. Consequently, one 
issue that this chart helps to establish is the degree to which disability 
itself is subject to scripted social formulas for its limiting meanings. Like 
film plots, the disabled body itself can be said to solidify a form of visual 
shorthand. Its appearance prompts a finite set of interpretive possibilities 
now readily recognizable to audiences weaned on the grammar of visual 
media. Without these readable disability formulas, most body genres 
would be significantly hampered in their sensation-generating objectives.
 Consequently, beneath comedy’s common portrayal of the disabled 
body as out of control, the habitual monstrosity of disabled avengers, the 
maimed capacity of sentimental illness drama, we find a variety of other 
disability subgenres such as blind “slasher” films that have been recycled 
for more than four decades now. For example, Peeping Tom (1960), Wait 
Until Dark (1967), Jennifer8 (1992), Silent Night, Deadly Night III (1989), You 
Better Watch Out, and even Afraid of the Dark (1992) promote identifica-
tion with visually impaired disabled female bodies in order to induce 
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intense feelings (masochism) of vulnerability in an audience. The genre 
consistently associates femininity and visual impairment with the sensa-
tion of extreme vulnerability that the act of stalking elicits. This repeated 
plotline produces a web of faulty associations that threaten to turn gender 
and disability into synonyms for the kind of excessive vulnerability that 
the situation of being hunted involves. The danger here is primarily one 
of synecdoche where phenomenologies of disability and gender become 
synonymous with social acts of terror.
 Moreover, the genre of melodrama, or the extra-tissue “weepies,” 
focused on both male and female figures, could hardly exist without 
award-winning and celebrated disability vehicles such as The miracle 
Worker (1962), Dark Victory (1939), and even Philadelphia (1993). In these 
instances of disability body genres, the predominant, excessive sensation 
produced often hinges upon the cultivation of the fear of disability that 
commonly conditions audience ideas of embodiment. Film appeals to 
viewer concerns about the maintenance of one’s bodily integrity, and thus 
the production of disability serves as a site of visceral sensation where 
abject fantasies of loss and dysfunction (maimed capacity) are made to 
destabilize the viewer’s own investments in ability. A masochistic rela-
tionship between a suffering character and viewer vulnerability is inau-
gurated.
 Nevertheless, these longstanding cinematic deployments of disability 
have remained undertheorized as a key component of all body genres. 
For instance, in thriller and slasher films a vengeful character with a dis-
ability is socially located as a monster. As a way of responding to socially 
depreciated situations, the monster secures his (and sometimes her) dire 
need to wreak havoc on non-disabled worlds as a form of retribution for 
bodily loss (Longmore). Such a contrivance can be witnessed as the natu-
ralized explanation of the villain’s motives in films such as Touch of Evil 
(1958), Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back (1980), Speed (1994), and Richard 
III (1955). In turn, audiences undergo a dual structure of identification 
(sadomasochism) by worrying over their own impending disablement 
while finding pleasure in the “hunt” as the primary sources of their iden-
tification with the imperiled victim’s membership among the normative. 
While there are myriad other combinations and permutations of these 
identificatory structures critical to the representation of disability (some 
of which we will discuss here as well), our primary focus will concentrate 
on the two genres identified above: monstrous thrillers and bumbling 
comedy films.
 Examples of disabled vengeance include Hannibal (2001), though the 
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title character himself is ironically exempted from this formula as a fur-
ther sign of his superiority as a cultured psychotic cannibal. Hannibal’s 
(Anthony Hopkins’s) psychiatric dementia is made glamorous—even tit-
illating—in a classic disability hierarchy, by contrasting his figure to that 
of an even more unbearably repulsive, hyperequipped-power-chair-using, 
sexual deviant named Mason Verger (Gary Oldman). Audience identifica-
tion is encouraged to re-orient itself in favor of Hannibal-the-cannibal by 
rooting for the murderous, and more visibly obnoxious, character to be 
dumped out of his chair and into a pit of flesh-eating hogs (and the char-
acter’s personal assistant does oblige this “audience” desire). As an aside 
it is important to point out that the voracious hog is also a symbol in the 
family crest of the murderous disabled avenger Richard III. Consequently, 
the film uses this allusion to Shakespeare—or, perhaps even more likely, 
the James Bond–like retelling of the drama in Ian Mckellen’s film ver-
sion (1995)—as a form of artistic insider lineage that helps to catapult its 
debased plot to the status of a psychological drama.
 If audiences do cheer (or instead resist the film ploy and grimace) as 
the latest hypertech parasite receives his just deserts, we are also sur-
rounded by ear-splitting grunts and chomping on the exegetic sound 
track to underscore the point that wheelchair users really are voracious 
consumers who burden society with their unproductive bodies. Thus the 
film stages a form of “just deserts” in feeding Virgil to flesh-eating hogs as 
an appropriately gruesome punishment for his embodiment of sexual and 
bodily deviancy. In such a way many screen scenes continue to encourage 
viewers to free themselves from the shackles of “politically correct” atti-
tudes toward disabled and queer bodies as self-evident markers of patho-
logical aberrancy.
 Similarly, examples from the category of comedy body genre cinema, 
another site for disabled body viewing, also hinges upon narrow ideas 
about unacceptable bodies that encourage freak-show-like titillation, as 
well as humor born of an all-too-easy superiority toward each character’s 
bumbling incompetencies. Indeed two such films—Dumb and Dumberer 
and Stuck on You—were released in the 2003 film season with promises 
to mock special schools, “idiocy,” and two guys “stuck” together, as in 
conjoined twins. Such cinematic products promise to heighten prior body 
sensation exploits by doubling and tripling the forms of abject humiliation 
(sadism) that the featured characters are willing to undergo, thus giving a 
new twist to what disability studies critic Martha Stoddard Holmes refers 
to as the twin structure of Victorian disability plots. 
 The film field, as usual, seems open to anyone who can get a distrib-
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utor and corporate backing, and promise to pull in revenues. Despite this 
limitation on concepts of mass appeal, there have been some films that 
dramatize a canny awareness about a social model of disability. These 
exemplars tend to take up disability as a core element of their storyline, 
as opposed to a series of freak encounters. The best examples of these 
counter-discursive forays include science fiction and comic-book plots 
developed in Gattaca (1997), much of Unbreakable (2000), and some might 
say X-men (2000) and X2 (2003). In these films trite attributions of the 
emotional life of disabled characters—vengeance, innocence, and barely 
forgivable motives born of tragedy—are swept up into a maelstrom of dis-
ability commentary and the plight of postmodern citizenry. As the char-
acter of Storm (Halle Berry) in the first sequel to X-men points out to a 
new mutant:
Storm: They don’t want us so they seek to protect us.
Nightcrawler: From whom?
Storm: Everyone else.
All these films foresee a dystopic future where various incarnations of the 
gene police provide evidence of a new eugenics on the near horizon of 
our social context.
 Mostly, though, our screens tend to transmit bizarre repetitions and 
standard excessive reactions to disability experience. In horror film—a 
genre, as we identify in the chart, where the villain is often represented 
as disabled—an audience’s shared sensations are not cultivated with 
respect to the disabled characters’ emotional experience. And if they are 
so encouraged, as in the overwrought plot twists of Shakespeare’s Richard 
III and its various theatrical and cinematic spin-offs, they will eventu-
ally, and gleefully, be exposed, later on, as an unwise audience choice. In 
fact, inverse correlations to body genres occur if one goes at the topic of 
representation from a disability perspective: melodramatic elements take 
up personal intimacy—often with a character’s self-denial and repulsion 
toward a newly acquired disability predicament—whereas horror films 
are likely to place us in a dreadful encounter with a monstrous, but still 
human and disabled, character. Hence audience experiences of sensation 
evoked by characters are not strictly a matter of simple identification; 
horror encourages emotions that serve to cement longstanding associa-
tions of stigma with bodily difference.
 Even so, one does not necessarily reject metaphorization while inter-
rogating what David Wills calls “the flaw in the trope of disability.” A con-
test of metaphorical determinism—such as discussions of the overdone 
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overcoming narrative—destine one to nevertheless avoid taking refuge in 
an “essence” of embodied perspective. What disability studies is engaged 
in here is a contest of certain forms of metaphor that have dominated the 
historical canon of disability representations; we are in a visceral battle 
over images which, as disability studies has asserted, are not outside 
questions of embodiment. Since disabled people must negotiate a finite 
repertoire of social meanings (both externally and internally), there are 
significant stakes in the humanities-based analysis of disability.
 For instance, Judith Butler has argued against the existence of a pre-
discursive sex prior to a socially inscribed gender. In doing so, Butler does 
not seek to de-materialize the embodied subjectivity of “women,” but 
rather to privilege a discursive component to embodiment itself. Similarly, 
in the case of disability, we exist in our bodies by negotiating a cultural 
repertoire of images that threaten to mire us in debilitating narratives of 
dysfunction and pathology. By contesting and expanding a representa-
tional repertoire of images in culture (even by virtue of shoring up the 
inadequacies of our current narrative possibilities), we also create space 
for alternative possibilities for imagining embodied experience itself.
 Just as in the key scene in Crash (1997) where Rosanna Arquette says, 
“I’d like to see if I could fit into a car designed for a normal body,” dis-
abled people are constantly negotiating a self-image with respect to a 
normative formula. The goal in disability studies is to leave a permanent 
mark upon “normative” modes of embodiment—to mar the sleek surface 
of normativity in the way that Arquette’s brace-buckle tears the leather 
bucket seat of the Mercedes without shame. Such a competition of image 
and metaphor refuses to distance audiences from the recognition that rep-
resentation and embodiment are conjoined in a meaningful dependency 
that disability studies should not sever but deepen.
 In the final section of this essay, “Cinematic Interventions,” we turn 
to an analysis of disability documentary cinema as a site of resistance and 
political revision to the body genres discussed to this point. Our effort 
here is to forward these alternative film narratives as places where com-
peting disability subjectivities can be forged and explored.
new disability documentary Cinema
In contradistinction to most examples of the body genre, we would 
contend that the current disability documentary cinema constitutes an 
avant-garde—even the inception of a veritable renaissance—in contem-
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porary disability depictions. In each documentary, one encounters the 
privileging of disabled persons’ voices not simply as a voice added to 
a growing cacophony of public debates about the meaning of disabled 
bodies, but also the explicit foregrounding of a cultural perspective 
informed by, and within, the phenomenology of bodily difference. For 
ease of definition, in this essay phenomenology means not only the cap-
ture of disability perspectives on film but also the meaningful influence 
that disability has upon one’s subjectivity and even cinematic technique 
itself. Whereas some articles have recognized the former issue (Patterson 
and Hughes 325–40), we want to focus particularly on the latter, subjec-
tivity and technique, as a means of designating the incarnation of bona 
fide disability cinema. Last, the third site of a shift in the depiction of dis-
ability has to do with the cultivation of disability-identified perspectives 
that have been formulated within subcultural communities, who are in 
turn influenced by both international disability rights movements and 
the area of disability studies.
 To exemplify the first point: if we step back for a moment in film his-
tory and think about U.S. film that was born during the classical eugenics 
era, we are struck by the degree to which that era’s visual film grammar 
assumes that an audience will be automatically repulsed and riveted by 
the display of any disability on-screen. For instance, in the public hygiene 
propaganda film Are You Fit to marry? (1928), near the end of the mother’s 
dream sequence, she imagines an adult version of her disabled baby as 
father to a strange brood of other disabled children. The pro-eugenics film 
takes up an explicit argument informed by beliefs about pangenesis in 
the nineteenth century—in that one kind of disability can (d)evolve into 
a myriad of other forms of disability. Whereas the adult version named 
Claude has something akin to cerebral palsy (a nongenetic disorder in and 
of itself), his progeny have rickets, amputations, feeble-mindedness, and a 
host of other unspecified maladies. One can only speculate that a psychic 
response cultivated in 1928 was a viewer’s moral and aesthetic recoil in 
horror at the sight of disability-begetting-disability-begetting-disability.
 But in our graduate seminar for students in disabled and disability 
studies at the University of Illinois of Chicago, viewers tend to find the 
above scenario ludicrous rather than repulsive. They may chuckle at the 
misinformed medical notions of an earlier decade, but mostly the students 
struggle to put themselves back into a mind-set where the mere sight of 
disability can be turned into a visual rhetoric of horror and distaste. The 
distinction between these two audiences, one admittedly imagined and 
projected into the past, says a great deal about the distance one travels in a 
course on representations of disability and cinema. Film study challenges 
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us to not dismiss a prior era’s more pleasurable misinformation, but, more 
importantly, to trace out a longstanding tradition of representational strat-
egies that continue to inform cinematic technique and influence concepts 
of “simply native” reactions to bodies. Consequently, even a film now 
some seventy-five years old can strike a contemporary audience as less 
farcical than proof of the degree to which new disability cinema must take 
up combat with a degrading visual inheritance. Documentary, after all, 
just like horror, melodrama, and pornography, makes bargains to demon-
strate “real life” emotions—to bring forth the most credible and empirical 
insider account of disability truths and existence.
 In other words, a course in the history of disability cinema still brings 
one face-to-face with a sense of the wreckage that can be wrought by gen-
erations of repeated representational patterns (such as those identified in 
our reconfiguring of Williams’s “Anatomy of Disabled Bodies in Film” 
chart) that function to the detriment of disabled people’s social identity. At 
the same time, we study ways that the anticipation of pleasurable infor-
mation and spectacle for an audience has shifted genealogically across 
time.
 For instance, the scene mentioned above from Are You Fit to marry? 
exhibits a “grotesque” fantasy about the progeny of the disabled protag-
onist in a series of medium shots where the mere presence of physical 
and cognitive disability is intended to be evidence enough of the horrible 
future that awaits the mother’s baby if she allows him to undergo a life-
saving surgery at birth. The medium shot itself proves suggestive of any 
number of medical textbook photographs where an individual body is 
used as a stand-in for a generic disability type. Horror, in other words, is 
mobilized not only in the proliferation of a host of disabled bodies and 
the consequent social stigma that they bear, but also in the easy appeal to 
objectifying representational methods in medicine.
 In a contemporary disability documentary such as Diane Maroger’s 
Forbidden maternity (2002), one also gains an intimacy with many disabled 
characters. But in order to counter the eugenics sensation of “something 
gone awry” in a lineage of defective progeny, Maroger employs a variety 
of techniques, settings, and dramatic situations that refuse to allow audi-
ences to take up distance from, or distaste of, the presence of disabled 
bodies. Long shots, close-ups, and nonstandard framing give audiences 
an intimacy with disabled bodies usually reserved for private or clinical 
settings. In addition, Maroger also employs a cast of other disabled social 
intimacies that the documentary’s main characters—Nathalie and Ber-
trand—have consciously sought out as an alternative support network to 
a repressive familial situation.
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 So we meet not only the two main characters, who both have cerebral 
palsy, but also their journalist friend, who has CP as well, and a host of 
other disabled children who now occupy the institution that they both 
grew up within. The film assumes a knowingness and comfort with this 
visual variety of bodily forms that move into and out of the alternative 
domestic and public space that Nathalie and Bertrand establish. In fact, 
the object of horror and the sadomasochistic associations that the genre 
traditionally employs are directly inverted in new disability documen-
tary cinema by virtue of the fact that the audience is situated to respond 
with repulsion at the debasing mind-set that dominates the characters’ 
interactions with an able-bodied world. Here is the key point: whereas the 
proselytizers of the eugenics period denoted the disabled body as the objectionable 
object within a sea of normalcy, new disability documentary cinema designates 
degrading social contexts as that which need to be rehabilitated.
 But a mind-set is often difficult to depict, particularly when one seeks 
to designate a generalized and amorphous dominant perspective about 
people with disabilities—one that is ubiquitous and yet dispersed through 
evidence that comes only by way of compiled documents and numerous 
investigations and paperwork, pieced together incrementally over the 
course of a lifetime. Surely, as Mark Sherry has demonstrated, disability 
hate crime does exist, but many of the serious troubles of disability exis-
tence can be compiled only through the series of deflections, distrust, and 
disavowals that are reserved for disabled bodies in apparently separate 
and contingent moments of excessive care and discrimination.
 By and large, Forbidden maternity lingers on details that might seem 
too inconsequential in its depiction of Bertrand and Nathalie’s life. For 
example, near the middle of the film there’s an extended scene shot in the 
kitchen of their apartment where Bertrand makes salad with a friend who 
has come over to share dinner with the couple. Whereas Hollywood would 
rarely “waste” footage in the recording of such a seemingly innocuous 
scenario, Forbidden maternity recognizes that one of its main oppositions 
is the mainstream supposition that disabled people are unduly dependent 
and cannot manage the details of lower-middle-class domestic life. Salad 
mixing, without some gut-wrenching and dramatic circumstance going 
on around it, would end up on the cutting room floor of most Hollywood 
productions. In disability documentary cinema this minutia of detail must 
be captured as the essence of the argument.
 In many ways these films function as the empirical evidence captured 
visually that sets out to refute, in the same way that a developed quali-
tative research project can, scientific formulas about the management of 
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disability and our false reliance on a myth of personal independence. 
The day-to-day details are the point because it is at this most basic level of 
modern existence that bureaucracies have doubted the ability of people 
with disabilities to manage their own affairs. In this sense the new docu-
mentary disability cinema’s focus on singular case studies opposes much 
of today’s science on disability, which seeks to generalize management 
and control schemes for disabled multitudes who are all discounted from 
the start from being able to coexist with their non-disabled peers. Such 
a context of systemic doubt and suspicion entails scenes that ask people 
with mobility impairments to perform their walking gait as “proof” that 
they need a handicap parking pass or to answer to security guards about 
their intention to pay for an item just because they are in a wheelchair.
 Such a point can also be found in a video such as When Billy Broke His 
Head (1995) where the filmmaker-narrator (Billy Golfus), who has recently 
experienced a traumatic brain injury, visits a veritable bevy of disabled 
activists and community members who suddenly populate his social 
landscape with a variety of previously unfamiliar disability perspectives. 
For instance, we visit the disabled musician Larry kegan, who shares the 
details of his personal dressing habits with the protagonist, and by exten-
sion his audience, as a way of further underscoring the complex nego-
tiation of even the most routine rituals of everyday life. Or we ride with 
Billy sitting next to a woman driver with a neurological disability who 
navigates the streets of her hometown in her modern equipped van with 
“only one minor traffic ticket in nine years.” Such incidents significantly 
parallel the salad-mixing scene mentioned above in that they portray dis-
abled people engaged in common activities that become extraordinarily 
uncommon, and even unlikely, within societies that seek to restrain, seg-
regate, and institutionalize disabled people on behalf of their differences.
 When viewers enter into these new disability documentary media 
landscapes, they discover immediately that routine activities refute the 
opposition to disabled people’s freedom as a denial of the right to pursue 
lives that are recognizably ordinary. For a generation weaned on spectac-
ular images, gravity-defying special effects, and the digitized erasure of 
appendages, the new landscape of disability documentary at first strikes 
one as anything but “spectacular” in comparison to the well-worn for-
mulas of body genres. These films work to unfold arguments that demand 
a focus upon activities that have been all but ousted from traditional 
Hollywood fare. Our new disability documentary cinema strives, first 
and foremost, to make an ordinary life with disability imaginable and 
even palatable to those of us who have inherited a bankrupt tradition of 
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disability imagery. This demand upon the audiences of new disability 
documentary cinema involves what the cultural critic Michael Ventura 
explains as the imaginative leap of identifying with a character who is 
not “conventionally beautiful”: “But the face of Helen keller was marked 
by her enormous powers of concentration, while to cast the face of Mare 
Winningham in the role is to suggest, powerfully, that one can come back 
from the depths unscathed. No small delusion is being sold here” (177).
 What one can also glean from the examples above, and what can be 
extended to a film such as our first documentary production, Vital Signs: 
Crip Culture Talks Back (1996), are that singular portrayals of people with 
disabilities are a staple and contrivance of popular genre filmmaking. 
Whereas in genre film the viewer consumes representations of disability 
one character at a time and most often follows that lone figure into an 
either/or resolution of death or cure (“the only two acceptable states” 
according to the disabled writer Anne Finger), new disability documentary 
cinema seeks to counter with the portrayal of disability ensembles (257).
 One could argue that the primary convention of this new documen-
tary genre is the effort to turn disability into a chorus of perspectives that 
deepen and multiply narrow cultural labels that often imprison disabled 
people within taxonomic medical categories. The medical model speci-
fies a generalized body type that can be presumably true for all bodies 
within a classificatory rubric of disorder. While disability documentary 
films do not seek to repress, suppress, or erase the fact of differing biolog-
ical capacities and appearances (as is sometimes charged in critiques of 
disability studies), they do seek to refute pathological classifications that 
prove too narrow and limiting to encompass an entire human life lived. 
For instance, in the above-mentioned film Forbidden maternity, Bertrand 
and Nathalie’s disabled journalist friend explains:
As a person with C.P. I’ve always had to fight to explain those two let-
ters that were my two letters—the letters that qualified me and always 
required an explanation. People could see I was disabled. I was obviously 
mobility impaired given the way my legs were. But when I mentioned 
“cerebral,” they’d say, “cerebral?” From the way you speak one wouldn’t 
guess you’re cerebrally handicapped. So I’d say, “I’m not cerebrally handi-
capped. I have cerebral palsy. In other words, when I was born my brain 
was wounded and this had consequences. In my case, this resulted in 
walking difficulties. In another person with C.P. it may result in speech 
impediment or trouble using the hands. That’s what cerebral means. I 
never said mental. It seems to me you’re confusing the words cerebral and 
mental.
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To confuse the word “cerebral” with the word “mental” is to attempt 
to malign one form of disability with another. Conditions become stig-
matized by virtue of the fact that we allow attributes to endlessly bleed 
into further disorders. Thus disability exists on a lethal, medicalized con-
tinuum where ascriptions of inferiority deepen and further disqualify 
bodies.
 As a result, people with physical disabilities find themselves refuting 
cognitive “involvements” (such as in the case of CP); and, in turn, people 
with cognitive disabilities find themselves having to charge those with 
physical disabilities with a further sedimenting of their own socially 
derived stigma. However, in either case the effort finds itself impossible 
because the fates of both groups are historically tethered to each other. 
Eugenics beliefs used physical disabilities and deformities to reference 
the “feeblemindedness” residing within, and those who tested below a 
certain IQ level found themselves standing naked in front of medical 
personnel searching for the inevitable physical stigmata (Mitchell and 
Snyder, ”Out of the Ashes”). Today, those most likely to be institutional-
ized, as Frederick Wiseman’s “Multi-handicapped” documentary series 
(1986) about the Talladega, Alabama, institution for Deaf-Blind people 
demonstrates, are consistently designated as residing among the “mul-
tiply disabled.”
 In addition, while it may seem surprising or even odd to be rehearsing 
the diagnostic fine points of the multiple permutations of individual 
experience of a disorder (in a particular environment enfolding a par-
ticular body), the point of the new disability documentary cinema is not 
to refuse impairment (as many contend even in disability studies) (Fin-
kelstein 30–36; Shakespeare 293–300; Barnes 577–80). Rather, these films 
insist on recognition of a more complex human constellation of experi-
ences that inform medical categories such as cerebral palsy. One must 
essentially explode the classification’s rigid yet often amorphous parame-
ters in order to recognize a more multiple and variegated existence within 
its boundaries.
 To momentarily return to Vital Signs, a similar principle is at stake. 
Rather than foreground a singular voice capable of refuting the inhu-
manity and derision that disabled people associate with their most incon-
sequential social interactions, the video orchestrates a panoply of dis-
ability perspectives that multiply and exponentially represent what used 
to be inaccurately referred to as “the disability experience.” The point of 
the film is not merely to present a chorus of voices all working in tandem 
but rather to capture the diversity, originality, and vitality of vantage 
points that comprise contemporary disability communities. Thus when 
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the disabled performance artist Cheryl Marie Wade says that “they can 
have their little telethons as long as we are on there [the television] doing 
all the other things we do,” an alternative perspective from Bob DeFe-
lice promptly counters that “I love telethons. I absolutely love them!” 
(Vital Signs). Like all vibrant subcultures, disability culture is diffuse and 
orchestrates multiple perspectives, as well as bodies, somatic systems, 
and minds.
 After a showing of Vital Signs at a conference of special educators 
in Chicago, the first respondent in the audience exclaimed, “Wow! All 
those people are so articulate and in control of their life stories. They’re 
nothing like the disabled people that we see in classes every day.” After 
mulling over the meaning of the comment, we realized the point was that 
the video paraded a somewhat idiosyncratic and articulate group of dis-
abled people who diverge wildly from the monotonous and misbehaved 
students who populate special education classes across the country. In 
response, we argued that disability documentary cinema was not a show-
casing of a transcendent point of view but rather a visceral rewriting of 
the way that we understand disability. The subjects in Vital Signs are not 
about the singular insights of atypical disabled people, but rather about 
the creativity that sparks and energizes disabled people when they find 
themselves amongst a community of their peers, performing their knowl-
edge and strategies for an audience that is anxious to learn the fine points 
of social negotiation in such hostile environments.
 What shifts most radically in this scenario is not the persons depicted 
but the way one comprehends disability experience as the stoke to cre-
ativity—as opposed to tragedy, burden, misfortune, and the categories 
that populate most IEP forms. The new disability documentary cinema 
changes the terms upon which our understanding of disability experi-
ence rests. In Vital Signs, the Irish disabled performance artist Mary Duffy 
explains this dilemma succinctly when she comments, “most people 
approach me as if: you’re a walking, talking disabled person. you’re 
not supposed to talk back.” This prototypical and gratuitous exchange 
highlights the fact that the social expectations of disabled people are so 
low that even the most cursory interaction promotes shock and disbelief. 
But the documentary is charged with instilling a new narrative pleasure: 
the request to have disabled persons with their unique postures, such as 
Mary Duffy, about disability-based insights and her own body’s/life’s 
exemplarity of it.
 The follow-up comment to this somewhat disconcerting first observa-
tion at the special education conference was from teachers who worried 
about showing the film to their students for fear that disabled kids would 
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be turned off by being pegged as the “expert” on disability experience. 
As if they hadn’t already been defined as detrimentally different within 
the normative classroom of most educational settings! In other words, the 
expressed concern was largely one that struggles with what it means to be 
singled out and stigmatized for a difference that has been noticed but not 
openly discussed. What if individual students have acquired a range of 
knowledge and experience that the teacher lacks? Our own approach to 
this issue is that without adequate pedagogical contexts about disability 
history and experience (such as those available in the new disability doc-
umentary cinema), disabled students will continue to drift and perform 
well below many of their non-disabled peers. Indeed in surveys of dis-
abled student achievement in U.S. public education, only students with a 
developed disabled identity manage to perform at or above the academic 
level of non-disabled students. Such a fact calls for a redress of our public 
school curricula that continue to erase disability content from the canon 
of Western culture. Just as female students and students of color tend to 
flourish in educational settings that promote the insights of their own 
communities in history, disabled students will continue to find education 
largely irrelevant as long as it sidelines their experiences and body differ-
ences as insignificant or beside the point.
Cinematic interventions
In closing we’d like to briefly return to our discussion of disability in 
historical context. One of the primary insights of the eugenics era was 
that disability proved to be a uniquely modern phenomenon: we had 
orchestrated a culture so fast-moving, complex, and demanding that 
many bodies could not adequately keep up. yet, despite this accurate 
depiction of contemporary modern life, the fatal flaw in eugenics theory 
was that rather than targeting the social context as something in need of 
repair, disabled bodies themselves became the targeted sites of interven-
tion. Thus efforts at cure, rehabilitation, segregation, prevention—even 
extermination—dominate the arsenal of eugenics’ approaches toward 
disabled bodies. Disabled bodies were at the forefront of modern inno-
vation: on the frontlines in their experience of how intervention upon 
the body has become a primary means of redress in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries (hence the proliferation of a vast array of therapies 
and social services).
 Popular film genres, such as those discussed in this essay, developed 
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accordingly by sporting a host of interventions to alleviate individual 
bodies of their socially derived stigma. In the 1950s, the first starring role 
for Marlon Brando in The men (1950) featured the wonders of a newly 
minted rehabilitation industry that could successfully adjust even a para-
plegic’s incapacitated body; in the 1970s a spate of returning-veterans 
films foreground sex as the root of an appropriate personal adjustment 
to postwar disability. Melodramas such as Forrest Gump miraculously 
repair the bodies of double-amputees as a solution to the conundrum 
that disability has been made to present. As mentioned above, even more 
recently, horror films such as Hannibal promote the expendability of phys-
ically disabled bodies to the more fashionable and cultured exploits of 
“psychotic” cannibalism. All these films trade upon a dominant oppo-
sition in the post-eugenics period that is involved in extreme efforts to 
“fix” disabled people in order to alleviate society of the need to be more 
inclusive and accommodating of difference.
 In contrast, the new disability documentary cinema seeks to target 
the rightful site of meaningful intervention, namely, a lethal and brutal 
social context. Rather than identifying different bodies as the appropriate 
source of intervention, uncomprehending social systems have begun to 
be targeted as a necessary domain of social commentary in film. All three 
of our documentary examples cited above foreground disabled bodies 
while interrogating contemporary social management systems that seek 
to survey, manage, and control nearly every aspect of their existence. 
New disability documentary cinema captures uncomprehending interac-
tions between disabled persons and the bureaucracies that ensnare them. 
In Forbidden maternity, Bertrand and Nathalie must solicit the help of a 
social worker in order to refute their institutional records that portray 
both of them as victims of “profound mental deficiencies.” In When Billy 
Broke His Head, the narrator must show up at the welfare office in person 
to get his reduced SSI checks reinstated to the paltry amount of $522 per 
month. In Vital Signs, disabled artists turn their objectifying experiences 
within the medical industry into social commentaries about the eradica-
tion of their humanity in medical theatres and public-stripping clinical 
settings.
 Rather than target the body as the site of intervention, the new dis-
ability documentary cinema targets the social services, rehabilitation, and 
medical industries as a more appropriate site of revision. These films tend 
to target those institutions that were initially designed to accommodate 
disability’s “endless” differences. yet, instead of flexible systems, contem-
porary institutions reveal themselves as efforts in the endless monopoli-
zation of all the details of one’s existence. They become equal-opportu-
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nity sites of discrimination that extract disabled people from pursuing 
their lives by entrenching them in a morass of legalistic and bureaucratic 
paperwork. When viewed collectively, these films give one the sense that 
our post-eugenic era specializes in keeping disabled people busy so that 
they demand less of the outside world as active participants.
 This is a wholly different take from the other world of body genres 
where people don’t want to have their pleasures politicized. All the films 
that return disabled charges to institutions—or, worse, offer euthanasia—
as a meaningful resolution (and we can even offer films with spectacular 
and complex disability-identified perspectives such as One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest [1975], Rain man [1988], Girl, Interrupted [2000]), summon up 
assurances about the beneficence of therapists, modern social organiza-
tions, and incarcerating stone walls beneath “soothing” adobe façades. 
Most disability narratives, however experimental, eventually do end 
up trying to prove that every white coat means well in returning us to 
safekeeping—on-screen, through a window, where we witness disability 
experiences managed by comfortable quarters, as if filmed through a 
soft-focus filter. Such a patronizing impulse is well characterized at the 
conclusion of minority Report (2002) when the protagonist (Tom Cruise) 
whisks off his autistic female charge for safekeeping on an island. There, 
presumably, she will both be shielded from the incomprehensions and 
exploitative tendencies of able-bodied culture while also finding her fem-
inine passivity redeemed by his sexual interests. And it is in film that we 
encounter disability largely as a “plight to be conquered” as long as when 
the lights come up, we don’t find the same bodies blocking the aisles on 
our way back to the theatre lobby.
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Mata Hari (Greta Garbo) descends toward her executioners, as Lt. Alexis Rosanoff 
(Ramon Novarro), her blind lover, “looks on.” Mata Hari. Directed by George Fitzmau-
rice. MGM, 1931.
We include here as a coda Anne Finger’s short story, which serves as a 
ficto-critical reading of disability and film. By introducing a protagonist 
(and her friend) observing the film under discussion, Finger implicates 
readers as both viewers and critics, as some combination of analysis and 
projected film “topic.” Throughout her story, Finger challenges the struc-
tures of storytelling as well as presenting a narrative through which such 
challenges meander. Right from the “opening credits” of the story, Finger 
projects storytelling itself as metafictional and shows how the story relies 
on readers and writer agreeing to a contract of suspended belief, mir-
roring the filmic contract viewers make with the unfolding film. They 
watch, they remember, they criticize, they enjoy. Through the story, Finger 
intertwines the role of film critics and film aficionados, and she delineates 
filmgoers’ complicated relationships with the films they love and con-
demn, the films into which they project themselves, and films that remain 
eternally problematic.
Blinded by the light, or: Where’s 
the rest of Me?
Anne Finger
A fictional character is limping towards a movie theatre.
 A fictional character? Let us give her a name.
 Irmgard.
 Irmgard? Where did that name come from?






 For it has occurred to me, in the course of writing that last sentence 
that Irmgard’s mother was a psychoanalyst, as was her mother before her. 
The name “Irmgard” and the family profession “psychoanalyst” are the 
tails of a kite, and attached to them, fluttering in the wind of history, is a 
chain of associations: Vienna, certain books which the grandmother nei-
ther burned nor hid, but during those years—for that is the shorthand 
with which the family refers to World War II—left on a shelf as if she had 
quite forgotten their existence, the necessary compromises made, etc., etc.
 The daughter of this grandmother married, in the 1950s, an Amer-
ican GI-doctor, drawn to his innocence as God must have been drawn to 
Mary’s. She was also, let us be perfectly frank, drawn to the chocolates 
and nylons and cigarettes from the PX; and spurred into marriage by the 
intense sexual frustration she suffered in a world de-populated of men; 
and to the promise he offered of escape from history. She escaped from 
history all right; in fact, in her new-found home, she was not infrequently 
called upon to correct a certain confusion that existed in the minds of 
many between the countries of “Austria” and “Australia.”
 So Irmgard was born in kansas in the early 1960s to a mother who 
had discovered that the charms of innocence soon wear thin. Having fin-
ished her residency at the Menninger Clinic, Irmgard’s mother left hus-
band and decamped, infant daughter in tow, to Manhattan. She also jetti-
soned, under the guidance of her own psychoanalyst, a certain European 
remoteness—it had never occurred to her, until she reached these shores, 
that parents might be other than emotionally remote—and assumed the 
guise of a true 1950s Mom, baking cookies in the evenings and experi-
encing guilt over her divorce and her failure to have breastfed Irmgard.
 Along with shortening her clumsy name to Irma, Irmgard declined to 
go into what was practically the family business. She has become instead 
a professor of English. She strayed from the fold, but, to be quite frank, 
not all that far from the fold. Irma would be quite happy if she never 
again heard the words “unconscious” or “hostility,” which, when they 
issued forth from her mother’s mouth, invariably seemed to be uttered 
with a frisson of Sphinx-like disdain. Add Irmgard to that list of literary 
daughters who exist in a state of vague and constant irritation at their 
literary mothers.
l
But while we have been teasing free that bit of yarn which protruded 
from the tangled skein of the unconscious, Irma has been limping steadily 














































newspapers and singing, in a revivalist-preacher’s voice: “Street Spir-
rit! Get your Street Spir-rit! Help the home-less. Street Spir-rit!” and the 
dreadlocked white kids who have seated themselves on the sidewalk in 
front of the movie theater holding a sign of torn brown cardboard which 
reads, “MONEY FOR POT, PLEASE.”
 What causes Irma’s limp?
 It could be any number of things:
 A broken heel on her shoe?
 A nasty fall while running—or maybe playing rugby—which has 
resulted in a sprained ankle?
 We all know that disability requires a narrative. (Although my own 
child, at the age of four, once asked me: How come I’m not disabled? one 
of his endless childish questions which I found impossible to answer.)
 Now Irma is stepping up to the box office and saying, “One disabled, 
for Mata Hari.” Through the invocation of this magic word, “disabled,” 
she pays six dollars for her ticket, instead of nine, and gains admission to 
this Sunday afternoon movie, part of a series this multiplex is running in 
one of its mini-theaters, Classics of the Hollywood Cinema.
 I am going to give Irma something more than a limp: I am giving her 
a pair of forearm crutches in fire-engine red. Why? It suits my purposes, 
I say, as enigmatically as Irma’s mother.
 “Last theater on your left,” the ticket taker says. “The ramp’s on your 
right.”
 This being a theater built within the past ten years, the ramp is as vis-
ible as the stairs, and Irma experiences a momentary frisson of irritation, 
which she suppresses, her mind not even forming the words, “After all, 
she means well, even if it’s a stupid thing to say.”
 Now Irma leans against the wall, bending her right leg at an angle, 
a flamingo-like posture. She is waiting. This act of waiting, which, in 
the days before her disability, was languorous, tinged with eroticism, a 
chance for her to exchange with others cool if brief looks of sexual regard, 
has now become something quite different: No she does not need any 
door opened for her; yes, she sees the ramp; I’m fine, I’m fine, I’m fine, 
she sings, her cripple’s song.
 She waits, and watches with unfocused eyes the passage of people in 
and out of her field of vision, the candy and popcorn counter opposite. 
When she was a kid, her eating in the movies was hemmed in by elabo-
rate rituals. She allowed herself popcorn, provided that she bit off and 
slowly masticated each knurl before allowing herself the belly. Using this 
method of eating, a small container of popcorn would last her through 
an entire movie, and give her the simultaneous sense of having gorged 
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herself—she had, after all, eaten for two hours without stopping!—and of 
having her appetites strictly under her control.
 When she was twelve or thirteen, she began to buy, instead of popcorn, 
nonpareils, wafers of chocolate flecked with white spheres of crystallized 
sugar. While those enormous figures on the screen above her kissed—for 
she had begun to frequent the sorts of movies where kissing went on—
she would slip one of these wafers into her mouth—the speckled side 
against her tongue, and then press her tongue against the roof of her 
mouth. Whenever she did this, she would remember once having bitten 
into a bar of unsweetened baking chocolate she had discovered in the 
cupboard, and how she had spat and spat, trying to spit the taste from her 
mouth. As the candy dissolved slowly in her mouth she would feel the 
chocolate mixing with saliva and streaming down over her tongue, her 
teeth, wending its way through the caverns and crevices of her mouth. 
Once a stream of chocolate-drool had escaped from the corner of her 
mouth, and Eleanor Martin, seated next to her, had said, “Gross!” and 
then whispered Irma’s sin in the collective ear of the other girls: She was 
drooling! Drooling like an idiot!
 But now, a woman with a long white cane is saying, “Irma!”
 “Linda!”
 The two women kiss, lip on cheek, lip on cheek. Waiting long? 
No, just . . . The bus was late. Well, I was already . . . I must have been late, 
too, because really, I’ve only been waiting . . . Have you seen this movie 
before? . . . The Million Dollar Movie, when I was a kid . . . I think I must 
have been a gay man in a previous life, because . . . 
 They have been to the movies together before, these two, so they 
know the drill: Irma needs the left aisle, and Linda up close.
 The lights go down, and the darkness rises up around them, velvet 
and close.
 Irma is arranging herself in her seat. Prior to the amputation of her 
own left leg, she had heard, of course, of phantom pain. She had imag-
ined it as the body’s banshee wail of mourning, as wild and raging as 
a mother’s cry of grief for a lost child, Ronald Reagan’s tortured filmic 
shout: Where’s the rest of me? Where’s the rest of me? Ahabian, chthonic, 
frenzied, inconsolable. She hadn’t imagined that her loss would be sharp, 
specific: that certain positions of her upper leg against a movie-theater 
seat would put pressure on a short-circuited nerve so that she would 
experience a niggling, slight, but nonetheless annoying phantom itch that 
wanted scratching. Her amputation did not make her aware of the indif-
ference of the universe—she had already known that perfectly well—but 
of quirkier things, closer to home: the length of movie seats in movie 
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theatres, for instance.
 “Too many previews,” Linda grouses, sotto voce.
 “I love previews,” Irma whispers back. “I wish life could be pre-
views.”
 Irma feels a pang of disappointment in this comment of Linda’s: 
Linda is a rather new friend, recently hired in another department at the 
university. Irma has been so excited that at last there’s another disabled 
faculty member—and that it is Linda, who is nearly as acerbic as she is 
smart—that she had hoped the two of them would agree on everything 
from the superiority of Black and Green organic chocolate over Scharf-
fenberger to the subject of previews before a film.
 The color drains from the screen: MGM’s lion roars beneath the motto: 
Ars gratia artis. Words fill the screen: Greta Garbo. Ramon Navarro. Mata 
Hari. And the music comes up, vaguely oriental and sinuous.
 Military men standing in straight lines, banging their drums and 
blowing into their bugles, a volley of shots, one man slumps dead; another 
volley of shots, another man slumps dead.
 Irma shuts her eyes. Since she has herself become disabled, she has 
allowed herself to again undertake these exercises, which she used to 
do as a child: to imagine herself, briefly, blind, or demented. Sometimes 
she imagines that instead of having had her left leg amputated, she is 
missing her right. Now, with the eye—that tyrant of the senses—off-duty, 
she attends to the dialogue on-screen:
 Two men volley demands:
 “Look, is any woman worth that?”
 “Surely you regret having betrayed your country.”
 With her eyes shut, Irma becomes preternaturally aware, not only of 
the dialogue, but of the sounds of candy being unwrapped, a persistent 
and annoying scrich-scrich-scrich—someone rummaging in a plastic car-
rier bag, perhaps—a dull and distant roar of traffic in the streets beyond.
 But with sight asleep, the rich and invisible sensory life going on 
around it rises to her consciousness. She has rebelled against the sort 
of Freudian religion in which she was raised, and collects strange tales 
about psychoanalysis as some lapsed Catholics do about the Church and 
its saints. She thinks of Freud’s early, abandoned obsession with the nose, 
and wonders if that, not dreams, isn’t the true royal road to the uncon-
scious. Despite his obsession with scopophilia, the primal scene, of which 
he made so much, is far more likely to have come to us via the ear than 
via our sight.
 She opens her eyes, more to mute the intensity of her aural concentra-
tion than anything else.
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 “Come on. Out with it. Who is she? Tell us, you fool,” she hears one 
of the two officials say to a goggle-eyed Byronic man tied to the post, who 
now utters the Garboesque sentence: “Let me alone.”
 “Oh, shoot him,” says the hardboiled flic, with no more emotion than 
he would show ordering a glass of wine.
 “It’s Mata Hari,” the detective knows it is: she’s bewitched all of Paris.
 “Ah well, some dance and some die.”
 “And some do both.”
 And then Mata Hari is sauntering onto the stage, past turbaned men 
who, seated cross-legged on the floor, play a variety of exotic instruments. 
She is executing a sacramental bump-and-grind before the statue of a 
multi-armed Balinese god. Small wonder tout Paris goes wild for her: 
after all, she is fleshing out the intercourse between heaven and earth 
at the heart of the Christian myth, although its representation in that 
bailiwick is quite a bit more sedate, Mary usually being shown with a 
look on her face that can be translated as “Oh, dear me!” Whereas Mata 
Hari—whose name is Malay for Eye of the Dawn—slinks onto stage with 
a panther step and then starts swiveling her hips and offering herself up, 
body and soul, to the remote statue who looks down at her in enigmatic 
silence.
 After a bit more narrative filler, the film approaches what Irma 
has been waiting for, the love scene between Greta Garbo and Ramon 
Navarro. It’s what she remembers from watching this movie with her 
friend Sharon’s mother on the television in their den: how old had Irma 
been then? Ten or eleven, still slogging through life bent under the weight 
of the name “Irmgard.”
 After being downright cruel to the poor lad in the previous scenes—
when he, with boyish ebullience, strew flowers at her feet, which she 
stepped over as if they were trash on the street—Garbo has come to 
Ramon’s quarters in Paris. She stands, lithe as a panther, in her Nefertiti-
meets-Catwoman costumes, peeling her gloves slowly off first one finger, 
then the next, then the next.
 Of course, at the age of eleven, a sequined Adrian gown was quite 
impossible for Irmgard to obtain, as were Mata Hari’s bejeweled cloches 
and sinuous veils and the tiered pagoda crown she wore when dancing: 
but a pair of gloves, those she could have. After first seeing this movie, 
she set aside her girlish mittens and wore only gloves. Alone in her bed-
room, she would put on her gloves and remove them slowly, finger by 
finger, freeing, one after another, the five miniature phalluses she carried 
about with her on each of her two hands. Does she remember this? No, 
she has squashed it back into the dark corner of the jumbled closet of her 
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unconscious. She is also quite unaware that, as she watches this scene, she 
is folding and refolding her hands together in her lap.
 It’s an odd audience that foregoes the lure of sun and air to sit in the 
darkness on a sunny Sunday afternoon: film buffs and gay men, mostly. 
Here’s Ramon Navarro—he-vamp extraordinaire, Mexican homosexual 
(the studio described him as being descended from Aztec royalty to make 
it quite clear he wasn’t the kind of Mexican who might tend a viewer’s 
garden or wash her dishes, and explained his bachelor status by his being 
devoted to his large family of numerous brothers and sisters). Navarro 
was later in life to be murdered by a pair of male hustlers he’d brought 
to his home in the Hollywood Hills. He’s pretending to be a Russian het-
erosexual, Lt. Alexis Rosanoff (on film, he doesn’t seem to be working 
very hard on the heterosexual aspect of things; nonetheless, women of 
the day went gaga for him. Perhaps Irma’s mother could answer Freud’s 
question “What do women want?” with “Among other things, somewhat 
effeminate gay men as fantasy lovers.”)
 And opposite him? Greta Garbo, who had the habit of referring to 
herself as a male: I first came here when I was a young boy . . . I was just a 
young lad . . . I’m not a normal man, so I can’t do what other people do . . . The 
Swedish actress portrays a heterosexual Dutch woman, Mata Hari—née 
Margaretha Geertruida Zelle, a dark orchid among blonde buttercups. A 
five-year-stint in Sumatra with an officer-husband of the Dutch Colonial 
Army transformed her into a speaker of Malay, a wearer of a translucent 
sarong, a woman to whom, when she was in the grip of a typhoid fever, 
dancing Hindu gods and goddesses appeared. Pictures close to the time 
of her execution for spying show her to have been plump and forty, with 
the sort of fleshy arms Irma keeps at bay with daily pumping of weights.
 It’s the one scene Irma remembers from decades ago. Alexis is gazing 
at an icon of the Madonna and saying: “My mother made a pilgrimage to 
the shrine of miracles to get it for me. It’s about a hundred miles from our 
town,” and the air in the dark theatre shivers with a sense of lust flavored 
with ironic detachment.
 “What is it supposed to do? Bring you luck?” asks Garbo.
 “It guards you from evil,” says Ramon. “I had to kneel before the altar 
and promise mother I would always keep a flame burning in front of it.”
 “Ra-mon! Ra-mon!” a male voice moans from the back of the theatre.
 The actors on the screen, eternally unaware of the audience, march 
on; although the general laughter that follows that passionate cry drowns 
out Garbo’s next words: “And have you kept that promise?” The film is 
a rock in a river, and the audience is the water moving around it, some-
times raging, sometimes in doldrums, ever in flux.
| Coda214
 Irma, despite her Ph.D. and her own finely developed ironic sensibili-
ties, feels a bit mocked herself, as if the love for sweet Ramon she had 
experienced as an eleven-year-old were now being held up for public 
ridicule. (Truth to tell, she had remembered the scene as even more high 
camp than this: that Ramon’s mama had walked not only a hundred 
miles to fetch this icon for her boy, but that she had walked on her knees. 
In the snow.)
 Ramon kneels before Greta, saying: “I love you as one adores sacred 
things.” When Irma was eleven, it had seemed not only possible but 
expected that someday a man would say such a thing to her. But no man 
ever had, nor had they thrown flowers at her feet, nor had a total stranger 
ever slipped an expensive ring on her finger, etc. No man has ever said of 
her, as Alexis said of Mata Hari earlier in the film: “I would give my right 
arm to meet her.”
 And now? Watching this scene is a bit like listening to the Sex Pistols 
doing “My Way.” Irma experiences both the grandiloquent soar and the 
mocking of the grandiloquent soar.
 The stump of Irma’s amputated leg starts to throb. She shifts posi-
tion, easing her weight from her left cheek to her right and then back 
again, pressing the places where her flesh joins her prosthesis. It took her 
a while, after her amputation, to master the art of sitting for any length 
of time, and during that period she developed a critical strictness that 
would have made her mother proud. Her mother had once regarded a 
row of women on the beach, reading murder mysteries and romances, 
and sneered, “I myself should prefer to stare at the horizon.” Irma had 
been intolerant of self-indulgent theatrical productions and dance per-
formances that sought to dazzle the audience with a fiery show. On the 
other hand, she championed any production, filmic or theatrical, which 
made her forget her pain. But now, she has become adept at the hundreds 
of minute accommodations her body must make in the course of an eve-
ning; she will even remove her prosthesis if her comfort warrants it.
 Irma glances at Linda, who is staring at the screen, and wonders what 
she sees. Linda is what is variously called legally blind, low vision, imper-
fectly blind.
 Spies standing in the rain; secret passageways; 1917 versions of high-
tech spy-gear; a traitor who may be a double-agent and must be done 
away with: and then, the chief German spy, with his Leninesque goatee, 
is calling “Jacques,” and disability limps on-screen. The poor word—
“limp”—it is called upon to cover so many differing gaits, from a stiff-
legged hesitation to this clumping lurch. All the film shows of Jacques as 
he enters the frame is a close-up of his lower legs. One of his feet might 
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belong, perhaps not to a romantic lead, but to Rosanoff’s orderly or to 
one of the twelve men of the firing squad, or to the in-sync marching 
soldiers. His other leg is shortened, his shoe has an enormous wedge on 
the bottom of it. Clearly he is one who might say he was born deform’d, 
unfinished, sent before my time/Into this breathing world, scarce half made up. 
Off he gallumps, Carlotta screams, wicked Mata scarcely winces.
 And Irma?
 The smooth flow of the narrative broke when Jacques’s feet entered 
the frame. Surely, she saw this scene when she watched the movie decades 
before? But it left no marker, no trace. She feels a kinship with the girl she 
once was, who imagined that someday she, dressed in a sequined gown, 
would be taken into the arms of a man like Ramon Navarro, who would 
say to her: I adore you, as one adores sacred things. But what of the girl 
who saw that crippled foot and took so little notice of it that it left no trace 
in her memory? That girl is the enemy of the woman she is now.
 Sometimes friends ask her if she dreams of herself as “you know—
the way you were. Before.” In her dreams she is inside herself. It is a bit 
like asking herself if she dreams of herself as white. She supposes in her 
dreams she is an amputee: she certainly isn’t otherwise, but then again, 
she’s not particularly aware of it.
 It’s daydreams where things get tricky: those theatrical productions 
of her mind where she is simultaneously within and without, not just 
the star, but also the audience; the writer, director and producer, gaffer 
and best boy, too. Her mind always hesitates, there’s a brief hiccup in the 
fantasy while she inserts her gait, her prosthesis, her bright red pair of 
crutches.
 More fabulous clothes; more threats of betrayal; more hurried assig-
nations. And then Mata Hari, whose heart has been made of ice, finds it 
melting: she is going to be saved by the love of a good man.
 Not just any good man, it turns out: the love of a good disabled man. 
For plucky Lieutenant Rosanoff, as he carries the secret missives back to 
Russia (a country which Mata pronounces, her mouth caressing each syl-
lable, as Russh-ee-a) has been shot from the sky, and in his tumble to earth 
has been blinded—although fortunately and miraculously remaining 
unscathed in every other fashion.
 Mata goes to see him at the hospital, and there disabled bodies 
abound: maimed soldiers displaying their stumps, somnambulant shell-
shocked veterans, blind men who stare with catatonic wisdom into the 
void, etc., etc., etc., etc. And here is Alexis, lying abed with a magnificent 
white bandage wrapped around his head (exhibiting his new and heroic 
lack).
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 And then the film marches towards the final moments, when Alexis 
and Mata’s love proves as true as it is doomed: there’s Mata in the court-
room, on trial for treason, looking very Joan of Arc in the dock; of course, 
Alexis, being blind, all this can be kept from him. When he’s brought to 
her in the final moments of her life, he thinks he’s visiting her at a sani-
tarium, that she’s off to the operating room rather than off to the firing 
squad; and then Mata’s blissful moment as she is led off, glowing with 
the light of true love.
 As the words, “The End,” appear on the screen, Irma leans over, picks 
up her crutches from where they have been lying on the floor, and Linda’s 
cane snaps open.
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